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Chapter 1
Introduction
In 1995, Acer America Inc. forwent $ 20 million in profits by paying $ 10
million to air-freight monitors to keep up with surging demand - and $ 10 million
more to write down much of that same inventory later, when demand abated
(Business Week 1996). In 1997, movie fans flocked to their local Blockbuster
video stores eager to rent The English Patient and Jerry Maguire, only to find
that all ten or so copies of each had already been checked out. Blockbuster
shared their frustration. It knew it was annoying customers and losing sales
(Cachon and Lariviere 2001). In 2001, the world’s largest network-equipment
maker Cisco shocked investors when announcing a $ 2.69 billion inventory write-
off of surplus raw materials. Essentially, Cisco’s supply chain management had
misread demand by $ 2.5 billion, almost half as much as its sales in the quarter
concerned (Narayanan and Raman 2004).
The adverse implications of mismatches between available supply and mar-
ket demand for Acer’s, Blockbuster’s, and Cisco’s bottom line profits are ob-
vious, but the root causes are not easily understood. While supply-demand
mismatches are conveniently explained by incompetent or irrational behavior
on the part of the managers, this layman viewpoint is neither complete, nor
is it very satisfying to build a theory on irrational behavior in general, since
the latter cannot be refuted (Cachon 2003). Management decisions leading to
such painful outcomes for Acer, Blockbuster, and Cisco might in fact simply
reflect individually rational managerial responses to existing information and
incentives. Providing managers with appropriate incentives and information to
induce optimal decisions is a non-trivial task, because most of today’s value
creating supply networks span across multiple players with local objectives and
possibly private information, interacting in a strategic fashion. Unfortunately,
in a globalized world, the most pressing supply chain problems arise exactly in
such complex environments. On the bright side, finding solutions promise sub-
stantial increases of system efficacy. Not surprisingly, the optimal coordination
of decisions along the supply chain has attracted vast research attention during
the last decade. Adopting game-theoretic methodology, the field has success-
fully increased our understanding of how decentralized supply chains should be
designed and executed in an uncertain world.
However, is producing ever more sophisticated theory about optimal design
of supply chain processes, executed by fully rational managers, the answer to
those who seek to improve supply chain efficiency in real world settings? The
1
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widespread use of managerial rules of thumb and the persisting implementa-
tion of simple and (theoretically) non-coordinating incentive schemes in prac-
tice suggest the answer is no. When it comes to implementation, the success
of theoretically supported supply chain tools and techniques depends crucially
on the descriptive accuracy of their assumptions on managerial behavior. Since
real people are the common factor in real world supply chain processes, we need
a better understanding of human behavior in order to improve these processes.
Further mathematical models are unlikely to be up the task, the least so if they
keep sticking to the their restrictive assumptions that people are 1) not a major
factor in the phenomena under study, 2) deterministic in their actions, 3) pre-
dictable in their actions, 4) independent of others, 5) not part of the product,
6) emotionless and 7) observable (Boudreau 2003).
The emerging field of Behavioral Operations Management has started revis-
iting these assumptions in order to step towards a descriptively more accurate
operations theory, without dismissing valuable complementary insights that can
be provided by mathematical models. Not surprisingly, we observe accumulating
evidence that supply chain models fail to reflect accurately the decision mak-
ers’ actual goals and the decision makers’ response to model parameter changes
(Bendoly et al. 2006).
This thesis contributes to this emerging body of knowledge through empiri-
cal tests of risk sharing arrangements frequently investigated in the supply chain
literature. The structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 first provides
the normative framework, including a presentation of the newsvendor model as
the technical backbone of many supply chain models. We then review existing
evidence on human behavior in the newsvendor problem in Section 2.2. Fi-
nally, Section 2.3 lays the detailed roadmap of the empirical part of this thesis.
Chapters 3 through 6 present the results from a set of laboratory experiments
designed to shed light on behavioral impediments to efficient risk management
in the supply chain. In Chapter 3 we investigate inventory decision making
under demand uncertainty in the presence of simple linear contracts. We find
that subjects adversely anchor their order decisions on the expected value of
the (known) demand distribution as well as, over time, on the most recent real-
ization of demand. Furthermore, we find that the psychology of decision regret
drives order behavior off the normative prescriptions. In Chapter 4 we inves-
tigate the willingness-to-pay for avoiding costly supply-demand mismatches by
sourcing from a perfectly flexible supplier. The main observation is that deci-
sion makers overvalue this option irrespective of their intrinsic attitude towards
risk. In Chapter 5 we enlarge to inventory decisions in the presence of more
sophisticated contracts that allow for a flexible sharing of inventory risk along
the supply chain. We observe that decision maker map contract parameters
into different mental accounts instead of integrating them in terms of their final
wealth position, leading to the differential perception of mathematically equiv-
alent contractual agreements. Chapter 6 addresses a situation where inventory
risk can be mitigated between different retail locations through lateral stock
allocations on an excess inventory market. We find that decision makers can
generally increase profits, but fail to fully exploit the risk pooling opportunities
offered by the existence of a secondary market. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes
with the implications of our work, both for managerial decision making and for
an empirically founded theory of supply chain management.
2
Chapter 2
Risk Taking in Supply
Chains: Prescriptions and
Empirical Evidence
2.1 Normative Predictions
This section presents theoretical results for supply chain design and execution
under uncertain demand. We follow the expositions of Cachon (2003, 2004)
and Lee and Whang (2002), while sticking to those parts of the theory that are
directly relevant for the framework of this thesis.
2.1.1 The Newsvendor Model
Consider the simple framework of a two-stage serial supply chain with a retailer
R buying q units of merchandise from a supplier S at a constant wholesale price
w prior to a selling season. The reason for the retailer committing to an order
quantity before learning market demand arises when the selling season is shorter
than the replenishment leadtime, a situation typically met for fashion goods.
Under a simple wholesale price only contract the transfer payment from the re-
tailer to the supplier is given by T (q) = wq. At the time of the ordering decision,
demand D is assumed to be uncertain with a known distribution function Φ(D),
the corresponding density φ(D), expected value µ, and standard deviation σ.
Furthermore, let g(D) denote the generalized failure rate g(D) = Dh(D), where
h(D) = φ(D)/(1 − Φ(D)) is the failure rate. We assume the distribution of D
to be symmetric, with support on [a, b], and to have the strictly increasing gen-
eralized failure rate (IGFR) property, g′(D) > 0. The IGFR assumption is not
too restrictive since many realistic distributions have this property, including
the Normal (Lariviere and Porteus 2001). The retailer earns a price p per unit
sold. For simplicity, the salvage value is set to zero. The retailer’s profit for a
given order quantity and realized demand D is pˇiR(q,D) = p ·min(q,D)−T (q).1
Letting S(q) =
∫ b
a
min(q,D)dΦ(D) =
∫ q
a
DdΦ(D) +
∫ b
q
qdΦ(D) denote expected
1In the following we suppress the second argument whenever convenient, keeping in mind
the dependence of p˙iR(q) on the demand state D.
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sales, the retailer’s expected profit from an order q is
piR(q) = pS(q)− T (q), (2.1)
with the well-known critical fractile solution
q∗ = Φ−1
(
p− w
p
)
. (2.2)
The order quantity q∗ represents an optimal trade-off between the overage cost
co = w from each leftover unit and the underage cost cu = p−w from each unit
of lost demand. For example, when the overage cost co increases, the optimal
order quantity decreases because it becomes relatively more costly to have excess
stock at the end of the season (as can be easily verified from 2.2).
The objective function (2.1) decsribes a decision maker who derives utility
solely from monetary wealth and moreover is risk-neutral as to the distribu-
tion of wealth across different states of demand. Several extensions have been
investigated in the literature (see Khouja 1999 for a review). One important
generalization of (2.1) considers the expected utility from an order q,
ED [u (pˇiR(q))] =
∫ b
a
u (pˇiR(D)) dΦ(D), (2.3)
with u(·) being an increasing function denoting the utility of wealth. For
u(x) = x total expected utility reduces to the risk-neutral case in (2.1). For the
general case, the following Theorem provides theoretical predictions for utility-
maximizing order quantities, relative to the risk-neutral benchmark commonly
considered in the supply chain literature (Eeckhoudt et al. 2004, all proofs of
this thesis can be found, or are referenced, in Appendix A.1).
Theorem 1. A risk-averse decision maker, captured by u′′(x) < 0, orders less
than the risk-neutral benchmark, i.e. q∗ra < q
∗. The opposite holds for a risk-
seeking decision maker for which u′′(x) > 0.
For the remainder of this thesis, it turns out practical to make the following
distinction (following Schweitzer and Cachon 2000). Products are labeled high
profit (HP) if p−wp >
1
2 and thus q
∗ > µ for symmetric demand distributions.
They are labeled low profit (LP) if p−wp <
1
2 and thus q
∗ < µ.
2.1.2 Supply Chain Inefficiencies under Linear Contracts
By definition, q∗ is optimal from the retailer’s point of view, but this is not
necessarily the case for the supply chain as a whole. The natural benchmark
for assessing q∗ from a supply chain perspective is a central planner committed
to the maximization of total expected supply chain profit
Π(q) = pS(q)− cq (2.4)
where c denotes the supplier’s unit production cost. This is again a standard
newsvendor problem, only now the optimal critical fractile solution
q◦ = Φ−1
(
p− c
p
)
(2.5)
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is independent of w since the wholesale price is only a transfer payment affecting
the distribution of total expected profit between the supply chain members.
Clearly, total expected supply chain profit is maximized only if the individual
firm making the order decision has an incentive to order q∗ = qo. This desirable
outcome is commonly termed supply chain coordination.
We now explicitly incorporate the strategic interaction within the supply
chain, while sticking to a simple wholesale price contract T (q) = wq. The
sequence of events is the following: First, the firms agree on a unit wholesale
price w. The retailer then orders q∗(w), the supplier produces and delivers q∗
in exchange for a transfer payment T (q∗) = wq∗, leaving the supplier with a
riskless profit piS = (w − c)q∗. Finally season demand D materializes and the
retailer earns a profit pˇiR(q∗, D). In this regime, the supply chain essentially
operates under a ”push” contract, since all inventory risk is pushed towards the
retailer prior to the selling season.
The actual contract is typically the outcome of some bargaining process. For
example, the supplier can make a ”take-it-or-leave-it” offer to the retailer. An-
ticipating the retailer’s optimal response q∗(w), the supplier chooses w in order
to maximize piS(w) = (w − c)q∗(w). Equivalently, but more convenient for the
exposition, piS(q) = (w∗(q)−c)q, since there is a one-to-one mapping between q∗
and w (by noting that Φ−1 in the first-order condition q∗ = Φ−1
(
p−w
p
)
is strictly
decreasing in its argument). Under the IGFR property of the demand distribu-
tion, Lariviere and Porteus (2001) show that piS(q) is unimodal, as illustrated
in Figure 2.1. The first-order condition is implicitly given by
q∗φ(q∗)− Φ(q∗) = p− c
p
. (2.6)
Figure 2.1: Push and pull contracts.
The important implication of (2.6) is that the supplier’s most preferred push
quantity q∗ does not maximize total supply chain profit Π (Figure 2.1), and
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neither does any other feasible outcome of a bargaining process on w. This
result becomes apparent by simple comparison of the retailer’s and the supply
chain’s optimality conditions (2.2) and (2.5). Supply chain coordination by
definition requires q∗(w) to be equal to qo as the unique maximizer of Πo, this
requires w = c under a simple wholesale price contract, a situation which would
leave the supplier with zero profit. For a given order quantity, the probability
of a stock-out or a leftover is the same for the retailer and the total supply
chain, but the associated costs are not: Given any wholesale price w > c, the
retailer’s opportunity cost of a shortage, p − w, is lower than for the supply
chain, p − c. On the other hand, the retailer’s unit cost of a leftover, w, are
higher than for the supply chain, c. Consequently, when w > c the retailer has
the incentive to order less than optimal, q∗(w) < qo. This is the well-known
double marginalization problem (Spengler 1950), which essentially arises in the
present context because the risk of supply chain inventory not matching demand
is pushed entirely toward the retailer.
Alternatively, the firms could adopt a ”pull” contract. Under this contrac-
tual scheme, the supplier produces a quantity qˆ ahead of the season (to avoid
unnecessary notational confusion, “ˆ” is used to indicate association with a pull
contract), but now the supplier keeps the inventory ownership. The retailer,
making no order commitment before the start of the selling season, pulls in-
ventory from the supplier with at-once orders when demand materializes. Most
of the inventory risk is shifted upstream in the supply chain and, essentially,
the retailer now buys from a newsvendor.2 The supplier chooses qˆ to maximize
pˆiS = wˆS(qˆ)− cqˆ, with the critical fractile solution
qˆ∗ = Φ−1
(
wˆ − c
wˆ
)
. (2.7)
The retailer’s expected profit is pˆiR(qˆ∗(wˆ)) = (p− wˆ)S(qˆ∗(wˆ)). Due to the one-
to-one mapping between qˆ∗ and wˆ in 2.7, this profit can be rewritten in terms
of qˆ, pˆiR(qˆ) = p(Φ(qo) − Φ(qˆ))j(qˆ), where j(qˆ) = S(qˆ)1−Φ(qˆ) . Cachon (2004) shows
that pˆiR(qˆ) is unimodal, as illustrated in Figure 2.1. The first-order condition is
implicitly given by
Φ(qˆ∗)j(qˆ∗)h(qˆ∗)
1 + j(qˆ∗)h(qˆ∗)
=
p− c
p
. (2.8)
Again, the important implication of (2.8) is that the retailer’s most preferred
pull quantity qˆ∗ does not maximize total supply chain profits, nor does any other
feasible negotiation outcome of wˆ (Figure 2.1). This becomes most apparent by
simple comparison of the supplier’s and the supply chain’s optimality conditions
(2.5) and (2.7). Supply chain coordination requires qˆ∗(wˆ) = qo by definition, it
entails wˆ = p, a situation which would leave the retailer with zero profit.
While the supply chain fares better under the retailer’s most preferred pull
production quantity qˆ∗(wˆ) than under the supplier’s most preferred order quan-
tity q∗(w) under a push contract (Figure 2.1), neither allocation of inventory
risk achieves channel coordination, nor is it Pareto-efficient. To see this, define
2Note that, under the pull regime, the retailer still shares the risk of D > qˆ. Only if
the supplier has the option for a second uncapacitated production run during the selling
season, the retailer can perfectly match supply with demand, see Donohue (2000) for a model
incorporating a mid-season production option.
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qP as the quantity where each firm’s expected profit under pull equals the ex-
pected profit under push (Figure 3.5(a)). It can then be shown that the Pareto
set among the single wholesale price contracts (push and pull contracts) includes
all pull contracts with q ∈ [qP , qo] and all push contracts with q ∈ [qP , qo] (Ca-
chon 2004). Since neither q∗(w) nor qˆ∗(wˆ) are in the Pareto set, there exist
opportunities for Pareto improvements. For example, the supplier’s most pre-
ferred push order quantity q∗(w) is clearly inferior. While moving from q∗(w)
(under which he is selling to a newsvendor retailer) towards qˆ∗(wˆ) makes the
supplier worse off, he can do better by adopting any pull contract in the Pareto
set. One such example is the pull contract qˆ′ which makes the retailer indifferent
to the push contract q∗, but increases the supplier’s expected profit. Despite
assuming the entire inventory risk, moving to a pull contract can be desirable
for the supplier since supply chain inventory will be closer to qo (Figure 3.5(a))
and typically, the retailer is willing to pay a higher wholesale price for being
able to avoid inventory risk by ”ordering to demand” (Figure 2.2(b)). As can
be verified from Figure 3.5(a), similar improvements are feasible when moving
from the retailer’s most preferred pull quantity qˆ∗ to a push contract within the
Pareto set [qP , qo].
To summarize, Pareto improvements are possible when firms consider both
push and pull regimes in the negotiation process. Still, the outcome will be a
contract that pushes the entire inventory risk to one party. The next section
looks at contracts that are essentially push (the supplier sells to a newsvendor
retailer) but induce jointly optimal order decisions by relieving the retailer from
some of the inventory risk.
2.1.3 Supply Chain Coordination and Risk-Sharing Con-
tracts
To coordinate the supply chain, the individual decision makers’ incentives need
to be aligned with those of a hypothetical central planning acting in the interest
of the supply chain as a whole. In our context, the retailer’s optimization prob-
lem in basically trades off the expected costs of leftover inventories against the
expected opportunity costs of lost sales (compare Section 2.1.1). Supply chain
coordination then can be achieved by appropriately adjusting these two costs
components, e.g. through a contractual agreement.
Buyback contract
For example, consider a buyback contract comprising a wholesale price wbb and
a buyback price b which the supplier pays the retailer per unit remaining at
the end of the season. The transfer payment T (q) between the retailer and the
supplier is T (q, wbb, b) = bS(q)+(wbb−b)q, yielding the retailer’s expected profit
from an order q,
piR(q) = pS(q)− T (q) = (p− b)S(q)− (wbb − b)q,
with an optimal order quantity q∗ = Φ−1
(
p−wbb
p−b
)
. Now consider the set of
buyback parameters {wbb, b} satisfying for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1,
p− b = λp (2.9)
wbb − b = λc. (2.10)
7
Chapter 2
(a) Order quantities
(b) Wholesale prices
Figure 2.2: Push to pull transition
Since the retailer’s expected profit,
piR(q) = (p− b)S(q)− (wbb − b)q = λΠ(q)
is an affine function of the total expected supply chain profit (2.4), it is straight-
forward to see that the retailer chooses q∗ = qo. Interestingly, this quantity
coincides with the supplier’s most preferred order quantity due to piS(q) =
Π(q)−piR(q) = (1−λ)Π(q). The expected supply chain profit can be arbitrarily
split between the retailer and the supplier through the parameter λ which is
only introduced for expositional purpose and is not part of the actual contract.
As a direct consequence, there is at least one coordinating buyback contract
that offers a Pareto improvement over any wholesale price only contract. For
example, the shaded triangle in Figure 2.3 contains those buyback contracts
8
Risk Taking in Supply Chains: Prescriptions and Empirical Evidence
that are Pareto improving over the firms’ expected profits under the supplier’s
most preferred retailer order under push.
Figure 2.3: Coordination by risk-sharing contracts
The economic reasoning behind the buyback is that it aligns the mismatch
risk perceived by the retailer with the entire system, making it rational for the
retailer to order more than under any wholesale price only contract. Specifically,
a buyback contract mitigates the retailer’s cost from a leftover unit, wbb − b,
as compared to the corresponding overage cost w under a wholesale-price only
contract. This is visualized in Figure 2.4 which plots the coordinating buyback
price b(wbb) = pp−c (wbb − c) for wbb = w (resulting in constant and identical
underage costs under the two contracts). With identical underage costs and
higher overage cost, the buyback contract {wbb = w, b(wbb)} induces the retailer
to order more than under the corresponding push contract with just a single
wholesale price w.
Instead of leaving the wholesale price unchanged, it might be more reason-
able to expect the firms to stick to a given profit allocation when moving from
a wholesale price only contract {w} to a buyback scheme {wbb, b}. Holding
the retailer’s profit share under the two contracts constant at λ = piR(q
∗(w))
Π(q∗(w)) ,
the coordinating parameters of a buyback contract are uniquely determined by
(2.9) and (2.10). Now the wholesale price wbb(w) tends to be slightly higher
then its simple push contract equivalent w (Figure 2.5(a)). As a consequence,
the underage cost cu = p − wbb(w) under the buyback contract tends to be
slightly lower than under the simple push contract where cu = p − w, pulling
orders down under the buyback contract (Figure 2.5(b)). However, the coor-
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Figure 2.4: Buyback price with wbb = w
dinating buyback price implies a substantial reduction in the retailer’s overage
costs co = wbb(w)− b(w), making it profitable to order more inventory. Overall,
the local changes in mismatch costs induce the retailer to boost his order quan-
tity up to qo. By definition total expected supply chain profit is maximized, but
the benefits to the supplier need further elaboration. To build some intuition,
compare the supplier’s deterministic profit (w − c)q∗(w) under a simple push
contract with his expected profit under a coordinating buyback contract,
pis(qo) = (wbb − b)qo − bI(qo)
where I(q) = q − S(q) denotes the expected leftover inventory from an order
q. On the one hand, the supplier’s profit is negatively affected by partially
refunding the retailer’s leftover inventory. On the other hand, this marginal
profit loss is more than offset by the marginal profit increase due to the larger
order quantity qo > q∗(w) along with a higher margin wbb − c for the units not
returned by the retailer (compare Figures 2.3 to 2.5).
Revenue sharing contract
As an alternative to the buyback, the supply chain partners might consider a
revenue sharing contract which has two parameters. First, the supplier charges
a wholesale price wrs per unit purchased. Secondly, the retailer shares some of
the revenue with the supplier. To be specific, the retailer keeps a fraction r of
the selling price p, so (1 − r)p is the revenue fraction the supplier earns. The
transfer payment T (q) between the retailer and the supplier is T (q, wrs, r) =
(1− r)pS(q) + wrsq, yielding the retailer’s expected profit from an order q,
piR(q) = pS(q)− T (q) = rpS(q)− wrsq,
10
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(a) Contract parameters (b) Overage and underage
Figure 2.5: Buyback price with constant λ
with an optimal newsvendor order quantity q∗ = Φ−1
(
rp−wrs
rp
)
. Now consider
the set of revenue sharing parameters {wrs, r} satisfying, for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1,
rp = λp (2.11)
wrs = λc. (2.12)
Under these terms the retailer’s expected profit,
piR(q) = rpS(q)− wrsq = λΠ(q),
is an affine function of Π(q) and it follows immediately that qo is the retailer’s
optimal order quantity. As for the buyback, revenue sharing contracts can thus
coordinate the supply chain and allow for a flexible profit allocation (Figure
2.3).
The economic reasoning underlying the revenue sharing contract is similar to
the buyback. This is visualized in Figure 2.6 which, holding the retailer’s profit
share under the two contracts constant at λ = piR(q
∗(w))
Π(q∗(w)) , plots the coordinating
parameters of a revenue sharing contract uniquely determined by (2.11) and
(2.12). The unit underage costs under the revenue sharing contract, rp − wrs,
tends to be slightly lower compared to the wholesale-price only counterpart,
p − w, but this is overcompensated by a decrease in the retailer’s overage cost
of a leftover, wrs. In effect, the shared inventory risk under revenue sharing
contracts can induce the retailer to order more than under a wholesale price-
only contract.
Buyback versus revenue sharing contracts
The buyback and the revenue sharing contract are equivalent in the strongest
sense. Note that, under a buyback [revenue sharing] contract, the retailer pays
11
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(a) Contract parameters (b) Overage and underage
Figure 2.6: Revenue sharing with constant λ
wbb − b [wrs] for every unit purchased and an additional b [(1 − r)p] per unit
sold. Then there is a pair of revenue sharing and buyback contracts, satisfying
the following equations,
wbb − b = wrs
b = (1− r)p,
that generate identical distributions of profits for any given order quantity q.
This can be seen from Figures 2.5(b) and 2.6(b) which illustrate that the two
contracts entail identical costs of overage and underage. While their mathemat-
ical equivalence imply that the two contracts have equal potential for supply
chain coordination in our simple setting, we want to point but that their paths
diverge in more complex situations (Cachon (2004)).
2.1.4 The Impact of Secondary Markets on Supply Chain
Efficacy
The previous sections have investigated serial supply chains where inventory risk
is distributed vertically in the system, if at all. For example, both buyback and
revenue sharing contracts partially transfer the risk of leftovers from the retailer
to the supplier. Most supply networks in reality have a divergent topology when
moving to downstream distribution stages, where multiple retail locations serve
the end consumer market. This offers interesting opportunities for managing
supply-demand mismatch risks since, in an uncertain world, often some sellers
have surplus stock while others are stocked out. Clearly, if transportation costs
are sufficiently low, it might be beneficial to transfer excess inventories laterally,
both from a system’s as well as from the individual firms’ point of view.
12
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To capture this story, considerM identical newsvendor retailers and suppose
that a secondary market for excess inventories opens at some point during the
selling season, dividing the season into periods 1 and 2. Let Di1(Di2) denote
retailer i’s demand in the first (second) period. Assume that each retailer’s
demands are independently drawn from Φ1(·) and Φ2(·). For consistency with
the standard newsvendor model without the secondary market, the distribution
of total demand Φ is the convolution of Φ1 and Φ2.
Overall, the sequence of events is the following. At the beginning of period
1, retailer i orders qi1 units from the supplier at a unit wholesale price w. After
first-period retail demand Di1 has materialized, retailer i enters the secondary
market where a market-clearing price τ is endogenously determined based on
aggregate demand and supply. Essentially, each retailer is a price taker which
is justified for large enough M . Given τ each retailer chooses a stock level qi2
for the second period, demands Di2 materialize and all profits are realized.
Lee and Whang (2002) show the existence of a symmetric subgame-perfect
equilibrium (q∗1, q
∗
2) in the retailers’ strategies (qi1, qi2),
3 captured in the fol-
lowing theorem (for the detailed mathematical derivation see Lee and Whang
2002).
Theorem 2. For M large enough, the first-period order quantity q∗1 , the second-
period order quantity q∗2 , and the secondary market equilibrium price τ
∗ satisfy
the following simultaneous equations:4
q∗1 = Φ
−1
1
(
p− w
p− τ∗
)
(2.13)
q∗2 = Φ
−1
2
(
p− τ∗
p
)
(2.14)
τ∗ = p[1− Φ(Γ1(q∗1)]. (2.15)
The equilibrium has a number of interesting implications for the retailers as
well as the supply chain as a whole. Most obvious, retailers benefit from the
existence of a secondary market because they can always achieve the standard
newsvendor profit by ignoring the secondary market. Likewise, the option to re-
balance inventories in the secondary market would strictly improve supply chain
performance if each retailer ordered his newsvendor quantity q∗ = Φ−1
(
p−w
p
)
and then entered the secondary market after period 1. However, the impact of
the secondary market on initial order quantities q∗1, relative to the vector of stan-
dard newsvendor order quantities q∗, is ambiguous. Combining (2.13) and (2.15)
to Φ1(q∗1)Φ2(Γ1(q
∗
1)) =
p−w
p , it is straightforward to show that each retailer’s
order quantity with the secondary market, q∗1 , is larger than the newsvendor
order Φ(q∗) = p−wp from (2.2) if and only if
Φ1
(
Φ−1
(
p− w
p
))
· Φ2
(
Γ1
(
Φ−1
(
p− w
p
)))
≤ p− w
p
. (2.16)
Condition (2.16) implies that the secondary market makes retailers to order
closer to mean demand, relative to the standard newsvendor solution, as visual-
ized in Figure 2.7. For example, consider a low profit product with p−wp < 0.5.
3We let qj = (q1j , q2j , ...qMj). Since our assumption of symmetric retailers implies q
∗
j1 =
q∗j2 = ... = q
∗
jM , we drop the subscript i in the following.
4Where Γi(qi) =
∫ qi
0 Φi(Di)dDi.
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Figure 2.7: Regression to the mean with Φ1 = Φ2 ∼ N(50, 20)
Since
Φ1(q)Φ2(Γ1(q)) < Φ(q)) (2.17)
for every q < µ, it follows that q∗1 > q
∗, i.e. the equilibrium order quantities
in the presence of the secondary market increase, relative to the order quantity
in the standard newsvendor model. The same, but reversed, logic applies to
a high profit product with p−wp > 0.5. The implications of condition (2.16)
are more intuitive than its mathematics: Retailers anticipating the option to
reallocate inventories on a secondary market order more (less) of a low profit
(high profit) product than in a situation without the secondary market. For
example, consider a low margin product with a small critical fractile solution
q∗ < µ. Low order quantities result, stochastically, in lower excess inventories
at the end of the first period. This in turn drives the equilibrium price in the
secondary market up, which follows directly from
dτ
dq1
=
d(p[1− Φ(Γ1(q1)])
dq1
= −pφ2(Γ1(q1))Φ1(q1) < 0. (2.18)
A higher expected price τ serves as an incentive for retailers to increase their
initial inventories. Symmetrically, a high profit product with a high critical
fractile solution q∗ > µ entails stochastically higher excess inventories in the
secondary market which, driving the equilibrium price τ down, invites retailers
to stock less initially and restock at a low price in the secondary market.
Without the secondary market, we know from the well-established double
marginalization problem that the retailers will understock the supply chain given
any wholesale price larger than the suppliers production costs (Section 2.1). In
this light, the secondary market’s tendency to regress retailer orders towards the
mean benefits the entire supply chain only for products that are low profit for the
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retailers. It negatively affects supply chain performance if the retail level earns
a unit margin p − w higher than its unit costs w. Whether inventory pooling
on the secondary market benefits total supply chain profits hinges critically on
the profit nature of the product from the perspective of the retail level. This in
turn depends on a number of industry-specific factors like the different players’
bargaining power as well as size and number of value-adding activities along the
chain.
2.2 Existing Behavioral Evidence
The newsvendor model is arguably the simplest model to teach ”optimal” opera-
tions management under uncertainty. Furthermore, its logic serves as a building
block for more complex models that seek to provide guidance as to the ”opti-
mal” supply chain design, e.g. of contracts, information systems, or electronic
markets. Clearly, a thorough understanding of how real people tackle the prob-
lem thus is crucial for improving teaching, guiding managerial practice as well
as refining theory. This section reviews existing empirical evidence on human
newsvendor behavior. The results so far indicate that the model’s simplicity,
commonly assumed by scholars, does not translate into an accurate description
of real behavior.
Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) is the first study to test the newsvendor
model’s empirical validity in a controlled laboratory setting. In their base ex-
periment, subjects make 30 inventory decision under a known uniform demand
distribution. In 15 rounds the known retail price p and unit cost w are set such
that q∗ > µ (high profit), in the remaining 15 rounds they entail q∗ < µ (low
profit). The key observation is a regression to the mean, i.e. decision maker’s
intuitively select order quantities that are closer to µ than the risk neutral
benchmark q∗. Making use of the distinction between low profit and high profit
products, the authors are in a position to validate various well-known and com-
peting behavioral explanations for deviations from the normative benchmark.
For example, they consider risk aversion which would conveniently reconcile de-
viations from q∗ with the normative principles of expected utility theory (Neu-
man and Von Morgenstern 1947). However, the unidirectional prediction of risk
aversion (Theorem 1) cannot explain the too-low-too-high order pattern, indi-
cating that intuitive newsvendor behavior deviates from expected utility theory
altogether. In a second treatment, all profit outcomes are moved into the gain
domain by an increase of the demand range. The observed mean ordering pat-
tern remains robust. This essentially excludes prospect theory which predicts
subjects to be risk averse in the domain of gains (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).
The authors provide two competing behavioral biases that can account for their
data. For example, decision makers might want to avoid anticipated disutility
δ(·) from ex-post inventory errors, |q −D|. This preference directly entails the
too-low-too-high pattern since expected inventory error regret ED[δ(|q−D|)] is
minimized at mean demand for δ′(·) for symmetric distributions of D. Secondly,
subjects might use a decision short cut by anchoring on mean demand and then
adjust towards the optimum q∗, but insufficiently so. Over time, the mean
anchor heuristic would suggest a convergence towards the optimum, but sub-
jects essentially fail to learn even over repeated (identical!) decisions. Instead
they reveal traces of the chasing demand strategy which assumes a decision
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maker anchors on the prior order quantity and adjusts (insufficiently) towards
the previous demand realization.
Since the observed choices do not change significantly over the 30 repetitions
played in Schweitzer and Cachon (S/C), the subjects essentially fail to learn.
Bolton and Katok (2007) build on the latter issue by more explicitly investigat-
ing the role of feedback, experience and learning. Their Study 1 extends the
number of decision rounds to 100. Although approaching the profit maximiz-
ing solution with sufficiently many repetitions, the ordering behavior remains
largely consistent with the too-high/too-low pattern. They additionally test the
effect of thinning out the set of order options (from 100 to 3), to ease the cogni-
tive burden and make profit differences between available options more salient
to the decision makers. Interestingly, this has no systematic effect. Study 2
investigates the impact of feedback on newsvendor performance. Specifically,
subjects are provided with period-by-period tracking information for both the
realized profit and the foregone profit from the options not taken, but this mea-
sure yields no significant increase in performance. In an additional study, the
authors constrain subjects to ordering a fixed quantity for a sequence of 10 peri-
ods. The reduced feedback variability of this ”standing order” constraint finally
drives order quantity significantly closer to the optimum, compared to the base
case from Study 1.
Along similar lines as Bolton and Katok (B/K), Lurie and Swaminathan
(2007) investigate the impact of feedback frequency on newsvendor behavior. In
study 1, subjects make decisions and receive feedback every round, every three
rounds, or every six rounds (between-subject). This is effectively the same as
the standing order treatment in B/K with period-by-period feedback on real-
ized demand as well as the profit of the chosen order quantity for the last, the
last three, or the last six rounds. The study considers only the high profit con-
dition where q∗ > µ but varies demand uncertainty as captured by either low or
high standard deviation of the uniform demand distribution (within-subject).
Contrary to what a normative account would suggest, the results show that
those who receive more frequent feedback actually have lower performance in
the high variance environment. The reason is that less frequent feedback keeps
subjects from reading too much into variability, which supports the finding from
B/K’s standing order treatment. Surprisingly though, feedback frequency has
no significant effect in the low variance environment which, in terms of demand
variance, is equal to the high profit condition in B/K. Potential reasons are
the provision of even less frequent feedback (standing orders for 10 rounds), the
cognitively less challenging thinned option set (3 options, potentially favoring
those who receive less frequent feedback), and a prolonged learning period in
B/K. Since frequent changes of order quantities are ultimately detrimental in
a stationary newsvendor task, Study 2 investigates whether introducing costs
of change (either high or low, between-subject) can mitigate decision makers’
tendency to respond to randomness too heavily. Using the high variability en-
vironment from Study 1, the study also involves three between-subject levels of
feedback frequency (every round, every five rounds, every 10 rounds), as well
as the high profit versus the low profit condition (between subject). Beside a
regression of average order quantities towards the mean demand, the intrigu-
ing finding of Study 2 is that imposing a change cost has no significant main
effect. Additionally, since no significant differences are observed when moving
from feedback every five rounds to feedback every 10 rounds, the results sug-
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gest a diminishing effect of reducing feedback frequency on performance. This
issue is further examined in Study 3 which, along with varying feedback fre-
quency (every two rounds, every five rounds, every 10 rounds), manipulates
decision frequency by requiring subjects to either place a single standing order
for the next feedback interval, or separate order quantities for each period in
that interval (between subject). The main finding is that decreasing feedback
frequency starts deteriorating performance beyond a certain point. Insignifi-
cant main and interaction effects of decision frequency indicate that feedback
frequency is the main driver of performance differences. In a final Study 4, Lurie
and Swaminathan (L/S) provide evidence on the cognitive processes of infor-
mation acquisition in the newsvendor context. Employing a process tracking
method, the study effectively shows that decision makers acquire more of the
available information (past orders, demand, and associated profits) when given
less frequent feedback.
Bostian et al. (2006) explicitly model the notion of bounded rationality in
the newsvendor problem. Specifically, and reasonably, they assume that decision
makers cannot ad hoc solve the problem accurately. Instead, decision makers
try to learn over time, which is potentially hindered by limited precision (as
to the profit function of a given order quantity) and limited memory (as to
the amount of historic information incorporated into the learning process). In
order to capture the high degree of decision inertia revealed in their experimental
data, the authors incorporate a reinforcement learning element into their model,
allowing the decision maker to learn from both factual payoffs from the order
quantity and counterfactual payoffs from order quantities not chosen. The model
calibration provides a good fit with their data from a standard newsvendor
experiment (which is not surprising, given the model’s many degrees of freedom).
In two additional studies, the authors investigate the impact of standing orders
on newsvendor behavior but cannot find significant effects, possibly due to the
short feedback interval of five periods (10 periods in B/K) and a low variance
environment (where there was no effect in L/S).
In their experimental study, Benzion et al. (2005) observe that newsvendor
orders are too close to the mean of a uniform demand distribution, but slowly
and insufficiently converge towards the optimal quantity q∗. The authors repli-
cate this result for normally distributed demand. This makes intuitive sense
since the mean is in fact the most likely outcome for the normal distribution
which renders µ as a potential anchor clue very salient. The results also show
that decision makers are more likely to change their previous orders towards the
previous demand realization although this pattern becomes weaker over time.
Thus, subjects appear to learn that past demand outcomes are irrelevant to
current decisions.
From a normative perspective, the newsvendor problem simply represents
a context-loaded decision frame of a basic choice between a (rather large) set
of risky prospects, and decisions should not be affected by the anchorable in-
formation cues specific to this frame. Schultz et al. (2007) investigate framing
effects in the newsvendor context, motivated by previous framing experiments
outside the operations domain, like the prominent Asian Flu experiment Tver-
sky and Kahnemann (1981). In their Study 1, the problem is first presented in
a gain frame where the firm pays w per unit ordered and earns p per unit sold.
A different group of subjects faces a loss frame where the firm incurs a unit
overage cost of w in case of leftovers and a unit underage cost equal to p−w in
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case of shortages. Both frames are offered in both the high profit and the low
profit condition and imply the same optimal order quantity q∗ normatively. By
arguing along the value function of prospect theory (risk aversion in the gain
frame, risk seeking in the loss frame) the authors expect smaller order quantities
in the gain frame but larger orders in the loss frame (corresponding to the risk
reflection effect detected by Tversky and Kahnemann (1981). Besides exhibiting
the usual mean ordering and demand chasing pattern, the data reveals no sta-
tistically significant order behavior between the two frames. To explore why the
well-documented risk reflection effect is not observed in the newsvendor context,
Study 2 investigates a sequence of tree decision tasks that are potentially prone
to the risk-reflection effect (between-subject). When gradually moving the orig-
inal Asian Flu experiment to more complex decision tasks from the business
domain, the authors find the risk-reflection effect to disappear. Possibly the key
insight of this study is a warning to those who are tempted to directly apply
behavioral theories, without carefully checking their context-sensitivity, to the
operations management domain.
The studies discussed above indicate the pervasive impact of demand-related
anchors on decision making in the newsvendor problem. Gavirneni and Xia
(2007) carry the notion of anchor values even further by providing subjects
in their experiments with information cues which, from a normative point of
view, entirely lack relevance for the optimal solution of the problem. Specif-
ically, these pieces of information are 1) a hypothetical quantity the subjects
are told they had ordered on a previous occasion, 2) the order quantity of a
hypothetical comparable competitor, and 3) the order quantity suggested by
a hypothetical consultant. The actual values of these anchors, as well as the
price and wholesale price, are varied across five different treatments presented
to the participants (within-subject). Interestingly, providing decision makers
with immaterial anchor information, in a non-stable decision environment with
no learning opportunities, suffices to weaken the impact of the mean demand
anchor. However, this does not translate into improved performance, since deci-
sion makers simply anchor on values other than mean demand, but these anchor
values never equal the optimal solution. Unfortunately, wide and rather unsys-
tematic variation of anchor and price/cost values prevents a clean breakdown of
those anchor values that drive behavior the most. As a second contribution, the
study contrasts individual decision making with group decision making (groups
of three). Surprisingly, group decisions are dispersed wider, contrary to the
intuition that group dynamics would tend to make individual preferences con-
verge. The authors conjecture that groups are more open to considering values
other than the available anchors. Based on hand-written comments from a
post-experiment, they further conclude that groups are less prone to misplaced
logic than individual subjects. Since many important industrial decisions with
a newsvendor structure are made by groups, this line of research merits further
attention.
In their study, Brown and Tang (2006) compare the ordering behavior of
MBA students and professional buyers in a one-short newsvendor experiment.
Inducing a critical ratio of a high profit product with q∗ > µ, the authors find
that MBA students order closer to mean demand. Interestingly, the professional
buyers order significantly less than the students and even below mean demand
(although this is not significant due to a small sample size of only six buyers).
Based on informal interviews, the authors provide economic, not psychological,
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reasons for the traders’ ordering behavior. Traders indicate that, in their respec-
tive business environment, they are generally measured based on their ability
to attain pre-specified target levels as to profits or sales. Subsequent model-
based analyses confirm that it is indeed optimal to order less than the expected
profit maximizing solution when being constrained by target performance levels
(Lau 1980). It is interesting to note that these performance measures, while
potentially having significance in the traders’ daily business, are immaterial in
the decision experiment. One notable implication of this is that the behavioral
researcher might actually loose control over non-observable factors when using
a professional sample, making a case for using student subjects.
In a similar spirit, Thonemann et al. (2007) compare behavior of students
and procurement professionals, with and without upfront training (between-
subject), leading to a 2x2 between-subject design. The first key results is that
managers, while learning slightly faster in early rounds, perform worse than
student subject, although not statistically significant so. The performance gap
even increases when subjects received an extensive lecture on the newsvendor
problem prior to the experiment, indicating that managers are less susceptible
to instructive learning.
The above studies have in common that they investigate intuitive newsven-
dor behavior in the presence of a simple wholesale price contract. Katok and
Wu (2007) consider newsvendor performance under risk-sharing contracts. They
find the usual mean ordering behavior. The central result of their study is that
inventory decision making under mathematically equivalent buyback and rev-
enue sharing contract differs, although this effect weakens over time.
To the best of our knowledge, Corbett and Fransoo (2007) is the only non-
experimental empirical study of newsvendor behavior. Using a web- and email-
based survey, they investigate inventory decisions of entrepreneurs and small
businesses. This unit of analysis is particularly interesting to study in the field
because 1) inventories are a major concern in small businesses, 2) inventory
decisions are typically made by a single person, and 3) entrepreneurs and small
businesses commonly do not work under complex, and hard to observe, incentive
distortions present in decentralized decision making environment in large firms.
The data suggests that entrepreneurs’ risk profiles are by and large consistent
with prospect theory which implies lower order quantities when inventory invest-
ments are viewed as potential gains (leading to risk aversion) but larger order
quantities when viewed as potential losses (leading to risk seeking). Contrary
to this, the authors find empirical evidence that risk aversion tends to increase
safety stocks. This result might be due to the fact that the survey respondents
usually face multi-period inventory problems for which the directional effect of
risk-aversion is theoretically not known. A more behaviorally-anchored explana-
tion might be entrepreneurs’ overconfidence in always being able to sell possible
leftover inventories at cost.
Overall, the existing research has accumulated consistent evidence that intu-
itive newsvendor behavior systematically deviates from normative prescriptions.
Since decision making under uncertainty is inherently difficult and the decision
literature has documented a large variety of behavioral deviations from nor-
mative accounts (Kahneman and Tversky 2000), the mere existence of decision
biases in the newsvendor problem is of course not surprising per se. What makes
it interesting is the fact that the observed (mis)behavior is guided by aspects
that are unique to the newsvendor context, requiring new approaches to over-
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come it. The practical efficacy of many tools and techniques suggested in the
literature might have to be reconsidered as a direct consequence of behavioral
research on the newsvendor problem.
2.3 Roadmap to the Empirical Studies
This thesis presents a set of laboratory experiments, in an attempt to further
advance our understanding of human factors in operations decision making.
Laboratory experiments are a well-established methodology for studying human
factors in many disciplines, including business fields like accounting, finance, and
marketing. They are especially useful for operations management, too, since
human behavior is a common factor in most operations processes in the real
world (Bendoly et al. 2006). The primary value of laboratory experiments boils
down to the outstanding control of situational factors, allowing the researcher
to induce theory assumptions that ordinarily cannot be controlled in the field
(cf. Kagel and Roth 2004). On the downside, increased experimental control of
cause-effect relationships in the laboratory typically comes at the cost of lower
external validity. Acknowledging this natural shortcoming, this thesis makes
careful attempts to extrapolate insights from the laboratory to the field, while
providing rigorous analyses of actual managerial decision making in industry is
clearly beyond its scope. Overall, human laboratory experiments appear to be
a good first step towards a behaviorally more founded theory of supply chain
management.
Our work specifically seeks to contrast decision making reality with the de-
cision making theory laid out in Section 2.1. Figure 2.8 gives a visual overview
of the empirical studies presented in the following chapters.
Figure 2.8: Roadmap to the thesis
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Taking full inventory risk: Chapter 3 identifies and tests the psychologi-
cal drivers behind previously observed mean ordering behavior in the newsven-
dor setting, in an attempt to untangle different competing explanations. Ad-
dressing the mean anchor explanation, our experimental study demonstrates
the large extent to which this decision bias is driven by task complexity (neces-
sitating the use of the heuristic) and task framing (facilitating the use of the
heuristic). Addressing the ex-post inventory error explanation, our study shows
that decision makers respond to the psychology of regret which reflects well the
social and monetary incentives faced by newsvendors in practice.
Avoiding inventory risk: Chapter 4 reports on the results of a laboratory
experiment designed to answer the following question: How accurate are judg-
ments of the value of decision postponement in a supply chain context? Relative
to the normative benchmark, we find that decision makers are consistently will-
ing to pay too much for avoiding the mismatch costs associated with making
inventory decisions under uncertainty. This result can be explained by a general
notion of pain of deciding as well as people’s disutility from decision regret, both
of which can be efficiently avoided by postponing the order decision.
Taking partial inventory risk: Chapter 5 investigates whether and how
the technical equivalence of a revenue sharing and a buyback agreements trans-
lates into their perception by human decision makers. Our empirical evidence
from a large-scale choice experiment indicates that, when making intuitive judg-
ments, decision makers tend to prefer buyback agreements relative to equivalent
revenue sharing mechanisms. The main implication of this finding is a higher
relative attractiveness of buyback agreements as to their potential for coordi-
nating the entire supply chain. This result can not be explained by expected
utility theory (nor by any other theory of choice under uncertainty that works
on distributions of final wealth). Our findings can be nicely tied to mental ac-
counting theory if we are willing to admit that choice behavior is driven by the
composition of contract parameters rather than the distributions of monetary
outcomes associated with these parameters.
Pooling inventory risk: Chapter 6 investigates the performance impact of
risk pooling opportunities, offered by the existence of excess inventory markets.
We find that decision makers are generally able to increase their profits by
exploiting the profitable opportunities to reallocate inventories. However, these
opportunities are not always exploited fully which can be accounted for by
fairness concerns that deviate from the self-centered view of economic agents as
implied by classic game theory. As a second finding, the impact of the secondary
market is by and large consistent with the qualitative predictions of theory, but
we observe behavior to depend on being a buyer or a seller in the secondary
market, even when these two positions are strategically equivalent. This result
can be tied to a sunk cost bias, inducing sellers of excess inventory to factor
in original procurement costs into their trading and pricing decisions on the
secondary market.
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Taking Full Inventory Risk
- Anchoring and Regret
The exposition in this chapter is an extended version of Kremer et al. (2008).
3.1 Introduction
A number of previous experimental studies study human behavior in the newsven-
dor problem. As first noted by Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) decision makers
order too few units of a high profit product but too many units of a low profit
product, relative to the normative critical fractile solution. This behavioral
mean ordering pattern is a robust finding across various representations of the
problem (Benzion et al. 2005, Lurie and Swaminathan 2007, Bostian et al. 2006,
Bolton and Katok 2007, Katok and Wu 2007) and has been accounted for by
different behavioral explanations with rather distinct decision-theoretical inter-
pretations.
With a mean anchoring heuristic a decision maker anchors on mean demand
and then adjusts insufficiently towards the optimal quantity. The heuristic can
describe decision maker who is intrinsically risk-neutral but unable to order the
corresponding profit maximizing quantity due to bounded rationality. While
mean anchoring is clearly a decision heuristic and makes no formal claim re-
garding what the subjectively optimal quantity is, a newsvendor minimizing
ex-post inventory error orders closer to mean demand deliberately, however
based on a preference system that is driven by decision regret and differs psy-
chologically from what is postulated by the standard newsvendor solution. We
would not expect a decision maker minimizing ex-post inventory error to arrive
at the expected profit optimal quantity even after unlimited learning experience
and with unlimited computational capabilities.
Put differently, the preference for minimizing ex-post inventory error pulls
the order quantity towards mean demand, whereas the mean anchor heuristic
pulls toward the profit optimal quantity, however insufficiently. The two decision
strategies are intertwined, theoretically linked by the empirically observed chas-
ing demand heuristic. This decision strategy assumes that the decision maker
anchors on his previous order quantity, and then adjusts towards the previous
demand realization which would have minimized the previous inventory error.
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Chasing demand thus is a psychological hybrid, entailing both an anchoring bias
and a preference for regret minimization.
The three decision strategies have in common the mean ordering behavior
they entail, but they differ psychologically and provide broadly different clues
for debiasing misguided newsvendor decisions, either by changing information or
by adjusting incentives, or both. This chapter contributes to the understanding
and possible improvements of newsvendor decision making by an attempt to
disentangle mean anchoring, ex-post inventory error minimization, and demand
chasing.
In our first study, we systematically control for task complexity, demand-
related anchors, and learning opportunities, each of which have different impli-
cations for the decision strategies described above. Due to our extreme sim-
plification of the newsvendor task, we find no evidence of mean ordering on
the aggregate level. However, the disaggregate data demonstrates the pervasive
strength of mean demand as a guide to non-optimal behavior. Furthermore,
questionnaire data on post-decision satisfaction gives reason to believe that the
psychology of regret is an integral part of making newsvendor decisions as well
as experiencing the outcomes of these decisions.
In our second study, we provide subjects with the opportunity to learn over
repeated decisions. We find mean ordering on the population level even when
any of the contextual factors fueling the above mentioned heuristics and prefer-
ences are in fact absent. This result suggests a broader notion of bounded ratio-
nality which could not be made explicit in preceding experiments on newsvendor
behavior. We also increase the costs of ex-post inventory errors, both in psycho-
logical and in monetary terms. We find an increased tendency to chase demand,
driving average orders towards mean demand, when antecedent variables for the
experience of regret become stronger.
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2 we first investigate the
regret-theoretic interpretation of the ex-post inventory error and then turn to
the anchoring heuristics. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 present results from two labora-
tory experiments designed to untangle decision strategies underlying previously
observed mean ordering behavior. We provide implications of our results for
better mechanism design in operations practice in Section 3.5 and summarize
our study in Section 3.6.
3.2 Behavioral Newsvendor Theory
We consider the standard setting of a newsvendor maximizing expected profit
pi(q) =
∫ b
a
pˇi(q,D)dΦ(D) (3.1)
where pˇiR(q,D) = p ·min(q,D) − wq is the profit of an order quantity q given
a demand realization D (compare Section 2.1.1). The optimal order quantity is
determined by the critical fractile solution q∗ = Φ−1
(
p−w
p
)
.
A number of recent experimental studies have accumulated evidence that
is inconsistent with the normative benchmark provided by the critical fractile
solution. As first observed by Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) human decision
makers tend to order too much of a low profit product (where q∗ < µ) and too
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little of a high profit product (where q∗ > µ). In the subsequent sections we
explore the, possibly competing, explanations for this empirical finding.
3.2.1 The Regretting Newsvendor: The Psychology of Be-
ing Wrong
It is implicit in (3.1) that how the decision maker feels about an order decision
q in retrospect is independent from other options of the choice set Z available at
the time the decision was made. Numerous studies indicate that this does not
necessarily reflect the way humans make decisions under uncertainty (Loomes
and Sugden 1987, Loomes 1988). Rather, after a certain state of the world
has materialized, many decision makers experience psychological sensations in
the sense of “what might have been” had one chosen differently. Hence, in
addition to the realized profit pˇi(q) the utility from a given decision q includes
regret (and possibly rejoice) with respect to alternative actions not being chosen.
This is captured by δ(·) as a function of the order quantity q and the set of
counterfactual order quantities Z − {q}, with δ′(·) > 0 and δ(0) = 0, leading to
the modified utility function
u(q) = pˇi(q) + δ(q, Z − {q}) (3.2)
which is defined for each state of the world D (Loomes and Sugden 1982).
Besides the ex-post experience of regret (or rejoice) the second fundamental
assumption regret theory rests on is that in making decisions under uncertainty
people try to anticipate possible future regret (or rejoice). Ex-ante, the decision
maker thus tries to maximize modified expected utility
ED [u(q)] = pi(q) + ED [δ(q, Z − {q})] . (3.3)
It is easy to note the resemblance of (3.3) with the preference for minimizing
ex-post inventory error which allows for a straightforward regret-theoretic in-
terpretation (as implied by Schweitzer and Cachon 2000): The decision maker
experiences regret from not having ordered D, but never experiences rejoice.
This is because realized demand D is the best order quantity ex-post and thus
at least as good as any order quantity chosen ex-ante. Anticipating potential
disutility δα from an ex-post inventory error |q−D|, the decision maker chooses
an order quantity q that maximizes total expected utility
ED[u(q)] = ED[pi(q)]− ED[δα(|q −D|)] (3.4)
The following Theorem then implies behavior consistent with the too-high-too-
low pattern repeatedly observed in laboratory experiments.
Theorem 3. ED[δα(|q − D|)] in (3.4) is minimized at µ if φ is symmetric
around µ. The order quantity q∗α maximizing total expected utility ED[u(q)] will
always be between q∗ and µ, unless q∗ = µ.
Albeit accurately describing mean ordering behavior formally, the preference for
ex-post inventory error minimization implies two critical behavioral assumptions
worth further discussion. First, minimizing ex-post inventory errors |q − D|
presumes that regret is experienced and anticipated only with respect to the
non-chosen order quantity that turns out optimal in hindsight, i.e. D. How-
ever, this assumption is less of a limitation. From a normative perspective,
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the preference for ex-post inventory error minimization in (3.4) will obey the
axiom of transitivity if the set of alternatives is held constant (Sugden 1993),
unlike the initial axiomatization of regret theory by Loomes and Sugden (1982).
Moreover, Quiggin (1994) in fact shows that regret must be determined solely
by the ex-post optimal decision, when making the reasonable assumption that
statewise dominated alternatives should not affect choices. Finally, deriving
disutility solely from the foregone option D seems plausible from a descriptive
perspective due to the high saliency of D after its realization, as compared to
other counterfactual order quantities the decision maker might regret not having
chosen.
While it seems reasonable to base regret on D, the preference for ex-post
inventory error minimization in (3.4) assumes further that inventory errors
|q−D| reduce total utility symmetrically for leftover units and unmet demand,
regardless of how costly these situations actually are. This implies that the
decision maker is not able or willing to explicitly calculate financial consequences
of being wrong. To capture this apparent shortcoming, consider the linear case
where regret after realization of demand D is given by δα(q,D) = α2(q−D)++
α1(D−q)+. We can loosely interpret α2 as the additional costs of leftovers while
α1 technically corresponds to goodwill costs of not being able to fully satisfy
demand. Total expected utility
ED[u(q)] =ED[pi(q)]− ED[δα(q,D)]
=
∫ q
a
(pD − α2(q −D))dΦ(D) +
∫ b
q
(pq − α1(D − q))dΦ(D)− wq
(3.5)
then yields the regret version of Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989) with a utility max-
imizing order quantity q∗ = Φ−1
(
p−w+α1
p+α1+α2
)
. From a psychological viewpoint,
(3.5) is appealing since it allows for regret being experienced more closely in
line with actual foregone profits. This experience needs not be symmetric for
stock-out and leftover inventory situations. In fact, for α1 = p−w and α2 = w,
it is easy to see that since the utility-maximizing order from (3.5) becomes
q∗ = Φ−1
(
p−w+α1
p+α1+α2
)
= Φ−1
(
p−w
p
)
. The notion of regret then has no decision
impact.
We arrive at a similar result when relaxing the linearity assumption in (3.5).
For the resulting general case,
ED [u(q)] = pi(q)− ED [δ(pˇi(D)− pˇi(q))] , (3.6)
unambiguous predictions are not possible without further constraints on the
structure of either the demand distribution Φ(D) or the regret function δ(·).
However, for uniformly distributed demand used in previous newsvendor exper-
iments, the following theorem shows that the regret minimizing order coincides
with the expected profit optimal order quantity.
Theorem 4. Expected utility ED [u(q)] in (3.6) is maximized at q∗ for D ∼
U [a, b].
When utility is solely derived from received and foregone monetary wealth,
regret theory thus turns out to be descriptively inaccurate for the newsven-
dor problem because it does not predict the too-high-too-low order behavior.
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Although some important antecedents for regret behavior, like e.g. quick uncer-
tainty resolution and knowledge about the outcome of the rejected alternatives
(Zeelenberg 1999), are typically present laboratory implementations of the prob-
lem, this result is little surprising. First, regret phenomena are most interesting
when prospects are not comonotonic (Quiggin 1994), but profit distributions
of the newsvendor order quantities typically are comonotonic with only small
statewise profit differences.5 Secondly, unlike most experimental tests of regret
theory found in the literature (e.g. Loomes and Sugden 1987), the newsvendor
problem is highly difficult to solve intuitively already in its standard repre-
sentation. This complexity alone is likely to deter the decision maker from
following the logic of the general regret formulation in (3.6) since accurately
anticipating foregone profits is cognitively challenging. Regretting ex-post in-
ventory errors |q − D| in (3.4) is a simple mental shortcut to actual foregone
profit, though. The preference for minimizing ex-post inventory error thus of-
fers a viable regret-theoretic explanation for empirically observed newsvendor
behavior, but it competes with different anchoring heuristics.
3.2.2 The Anchoring Newsvendor: The Use of Decision
Shortcuts
By the metrics of most decision makers, even the standard representation of the
newsvendor problem is highly complex and calculating an optimum (which needs
not be the risk-neutral textbook solution) is cognitively not feasible or just not
worth the effort. In such situations, people’s decisions tend to be biased towards
salient anchor values suggested by the particular frame of the problem at hand
(Slovic and Lichtenstein 1971, Kahneman and Tversky 1974). The newsvendor
problem provides very salient cues associated with the demand distribution.
Themean anchor heuristic assumes decision makers anchor on mean demand
and then insufficiently adjust towards the optimum, implying the same too-low-
too-high prediction as the ex-post inventory error minimization. With repeated
rounds, the mean anchor heuristic predicts initial orders q0 to be close to mean
demand µ, followed by an insufficient convergence towards the optimum q∗,
formalized as
qt = α(t)µ+ (1− α(t))q∗ (3.7)
with α′(t) < 0 and 0 < α(t) ≤ 1 . Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) find that first
round order quantities are closer to mean demand than average order quantities
across all rounds. On the same level of aggregation, regression based estimates
of α(t) as a linear function of t in Bolton and Katok (2007) and Katok and Wu
(2007) support the contention that a population of decision makers learns to
move towards the optimum. Likewise, the estimates of α(t) in Benzion et al.
(2005) are significantly lower for the first 20 rounds of their experiment than for
the last 20 rounds. Empirical evidence for themean anchor heuristic is obviously
strong but it cannot explain why the adjustment process on the population
level remains strikingly insufficient even with extended learning, training, and
feedback. A complementary explanation is required.
5Two prospects qi and qj are comonotonic if, for any two states Dk and Dl, pˇi(qi, Dk) ≥
pˇi(qi, Dl) ⇒ pˇi(qj , Dk) ≥ pˇi(qj , Dl). Prospects in the standard newsvendor problem are ob-
viously comonotonic by nature since pˇi(q,Dk) ≥ pˇi(q,Dl) for Dk > Dl and any given order
quantity q.
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Similar to the psychology of the mean anchor heuristic, decision makers
might anchor on prior order quantities and adjust towards prior demand re-
alizations. The resulting chasing demand pattern has found some empirical
support, both on an aggregate (Schweitzer and Cachon 2000, Katok and Wu
2007) and on an individual level (Bolton and Katok 2007). Unlike the mean
anchor heuristic, the chasing demand bias makes no formal claim regarding the
relationship between mean demand and an individual order decision qt in pe-
riod t (Schweitzer and Cachon 2000). However, it does for the decision maker’s
average order quantity over N periods, q¯N . Consider a simple model of the
chasing demand heuristic with the newsvendor adapting his previous order qt−1
towards the previous demand realization Dt−1 in order to choose his period t
order quantity
qt = qt−1 + α(Dt−1 − qt−1), (3.8)
with 0 < α ≤ 1. The average order quantity q¯N then converges to mean
demand as N grows large. This result is independent of the particular initial
order quantity q0 which the chasing demand heuristic makes no prediction for.
Theorem 5. The expected average order EDN [q¯N ] converges to µ as N →∞.
The chasing demand heuristic in (3.8) carries an interesting psychological anal-
ogy to the ex-post inventory error minimization in (3.4) and can be viewed as
a hybrid decision strategy. It encompasses a fallacious belief in positive correla-
tion between independent demand draws as well as a regret for past inventory
errors. Learning about Dt−1 induces the experience of regret, approximated by
|Dt−1 − qt−1|. Since past results cannot be changed in hindsight and should
not matter for future decisions, minimizing past regret by adjusting the previ-
ous order qt−1 towards previous demand Dt−1 is normatively flawed. However,
from the behavioral perspective discussed in the previous section, the salience of
the recent demand realization Dt−1 fuels the psychology of regret (Zeelenberg
1999), especially since Dt−1 minimizes experienced regret. If learning about in-
ventory errors reinforces regret and subsequently the chasing demand heuristic,
it seems less surprising that feedback does not work well (Bolton and Katok
2007) or even degrades performance (Lurie and Swaminathan 2007).
Overall, mean ordering behavior is a consequence of different decision biases
which are triggered by the complexity of the newsvendor problem and work
on similar demand-related clues provided by the decision frame. They have
in common the suboptimal performance they entail. Even well-meant decision
guidance leads human decision makers off the track of standard theory which
academics commonly use to solve the newsvendor problem and its many vari-
ants.
3.3 Study 1: The Impact of Task Complexity
and Framing
This section reports on the results of a laboratory experiment designed to ex-
plore how mean ordering behavior, and the decision strategies underlying it, are
triggered by task complexity and guided by demand-related information cues
provided by the newsvendor problem.
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Lacking a universal definition, the term task complexity has been conceptu-
alized and operationalized in a number of ways (Wood 1986, Campbell 1988).
How a decision maker experiences complexity of a task is context-specific and
influenced by a variety of factors, including personal characteristics, objective
task complexity, and the availability and type of decision support. Objective
task complexity is a function of (1) the number of distinct information cues to
be processed, (2) the number of distinct processes to be executed and (3) the
relationship between cues and processes (Speier 2006). The standard newsven-
dor is arguably the simplest model to teach operations decision making under
risk, but it is inherently complex by the above metrics. Consider a person with
some well-defined utility function u(·). Standard theory tacitly views the de-
cision maker as being able and willing to combine the problem parameters to
profits pi(q) for each possible state D, evaluate statewise profits in terms of util-
ity u(pi(q)), sum these probability-weighted utilities to compute ED[u(pi(q))] for
each q, and finally choose the q that yields maximum expected utility (Johnson
and Payne 1985). It is not surprising that decision makers do not perfectly
follow this process, but rather employ heuristic strategies, especially when fi-
nancial incentives and intrinsic motivation are low compared to the experienced
task complexity (Camerer and Hogarth 1999).
Previous newsvendor experiments lowered experienced complexity, expecting
a positive impact on performance. Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) offer decision
support through upfront training in the necessary statistics or ongoing feedback
during the choice task, but subjects appeared to be either unable or unwilling
to pick it up. Lurie and Swaminathan (2007) find that feedback on demand re-
alizations can even degrade performance when provided too frequently. Bolton
and Katok (2007) control objective task complexity by reducing the number of
available order options. Performance does not improve, even when additional
information on foregone profits in previous rounds and moving averages of recent
demand realization are provided. The question remains whether previous ma-
nipulations of complexity and decision support were still insufficient or, as the
flip-side of the same coin, whether the problem-specific cues (like mean demand)
are generally too strong, triggering the use of heuristics even when experienced
complexity is lowered to the minimum possible.
It is well-known from the decision sciences literature that perceived task
complexity moderates the use of context-specific heuristics and resulting per-
formance (Te’eni 1989). In a strategic choice situation, Ho and Weigelt (1996)
find that players predominantly select the least complex strategies from a set
of strategically equivalent multiple equilibria. In a non-strategic riskless choice
situation, Payne (1976) finds that decision makers tend to resort to heuristics
when task complexity increases. In a similar study, Olshavsky (1979) provides
further evidence for this contingent processing hypothesis. In his study, sub-
jects simplify their decision strategies when the number of alternatives as well
as the number of attributes describing each alternative increase. Concerning
decision performance, Paquette and Kida (1988) find that decision makers do
actually better by using simpler decision strategies when task complexity in-
creases. In a simulation-based study of a non-strategic risky choice situation
similar to the newsvendor problem, Johnson and Payne (1985) replicate this
result. The authors find that heuristic strategies can be highly accurate while
substantially reducing cognitive effort relative to normative procedures, but they
carefully point out that the accuracy of heuristic decision strategies is highly
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task-contingent. In the newsvendor context, subjects in previous studies left up
to 61% of expected profit on the table by not ordering optimally (Schweitzer
and Cachon 2000).
Overall, the literature consistently shows that decision makers resort to
heuristics already at relatively low complexity levels and decrease cognitive ef-
fort further when perceived complexity increases.
Hypothesis 1 (The complexity explanation). Mean ordering behavior de-
creases in task complexity.
In order to test Hypothesis 1, we relax the perceived complexity, relative to
the perceived decision importance. First, we narrow the cardinality of both the
choice and demand space (Payne 1976). Specifically, our experiment considers
three treatments with 7, 5, and 3 possible order options and demand states,
respectively. This is similar to, but more radical than, Bolton and Katok (2007)
who reduce the number of order options but maintain the number of possible
demand states. Secondly, in the actual choice situations we provide profit in-
formation for each order-demand combination (Table 3.1(a)) but do not reveal
the price and cost values underlying them. Effectively, we control for possible
decision biases arising from distorted parameter perception, like the relative
overvaluation of factual costs of overage, w, compared to the opportunity costs
of underage, p− w (Thaler 1980). Knowledge of these parameters would need-
lessly add further complexity to the task because it has no bearing on either
mean demand anchoring, minimizing ex-post inventory error, or demand chas-
ing, as the three competing explanations for the mean ordering behavior. Taken
together, our task manipulations force subjects to work directly on the wealth
distributions in a scaled-down newsvendor problem, giving normative theory its
best shot.6
Task complexity necessitates the use of a decision heuristic but it does not
predict mean anchoring. The three decision strategies discussed in Section 3.2
entail this prediction and they have in common that they rely on demand-related
cues provided by the particular frame of the newsvendor model, while standard
decision theory views the problem simply as choosing from a set of final wealth
distributions.
Hypothesis 2 (The framing explanation). Mean ordering behavior van-
ishes when the demand-related anchor values of the newsvendor problem are not
present.
In order to test Hypothesis 2 we first remove previous demand realization as a
potential anchor value: Resolving uncertainty only after all choices are made, we
essentially control for the chasing demand heuristic. Furthermore, we introduce
a NEUTRAL frame as depicted in Table 3.1(b). Since only the OPERATIONS
frame provides the relevant demand-related anchors, we can test the ex-post
inventory error minimization and the mean anchor heuristic by a comparison
with behavior under the NEUTRAL frame.
6This includes regret theory, the psychology of which is reinforced by a matrix representa-
tion, due to easy statewise wealth comparisons (Loomes and Sugden 1987).
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Table 3.1: Two frames of the newsvendor problem
(a) OPERATIONS
Demand
300 600 900
1
3
1
3
1
3
O
rd
er 300 6 6 6
600 4 12 12
900 2 10 18
(b) NEUTRAL
1
3
1
3
1
3
A 6 6 6
B 4 12 12
C 2 10 18
Our manipulations move us substantially away from the way we teach the
newsvendor model, but they serve a good purpose. By reducing the relative
task complexity and controlling the demand-related anchors of the newsvendor
frame as a potential source for decision bias, we are in a position to investigate
the descriptive validity of expected utility theory and most of its generalizations
(like regret theory a` la Loomes and Sugden), none of which predicts differences
in choice behavior in the OPERATIONS and the NEUTRAL frame.
3.3.1 Parameterization and Laboratory Implementation
Study 1 entails 12 different treatments in a 2x2x3 mixed design, with one
between-subject factor (OPERATIONS frame vs. NEUTRAL frame) and two
within-subject factors (high vs. low profit, and three different number of states).
For each of the low profit scenarios (3, 5, or 7 states), we use a discrete uniform
demand distribution with lower support A = 100 and upper support B = 160.
For each high profit scenario, A = 300 and B = 900. For the 3-states treatments,
we prices and cost parameters such that p−wp = 0.25 in low profit condition and
p−w
p = 0.75 in high profit condition (see Appendix for details on all choice ma-
trices implemented in this study). For the 5- and 7-states treatments, we choose
these parameters such that pi(q∗−1) = pi(q
∗
+1) for the two order options q
∗
−1 and
q∗+1 adjacent to q
∗, allowing us to assess risk preferences more easily. For the low
profit condition these parameters entail losses for some combinations of order
quantity and demand, but for the quantities of central interest for our study
(q∗−1, q
∗, and q∗+1) all possible outcomes lie in the domain of gains.
The experiment was run at the experimental laboratory of the Collaborative
Research Center 504 at the University of Mannheim. In total we recruited 52
subjects for Study 1, mostly undergraduate students, by means of a computer-
ized recruitment system. 25 subjects participated in the OPERATIONS and 27
subjects in the NEUTRAL frame. Each subject made a decision for each com-
bination of profit condition (HP , LP ) and number of states (3, 5, 7), resulting
in six independent choice situations which were presented in random order to
counterbalance possible order effects.
Each session began with participants reading manual instructions and re-
maining questions were resolved. To ensure that the choice task was properly
understood, subjects then had to answer a short series of practicing questions
followed by the actual choice situations. In order to increase participants’ in-
volvement in each of the choice situations, we omitted laboratory tokens and
rather let the choice matrices contain real payoffs (in Euros), and chose the
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random lottery procedure for determining the actual payments to the partici-
pants (Benzion et al. 2005). After all choices had been made and all uncertainty
had been resolved we randomly determined, for each subject independently, one
choice situation the realized profit of which was payed out for real. Together
with the limited number of choice situations faced by each participant, we ex-
pected subjects to devote comparatively more time and cognitive effort on each
decision than in previous experimental studies on newsvendor behavior. Also,
participants were allowed (and, in fact, explicitly motivated) to revise earlier
decisions.
The average duration of all experimental sessions was roughly 30 minutes
and average earnings were e9.50 including a e2 participation fee.
3.3.2 Results
Figure 3.1 displays the average order quantities on the aggregate population
level. We can reject the null hypothesis that the average orders match the risk-
(a) LP , 3 states (b) LP , 5 states (c) LP , 7 states
(d) HP , 3 states (e) HP , 5 states (f) HP , 7 states
Figure 3.1: Average choices (standard deviations in parantheses)
neutral benchmark q∗ for all high profit treatments (two-tailed sign-test, p =
0.01) but not for the low profit treatments (except in OPERATIONS frame with
5 states, where p = 0.06). Comparing orders under the two different frames, we
find significant differences only for high profit with seven states where subjects
in the OPERATIONS frame treatment order closer to mean demand than in the
corresponding NEUTRAL frame treatment (two tailed Mann-Whitney-U-test,
p = 0.012). On the aggregate level, we thus find no evidence for mean ordering
behavior and only little differences between the two frames.
We now examine individual choice behavior, defining a subject’s choices as
mean-ordering behavior if, given a HP/LP -pair for a number of states (3, 5,
or 7), in both the LP and the HP condition the chosen quantity is closer to
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mean demand than the profit-maximizing quantity q∗. Likewise, we define risk
aversion if none of the order quantities chosen in HP an LP is larger than q∗
and at least one of them is lower than q∗ (and vice versa in order to classify risk
seeking behavior). Figure 3.2 displays the revealed choices.
(a) Operations (b) Neutral
Figure 3.2: Individual choice behavior
For the OPERATIONS frame, the data on individual choice patterns reveals
that mean ordering behavior increases in the number of states involved in the
choice task (Cochran-Q test, p = 0.01). This result speaks to Hypothesis 1
(complexity). As to Hypothesis 2 (framing), the data reveals a stronger ten-
dency to anchor in the OPERATIONS frame than in the NEUTRAL frame.
This is intuitive because the latter simply does not provide the decision maker
with the mean demand anchor. We conjecture that, given the absence of mean
demand as a natural anchor, subjects in the NEUTRAL frame spent more effort
on the decision, resulting in choices that potentially better reflect their under-
lying preferences with respect to the monetary outcomes given in the decision
matrices. This is supported by Table 3.2 which reports on average response
times for each treatment. Testing a general linear model reveals a significant
main effect of the number of states (within-subject, significant at the 1%-level)
as well as of the framing (between-subject, significant at the 1%-level).
Table 3.2: Average response times (in seconds)
States OPERATIONS (N=25) NEUTRAL (N=27)
3 30s 32s
5 35s 41s
7 38s 54s
3.3.3 Discussion
The results of Study 1 show the significant impact of task complexity and an-
chorable information on mean ordering behavior. The majority of choices were
in fact consistent with the predictions of expected utility theory, particularly
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in the NEUTRAL frame. More than half of the subjects’ choices revealed risk-
averse preferences. Nevertheless, results on the individual level indicate mean
ordering even in simple decision situations. Since we controlled for learning
opportunities, the chasing demand heuristic cannot account for this result. The
question remains whether choices were pulled towards the mean by the mean
anchor or due to the desire to minimize expected regret from an ex-post in-
ventory error. We try to give a first lead to this by investigating the impact
of regret on post-decision satisfaction, however noting that the mere experience
of ex-post regret is, while apparently necessary, an insufficient condition for
assuming ex-ante anticipation of decision regret. After the demand resolution
and independently for each choice situation, in both treatments we provided
participants with information on the realized as well as foregone profits and
asked them how happy they were with their choice in hindsight. Satisfaction
was elicited by means of a 12-point scale anchored by unhappy (1) and happy
(12). Let Sit denote the satisfaction expressed by subject i for the resolved
choice situation t. We estimate a least square dummy variable model with fixed
effects for each decision maker,
Sit = β0 + β1pˇi(qit) + β2R
L/S
it , (3.9)
where RL/Sit = pˇi(Dit) − pˇi(qit). In this model, ex-post satisfaction is driven by
the absolute payoff of the chosen option qit as well as its level relative to the
counterfactual payoff had one chosen Dit instead. Furthermore, we estimate the
parameters of
Sit = β0 + β1pˇi(qit) + β2R
S/C
it (3.10)
where RS/Cit = |qit − Dit|. In this model, ex-post satisfaction is driven by the
absolute payoff of the chosen option as well as the ex-post inventory error. The
results in Table 3.3 indicate that post-decision utility is indeed driven by both
the realized profit and counterfactual outcomes, regardless of how we capture
the notion of decision regret.
Table 3.3: Ex-post regret evaluation
S/C L/S
NEUTRAL OPERATIONS NEUTRAL OPERATIONS
β0 5.346 5.561 5.290 5.415
β1 0.304 0.604 0.341 0.624
β2 -0.311 -0.245 -0.268 -0.282
adj. R2 0.494 0.652 0.474 0.671
F 6.609 11.730 6.173 12.703
Since factual experience of regret ex-post to the resolution of uncertainty is
a quite natural prerequisite for this psychological sensation to have an ex-ante
decision impact, we conjecture that regret plays a role in newsvendor decision
making.7 In the next section, we try to shed further light on regret from ex-post
inventory errors.
7In a separate estimation we included parameters of disappointment theory (Bell 1985)
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3.4 Study 2: Regretting Ex-post Inventory Er-
rors
Over repeated decisions, the mean anchor heuristic pulls the order quantity
toward the profit optimum, but insufficiently so. In contrast, the preference
for minimizing ex-post inventory error pulls the order quantity towards mean
demand where regret from being wrong is minimized. Analyzing behavior over
time thus potentially helps untangling regret from anchoring, but evidence from
such analyses is still rather mixed (Katok andWu 2007, Bolton and Katok 2007).
In Study 2, we follow a different approach by systematically manipulating the
causes for the ex-post inventory error minimization.
Regret behavior is generally more likely if significant persons in the decision
maker’s social network evaluate the decision outcome (Zeelenberg 1999). For
example, the newsvendor might want to account for the fact that he is evalu-
ated based on the fact that the order decision turned out to be non-optimal in
hindsight, regardless of how costly the deviation actually is (Bell 1982). This
not only fosters regret per se, but also offers one plausible psychological cause
of the symmetric regret evaluation of understock and overstock as implied by
the ex-post inventory error minimization in (3.4) as well as the chasing demand
heuristic in (3.8). From a behavioral point of view, we can thus formulate the
following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 3A (Regret). Mean ordering behavior increases when inventory
errors become costly in both psychological and monetary terms.
Hypothesis 3A describes the impact of regret on mean ordering. The following
hypotheses address the potential impact of regret on the decision strategies that
underlie this behavior.
Hypothesis 3B (Regret). The preference for minimizing ex-post inventory
errors regresses order quantities towards mean demand, when inventory errors
become costly in both psychological and monetary terms.
Hypothesis 3C (Regret). Demand chasing behavior increases when inventory
errors become costly, both in psychological and in monetary terms.
3.4.1 Laboratory Implementation
Participants play 30 rounds in the 7 states condition of Study 1, under both
the high profit and the low profit condition. The two profit conditions’ order
is varied accross subjects. Since we do not detect significant order effects, the
following section reports on the results from the pooled data. Period demand
materializes right after an order was placed and confirmed. Overall, Study
2 entails 8 different treatments in a 2x4 mixed design, with one within-subject
also mentioned by Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) as a potential psychological cause for the
desire to minimize ex-post inventory error. Elation is experienced if received profit exceeds
prior expectations, D+ = max(pˇi(q) − pi(q), 0), disappointment if it falls short of the chosen
option’s expected value, D− = max(pi(q) − pˇi(q), 0). We found both effects negligible and
non-significant.
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factor (high vs. low profit) and one between-subject factor (Incentives for regret,
with four different levels discussed below).
In order to test Hypotheses 3 (Regret), we manipulate incentives and infor-
mation in the four treatments NEUTRAL (n), OPERATIONS (o), REGRET
(r), and PENALTY (r). The base treatments NEUTRAL and OPERATIONS
were identical to the setup of Study 1, except that learning over multiple rounds
is now possible. In addition to the information provided in the OPERATIONS
treatment, under the REGRET treatment the computer screen prompts ”‘You
ordered [q − D] units more than you needed!!!”’ (if q > D) or ”‘You ordered
[D − q] units less than you needed!!!”’ (if q < D). If this permanent, but mon-
etarily irrelevant, reminder of being wrong fosters the psychology of regret, the
theory in Section 3.2 would imply more mean ordering under REGRET than
under OPERATIONS. In addition to the information provided in the REGRET
treatment, the PENALTY treatment penalizes the inventory error |q−D| with
1.5 cent per unit. This penalty implies that the expected profit optimal order
quantities (q∗LP = 600 and q
∗
HP = 700) are closer to mean demand (µLP = 650
and µHP = 600) than in the other three treatments (where q∗LP = 550 and
q∗HP = 800).
8 Thus, order quantities under PENALTY should be closer to
mean demand, compared to the profit optimal orders q∗ in the remaining three
treatments which are equivalent with respect to the distributions of final profits
they entail.
Overall, we expect to observe less mean ordering behavior under NEUTRAL
than under the remaining three treatments, because the NEUTRAL treatment
does not provide the decision maker with the necessary demand-related informa-
tion for anchoring on mean demand, chasing demand, or regretting inventory
errors. Further, we expect more mean ordering behavior when moving from
OPERATIONS to REGRET, and even more when moving from REGRET to
PENALTY, since the incentives for both the minimization of expected ex-post
inventory errors as well as the incentives for chasing demand increase along
this line. Let qˆij denote the average order quantity across subjects and rounds
in profit condition i ∈ {LP,HP} and treatment j ∈ {n, o, r, p} (we drop the
indices i and j wherever appropriate). Our research hypotheses then translate
to
q∗ < qˆLPn < qˆ
LP
o < qˆ
LP
r < qˆ
LP
p
in the low profit condition, and
qˆHPp < qˆ
HP
r < qˆ
HP
o < qˆ
HP
n < q
∗
in the high profit condition.
In total we recruited 112 subjects for Study 2, following the same experimen-
tal protocol as in Study 1. The average duration of all experimental sessions was
roughly 30 minutes. As in Study 1 we employed the random lottery procedure
for payment determination, leading to average earnings of e8 including a e2
participation fee.
8The demand distribution was scaled up in LP to [500; 800] implying no change of the
profit entries in the decision matrix, see Appendix C.
36
Taking Full Inventory Risk - Anchoring and Regret
3.4.2 Results
We first analyze aggregate choice behavior. In analogy to qˆij , let and qˆ
i′
j define
the first-round order quantity averaged across subjects, and qˆi
′
Study1 the corre-
sponding quantities from Study 1 where each condition was only played once.
Note that the results from the OPERATIONS treatment in Study 1 is used to
provide one common benchmark qˆi
′
Study1 for the OPERATIONS, REGRET, and
PENALTY treatments in Study 2. Figure 3.3 gives an overview of the results.
Tables 3.3(a) and 3.3(b) provide the results from a number of statistical tests.
(a) Low Profit (b) High Profit
Figure 3.3: Aggregate results
For all four treatments we observe that subjects order more than q∗ in the
low profit condition, and less than q∗ in the high profit condition. This pattern
holds for average orders qˆij as well as initial orders qˆ
i′
j (significant except for
initial order quantities under the low profit condition in PENALTY). Pulling
both profit conditions together, the results indicate mean ordering behavior on
the population level.
It is interesting to compare these results with the data from Study 1 which
does not detect mean ordering on the level of average orders. Descriptively,
we find qˆij > qˆ
i′
j > qˆ
i′
Study1 for all eight combinations of profit condition i ∈
{LP,HP} and treatment j ∈ {n, o, r, p}. Comparing first round orders qˆij from
Study 2 with qˆi
′
Study1 from Study 1, the differences are statistically significant
except for the NEUTRAL and the PENALTY treatment under the high profit
condition. Comparing average orders qˆi
′
j and qˆ
i′
Study1, the differences are only
significant in the low profit condition, except for the NEUTRAL treatment.
Thus, there is evidence that subjects tend to choose riskier gambles (i.e. larger
order quantities in the newsvendor context) when facing multiple rounds of the
same problem.
We also analyze how decisions are affected by the four different frames of-
fered in this study (statistical tests in Tables 3.3(a) and 3.3(b)). Consistent with
our research hypotheses, the data shows that q∗ < qˆLPn < qˆ
LP
o = qˆ
LP
r < qˆ
LP
p for
the low profit condition, and q∗ > qˆHPn > qˆ
HP
o > qˆ
HP
r > qˆ
HP
p for the high profit
condition. For both profit conditions statistical tests reject the null hypothesis
qˆin = qˆio = qˆir = qˆip. The NEUTRAL treatment yields significantly lower (higher)
order quantities than the three newsvendor frames in the low (high) profit con-
dition. We detect no significant differences between the OPERATIONS and
37
Chapter 3
(a
)
L
o
w
p
ro
fi
t
D
e
c
isio
n
s
H
y
p
o
th
e
se
s
a
H
0
:
qˆ ′
qˆ
qˆ ′
=
q ∗
qˆ
=
q ∗
qˆ ′
=
qˆ
qˆ ′
=
qˆ ′S
t
u
d
y
1
qˆ ′
=
qˆ
S
t
u
d
y
1
N
E
U
T
R
A
L
(n
)
5
6
8
5
8
6
p
=
0
.0
6
8
p
<
0
.0
0
1
p
=
0
.0
3
7
p
=
0
.1
6
4
p
=
0
.0
0
1
O
P
E
R
A
T
IO
N
S
(o
)
6
0
3
6
0
5
p
=
0
.0
0
1
p
<
0
.0
0
1
p
=
0
.9
8
3
p
=
0
.0
0
2
p
=
0
.0
0
8
R
E
G
R
E
T
(r
)
5
9
2
6
0
5
p
<
0
.0
0
1
p
<
0
.0
0
1
p
=
0
.0
3
6
p
=
0
.0
0
5
p
<
0
.0
0
1
P
E
N
A
L
T
Y
(p
)
b
6
0
2
6
2
0
p
=
0
.9
2
2
p
<
0
.0
0
1
p
=
0
.0
9
2
p
=
0
.0
0
1
p
<
0
.0
0
1
H
0
:
c
qˆ
n
=
qˆ
o
p
=
0
.0
3
5
p
=
0
.0
9
6
H
0
:
qˆ
n
=
qˆ
r
p
=
0
.1
1
0
p
=
0
.0
6
0
H
0
:
qˆ
n
=
qˆ
p
p
=
0
.0
2
4
p
<
0
.0
0
0
H
0
:
qˆ
o
=
qˆ
r
p
=
0
.2
2
1
p
=
0
.8
3
0
H
0
:
qˆ
o
=
qˆ
p
p
=
0
.8
5
5
p
=
0
.0
7
0
H
0
:
qˆ
r
=
qˆ
p
p
=
0
.1
3
7
p
=
0
.0
6
8
H
0
:
d
qˆ
n
=
qˆ
o
=
qˆ
r
=
qˆ
p
p
=
0
.0
4
4
p
=
0
.0
0
2
(b
)
H
ig
h
p
ro
fi
t
D
e
c
isio
n
s
H
y
p
o
th
e
se
s
H
0
:
qˆ ′
qˆ
qˆ ′
=
q ∗
qˆ
=
q ∗
qˆ ′
=
qˆ
qˆ ′
=
qˆ ′S
t
u
d
y
1
qˆ ′
=
qˆ
S
t
u
d
y
1
N
E
U
T
R
A
L
(n
)
7
2
3
7
2
4
p
=
0
.0
1
4
p
<
0
.0
0
1
p
=
0
.6
1
6
p
=
0
.2
7
9
p
=
0
.5
2
5
O
P
E
R
A
T
IO
N
S
(o
)
6
3
5
6
6
4
p
=
0
.0
0
1
p
<
0
.0
0
1
p
=
0
.2
4
8
p
=
0
.3
8
4
p
=
0
.0
1
1
R
E
G
R
E
T
(r
)
6
0
6
6
4
8
p
<
0
.0
0
1
p
<
0
.0
0
1
p
=
0
.0
0
2
p
=
0
.6
4
0
p
=
0
.0
6
3
P
E
N
A
L
T
Y
(p
)
e
6
0
6
6
1
3
p
<
0
.0
0
1
p
<
0
.0
0
1
p
=
0
.4
7
3
p
=
0
.6
1
4
p
=
0
.6
4
8
H
0
:
qˆ
n
=
qˆ
o
p
=
0
.0
3
0
p
=
0
.0
1
2
H
0
:
qˆ
n
=
qˆ
r
p
=
0
.0
0
1
p
=
0
.0
0
1
H
0
:
qˆ
n
=
qˆ
p
p
=
0
.0
0
1
p
<
0
.0
0
1
H
0
:
qˆ
o
=
qˆ
r
p
=
0
.5
8
5
p
=
0
.2
8
8
H
0
:
qˆ
o
=
qˆ
p
p
=
0
.6
4
1
p
=
0
.0
0
6
H
0
:
qˆ
r
=
qˆ
p
p
=
0
.9
0
7
p
=
0
.0
4
1
H
0
:
qˆ
n
=
qˆ
o
=
qˆ
r
=
qˆ
p
p
=
0
.0
0
3
p
<
0
.0
0
1
a
W
ilc
o
x
o
n
fo
r
qˆ ′
=
q ∗
a
n
d
qˆ
=
q ∗
,
p
a
ire
d
-sa
m
p
le
W
ilc
o
x
o
n
fo
r
qˆ ′
=
qˆ
,
M
a
n
n
-U
fo
r
qˆ ′
=
qˆ ′S
t
u
d
y
1
b
e
x
p
e
c
te
d
p
ro
fi
t
m
a
x
im
iz
in
g
d
e
c
isio
n
q ∗
=
6
0
0
c
M
a
n
n
-U
te
sts
fo
r
a
ll
p
a
irw
ise
c
o
m
p
a
riso
n
s
qˆ
l
=
qˆ
m
d
K
ru
sk
a
l-W
a
llis
te
st
e
e
x
p
e
c
te
d
p
ro
fi
t
m
a
x
im
iz
in
g
d
e
c
isio
n
q ∗
=
7
0
0
T
able
3.4:
A
ggregate
behavior:
Statistical
tests
38
Taking Full Inventory Risk - Anchoring and Regret
REGRET treatment. In pairwise comparisons, the PENALTY treatment sys-
tematically yields average order quantities that are closer to mean demand than
in the three other treatments. On the aggregate level, our data thus suggests
that mean ordering becomes more prevalent when the basic choice task provides
the notion of demand (NEUTRAL→ OPERATIONS/REGRET), and even fur-
ther when the decision frame fosters the psychology underlying the preference
for inventory error minimization (OPERATIONS/REGRET → PENALTY).
We now examine individual choice behavior in order to check whether mean
ordering observed on the population level is a meaningful reflection of mean
ordering on the part of the population members, rather than an incidental
aggregation result. Define a subject’s choices as mean ordering if in both the
LP and the HP condition orders are closer to mean demand than the profit-
maximizing quantity q∗. For a given treatment, let θ be the proportion of
subjects exhibiting the mean ordering pattern in their average order behavior
across all rounds, and θ′ the corresponding measure for initial order quantities.
Figure 3.4 summarizes behavior in all treatments, including the mean ordering
proportion θ′Study1 from the 7 states treatments in Study 1. Table 3.5 provides
the related statistical tests.
Figure 3.4: Mean ordering across treatments
Comparing initial choice mean ordering θ′ with θ′Study1 for the NEUTRAL
frame, we find no differences between Study 1 and 2. For the three newsvendor
frames, we find that subjects tend to exhibit more mean ordering θ′ than in the
corresponding one-shot choice situation in Study 1, but these differences are not
significant in the statistical sense. Comparing average choice mean ordering θ
with θ′Study1 we find a significantly higher proportion of mean ordering subjects
in Study 2 than in Study 1. Furthermore, while a substantial number of sub-
jects exhibit mean order behavior already in their initial order decisions, qˆi
′
,
the proportion θ is significantly larger when calculated based on average order
quantities across all rounds, qˆi. We also compare mean ordering, θj , across the
different frames offered in this study. While the differences between the OP-
ERATIONS, REGRET, and PENALTY are neither systematic nor significant,
the three newsvendor frames exhibit significantly more mean ordering than the
NEUTRAL frame, in accordance with the results from Study 1.
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Decisions Hypotheses H0 :a
θ′ θ θ′ = θ′Study1 θ = θ
′
Study1 θ
′ = θ
NEUTRAL (n) 7% 57% p = 1.000 p < 0.001 p < 0.001
OPERATIONS (o) 63% 95% p = 0.223 p < 0.001 p = 0.031
REGRET (r) 63% 84% p = 0.114 p = 0.001 p = 0.039
PENALTY (p) 74% 97% p = 0.014 p < 0.001 p = 0.016
H0 : θn = θo p < 0.001 p = 0.004
H0 : θn = θr p < 0.001 p = 0.025
H0 : θn = θp p < 0.001 p < 0.001
H0 : θo = θr p = 1.000 p = 0.392
H0 : θo = θp p = 0.528 p = 1.000
H0 : θr = θp p = 0.419 p = 0.196
H0 : b θn = θo = θr = θp p = 0.003 p < 0.000
aFisher’s exact test for θ′ = θ′Study1 and θ = θ
′
Study1, McNemar test for θ
′ = θ
bFisher’s exact test
Table 3.5: Mean ordering: Statistical tests
We observe that mean ordering is significantly more prevalent when mea-
sured based on qˆi, i.e. order decisions averaged over time. One possible expla-
nation for this is the demand chasing heuristic which predicts average orders to
converge towards mean demand. As discussed in Section 3.2.2, demand chasing
can be viewed as a hybrid strategy combining the fallacious belief in positive
correlation between independent random draws as well as a fallacious desire
to minimize past regret. We now investigate the extent to which this decision
strategy emerges in our sample, and how it is moderated by the different treat-
ments used in our study. For each subject we fit the parameters of the linear
demand chasing model (3.8) from Section 3.2.2,
qt = α0 + α1qt−1 + α2(Dt−1 − qt−1),
to define archetypical decision strategies over time. If both the entire model
(by its F -statistics) and the parameter estimate for α2 (by its t-statistics) are
significant on the 10% level at least, we classify the subject as demand chasing
if α2 > 0, and as counterfactual demand chasing if α2 < 0.
The distributions of strategy types, displayed in Figure 3.5, significantly dif-
fer across the four treatments (Fisher-Freeman-Halton test, p = 0.006). In the
NEUTRAL treatment, we observe no demand chasing at all. On the other hand,
we observe a substantial number of subjects with α2 < 0 which corresponds
to the fallacious belief in a negative correlation between essentially uncorre-
lated random demand draws, however noting that the NEUTRAL treatment
technically does not offer the notion of ”demand”. In the OPERATIONS and
REGRET treatments, subjects are slightly less prone to counterfactual demand
chasing with α2 < 0 (16% in each treatment), but 16% to 19% of subjects follow
the demand chasing strategy with α2 > 0. These numbers are comparable to
the results reported in Bolton and Katok (2007). Finally, 39% of subjects in
the PENALTY treatment classify as demand chasing while the proportion of
subjects with α2 < 0 is further reduced to 10%.
To focus on the demand chasing heuristic and its impact on average or-
der quantities, let θαj denote the proportion of demand chasing subjects in
treatment j ∈ {n, o, r, p}. A series of statistical tests confirm the observa-
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θαj
NEUTRAL (n) 0%
OPERATIONS (o) 16%
REGRET (r) 19%
PENALTY (p) 39%
H0 : a θαn = θ
α
o p = 0.053
H0 : θαn = θ
α
r p = 0.024
H0 : θαn = θ
α
p p < 0.001
H0 : θαo = θ
α
r p = 1.000
H0 : θαo = θ
α
p p = 0.117
H0 : θαr = θ
α
p p = 0.099
aAll tests are Fisher’s exact
tests
Figure 3.5: Demand chasing
tion that demand chasing increases when moving from the NEUTRAL frame
towards the PENALTY frame, although the difference between OPERATIONS
and PENALTY is not statistically significant (Figure 3.5). The larger propor-
tion of demand chasing individuals in the three newsvendor frames is likely to
contribute to the mean anchoring observed in these treatments. We now check
whether our data mirrors the theoretical prediction of Theorem 5 which states
that demand chasing behavior entails mean ordering on the average. With the
exception of a single subject in treatment PENALTY, we find that those who
chase demand indeed place orders that exhibit the too-low-too-high pattern on
average.
3.4.3 Discussion
Mean ordering in the newsvendor problem can be attributed to a set of in-
terrelated decision strategies: Mean anchoring, ex-post inventory error mini-
mization, and demand chasing. These strategies have in common information
and incentive-related antecedent variables. Study 2 systematically manipulates
these variables in an attempt to untangle the drivers for mean ordering as well
as their underlying psychological causes. We arrive at several results some of
which have implications beyond the newsvendor problem.
Result 1: Subjects tend to make riskier choices (which is equivalent to larger
orders in the newsvendor problem) when facing the same choice situation re-
peatedly.
We conjecture that subjects might be prone to make riskier choices in each round
if they expect fortunate and unfortunate random draws to balance over multiple
rounds and thus perceive each order decision qˆij in Study 2 as less important for
the final payoff than the corresponding single choice qˆi
′
Study1 in Study 1. This is
of course flawed reasoning and particularly surprising under the random lottery
procedure applied in our experiments: Since every decision is equally likely to be
the sole one determining the final payoff, if anything this payment determination
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method should foster the perception of each decision as ”potentially important”.
Result 2: Subjects exhibit mean ordering behavior even in NEUTRAL, both
on the population and the individual level.
Clearly, neither the notion of inventory error or mean demand anchoring can
account for this result, because the NEUTRAL frame simply does not offer the
necessary information clues. The fallacious belief in positive correlation (which
translates to demand chasing in the three context-loaded newsvendor frames)
is one potentially valid explanation since it implies average orders to converge
to the mean. However, we do not detect this bias in the NEUTRAL frame.
We believe the likely reason behind Result 2 lies in a more general notion of
bounded rationality beyond the behavioral biases initially offered by Schweitzer
and Cachon (2000) and discussed in Section 3.2. To build some understanding,
consider a decision maker who strives after the expected profit maximal solu-
tion but, due to bounded rationality, considers all possible order quantities as
candidates for selection with better alternatives being chosen with larger prob-
abilities. Su (2007) captures this logic in a multinomial logit model. In this
formulation, a decision is not deterministic but rather the realization of a prob-
abilistic choice reasoning, while q∗ remains the most likely decision. Su (2007)
shows that probabilistic choices are normally distributed around q∗. For uni-
formly [a; b]-distributed demand, the choice distribution is naturally truncated
at a and b. The average choice then is not the choice distribution’s expected
value, q∗, but rather converges towards mean demand. For the intuition behind
this model-based result, consider a low profit product with a < q∗ < µ < b.
Loosely put, there is more room to err towards b, and thus towards the mean µ,
than there is room to err towards a. The reverse holds for a high profit product.
Considering our results from the NEUTRAL treatment, much of the evi-
dence on mean ordering in the newsvendor problem might in fact be due to
a expected profit-weighted randomization among available order alternatives.
But our results show that there is more to it.
Result 3: Average orders qˆ regress towards mean demand if a) mean demand
provides a salient anchor value, and b) the availability of information and in-
centives relevant for the psychology of regret increases.
Study 2 set out to untangle the two explanations a) and b) for the tendency
of average order quantities in a newsvendor population to converge towards
mean demand. To this end, it turns out to be instructive to first analyze initial
order quantities qˆ′. Based on qˆ′ in both profit conditions, we observe more
mean ordering in the three newsvendor frames than under NEUTRAL. This
result can be attributed either to the salient mean anchor or the minimization
of ex-post inventory errors under OPERATIONS, REGRET, and PENALTY.
Note that these frames provide the same mean demand anchor but differ in
their potential to induce inventory error regret. Since initial orders qˆ′ are not
significantly different between the three newsvendor frames, the minimization
of expected ex-post inventory errors is unlikely to drive behavior. This is not
too surprising since the profit optimal response to the inventory error penalty
is generally hard to figure out. It is hard to believe that subjects understand ad
hoc how to minimize the expected ex-post inventory error even if they want. As
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far as initial order decisions qˆ′ are concerned, we thus conclude that it is most
likely the mean demand anchor that drives mean ordering behavior.
Returning to average orders qˆ, we observe the most severe too-high-too-
low pattern under PENALTY. In this treatment, straight monetary arguments
should drive orders towards mean demand since the expected monetary penalty
from inventory errors is minimized at mean demand. However, the expected
penalty minimization objective is a complex stochastic problem itself, and un-
likely to be more amenable to an intuitive solution than the objective to maxi-
mize expected profits. Note in this respect that the base profits pˇi(q) displayed in
the decision matrices remain unaltered and thus offer no guidance for the penalty
minimization objective. While, at first sight, our results from the PENALTY
treatment suggest that subjects learn over time how to minimize expected penal-
ties from ex-post inventory errors, it seems more likely that they chase demand.
This decision strategy is psychologically similar to the desire to minimize ex-
pected ex-post inventory errors, but cognitively much easier to process.
Result 4: Demand chasing increases with the availability of information and
incentives that foster the psychology of regret.
Regret from inventory errors can result from significant socio-economic incen-
tives set by significant persons in a decision maker’s social network. The mon-
etary penalties in our PENALTY treatment are likely to offer a better approx-
imation for such non-monetary incentives than the REGRET treatment where
a stick-figure shouting ”you were wrong” is used to simulate psychological pres-
sure from others. Since inventory decisions and their outcomes are typically
monitored and evaluated by others in real settings, demand chasing and result-
ing average mean ordering is potentially underestimated in previous studies on
newsvendor decision making. To support this conjecture, we provide anecdotal
evidence from our own recent experience with inventory projects in industry.
For example, consider the after-sales supply chain of a large pharmaceutical
company stocking global spare parts in its Mannheim distribution center to
provide their field engineers in case of machine failures at a customer site. While
not facing the standard newsvendor model exactly, the company’s inventory
managers do face the standard dilemma of inventory decision making under
uncertainty. On the one hand, the firm incurs substantial inventory holding
costs for its highly expensive parts. On the other hand, stock-outs imply highly
expensive emergency shipments necessitated by the company’s desire to provide
a 100 percent next-day delivery service. Spare parts demand is highly sporadic
and generally unknown. As usual in inventory control under uncertainty, being
wrong is a costly but essential part of daily decision making at the company. In
personal communications, the responsible general supply chain manager told us
about an interesting9 impediment to his work which makes optimal inventory
control difficult, if not impossible. On a frequent basis, inventory managers have
to report to the managerial accounting department where they essentially take
on the blame for any mismatches between inventory availability and spare parts
demand, both for inventories and for shortage-induced emergency shipments. It
is exactly this kind of non-monetary incentives that fosters regret from inventory
errors and fuels strategies to reduce it, including the chasing demand heuristic.
9This of course is mostly interesting for us, but less for the inventory managers.
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As a further example, consider a Germany-based grocery retail chain. Amongst
other things, the retailer sells perishable items many of which fit the newsvendor
setting exactly (like e.g. lettuce or strawberries). From the retailer’s perspective
most of these are low profit products due to slim margins, but implicit costs
of low service levels not captured by the lost margin p − w effectively renders
them high profit. These critical fractile deliberations are not at all the per-
spective of those who actually control inventories on the store level, though.
Store managers have no knowledge of the procurement costs and thus cannot
calculate lost margins, nor can they follow unambiguous target service levels
set by management. Instead, general managers visit retail outlets on a daily
level and, inevitably, observe leftovers or stock-outs. The resulting message
communicated to store managers is typically very clear (but ultimately coun-
terproductive): They get the blame for any supply-demand mismatch ex-post,
even if the stocking decision was optimal ex-ante. Moreover, being blamed for
stock-outs and leftovers is quite a symmetric experience for the store managers
despite the actual asymmetry between the underage costs of a stock-out and the
overage costs of a leftover. Again, the psychological incentives set by manage-
ment effectively provide shop level employees with good reasons to follow the
ex-post inventory error minimization and the related chasing demand heuristic.
3.5 Managerial Implications
In an uncertain world, most supply chains (or parts of them) face newsvendor-
type problems and much of the contemporary supply chain research provides
managerial guidance on how to provide the right information (Chen 2003) and
set the right incentives (Cachon 2003) in order to improve total system per-
formance. While much of this work sets the unit of analysis to the level of
self-interested and perfectly rational firms, actual newsvendor decisions in prac-
tice are typically delegated to individuals, or groups of individuals, with limited
cognitive abilities. Our study and previous behavioral research observe mean
ordering, which is the consequence of a set of interrelated decision strategies
with different psychological causes. Depending on whether this behavior is a
judgment bias or rather a preference-based deviation from standard theory these
strategies have very different implications for debiasing (Arkes 1991).
3.5.1 Redesigning Information Systems
Just like any other decision rationale, the three strategies leading to the mean
ordering pattern require context-specific information ”to work on”. Controlling
the availability and presentation of this information thus is a potential means
to mitigate biased decision making.
While demand information is crucial for newsvendor decision making by
definition of the task, it is also core to the biases we encounter. This is most
obvious for information about the mean of demand. As shown in our studies,
removing demand information altogether would lessen the tendency to anchor
on mean demand. However, introducing the NEUTRAL frame is rather an
academic exercise to illustrate the strength of the mean demand anchor and
does not represent a very viable strategy for practice. We might still hope that
the mean demand anchor is less salient or not existing at all in real settings since
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many newsvendor decisions in practice are not based on known distributions
but rather made under ambiguity. Unfortunately, recent experimental results of
Thonemann et al. (2007) show that mean anchoring tends to be even more severe
when decision makers only know the bounds, but not the exact distribution.
Moreover, even with the ambiguous information often found in practice, it is
likely that decision makers form beliefs about the most likely outcome, and
then anchor on it. For example, we know it is widespread planning practice
to use best-case, mean, and worst-case scenarios in highly strategic decisions
under uncertainty. This again carries a notion of ”mean”. Also, most of today’s
commercial ERP and demand planning systems provide highly salient point
forecasts when there is a demand history (Wagner 2002). Realizing that decision
makers respond to reference points other than mean demand (Gavirneni and Xia
2007), management should try to carefully select and provide anchors that guide
decisions further towards the optimal solution.
Mean demand represents an anchorable information cue ex-ante to the order
decision. Over repeated decisions, the newsvendor problem provides plenty of
ex-post information like previous demand, inventory error, or profit realizations.
While information economics and adaptive learning theories strongly suggest
that more information is strictly better than less, results from both previous
and our studies illustrate that decision makers in the newsvendor problem fre-
quently convert available ex-post information into flawed subsequent decisions.
Carefully controlling these ex-post information cues thus offers opportunities
for debiasing flawed newsvendor behavior. Simply providing the decision maker
with the most recent demand realization is barely helpful, though. This is
because recent demand draws bear no information about the critical fractile
solution,10. Even worse, they potentially facilitate simple comparisons between
realized demand D and the chosen order quantity q. Such comparisons shade
the correct logic of leftover units being more costly than unmet demand in low
profit situations (and reversed in high profit situations) and fuel symmetric disu-
tility from inventory errors, |q−D|, underlying both the ex-post inventory error
minimization objective and the demand chasing heuristic. Providing feedback
only on past demand might also degrade performance if an increased focus on
recent demand realization leads the decision maker to confuse the inventory
control problem with the task to correctly ”guess demand”. Rather than letting
past demand realization become a potentially misleading anchor point, it seems
more promising to provide feedback on foregone payoffs from order options not
chosen by the decision maker. Unfortunately, experimental results show that
decision makers are unable to exploit such information efficiently (Bolton and
Katok 2007). Furthermore, hindsight knowledge of the profit optimal order
quantity, which is by definition realized demand D, might tempt the decision
maker to adjust towards it, further reinforcing the demand chasing strategy.
The question of ”what” information to provide thus easily poses a dilemma.
The decision on ”how often” to provide it seems somewhat simpler: one basic
lesson to learn from newsvendor experiments to date is that too frequent in-
formation is not helpful and can even degrade performance, contrary to what
common managerial instinct as well as decision theory would suggest (Lurie and
Swaminathan 2007). In particular, less frequent feedback has proven to result
10This is especially true if the demand distribution is known to the decision maker, and
not correlated over time, the situation usually present in laboratory implementations of the
problem.
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in less demand chasing.
Lastly, our results suggest that ”how” information is presented can be just as
important as ”what” information is provided ”how often”. Easing the cognitive
processing requirements by thinning the option and state space seem to induce
more choices in line with normative suggestions. While complexity reduction
was mainly motivated by experimental control arguments in the context of our
studies, it is potentially worthwhile to examine alternative task presentations in
future studies.
3.5.2 Redesigning Incentives
Although they anchor even with extended experience, decision makers in the
newsvendor problem respond to incentives in a qualitatively correct manner,
i.e. order quantities increase in p−wp (Gavirneni and Xia 2007). This suggests
that a stockout penalty or a subsidy for leftover inventory could be imposed in
order to correct the mean ordering behavior for a high profit product, whereas
a stockout bonus or an excess inventory penalty would work in a low profit
environment. The efficacy of this approach is questionable from a practical
perspective, though. First, it requires the firm to know the optimal quantity q∗.
This obviously makes the whole exercise redundant because the firm could just
implement q∗ in this case. Secondly, as our studies illustrate, order behavior
is widely heterogeneous in a population of decision makers, and one incentive
scheme is unlikely to fit them all. Third, correcting behavior by monetary
incentives might not even add to the firm’s bottom line when coordinating
bonus payments to inventory managers exceed the profit increase from ordering
towards q∗. Lastly, monetary penalties and subsidies help little in mitigating the
chasing demand heuristic, as illustrated in the PENALTY treatment of Study
2.
Making changes costly might prevent decision makers from reacting to ran-
dom demand fluctuations too heavily. Lurie and Swaminathan (2007) find ev-
idence that changes of order quantities are less frequent the more costly they
are. Surprisingly though, these incentives do not translate into improved perfor-
mance. Moreover, introducing cost of change is potentially dangerous in many
real settings, because it sets the wrong incentive when demand is non-stationary
and optimal inventory control actually requires order changes.
Our results from Study 2 show that the tendency towards frequent order
changes is moderated by decision regret. In order to mitigate the detrimental
impact of the chasing demand heuristic, it seems good managerial advice to
attenuate the regret psychological factors fueling it. An obvious way to do so
is teaching decision makers the core of inventory control under uncertain de-
mand, namely that being wrong is a natural part of it. Training might remove
the deceptive belief that inventory errors can only be attributed to flawed or-
der decisions. Unfortunately, at least in laboratory settings, such training has
proven to be largely ineffective. A promising alternative is to change intra-firm
incentives that foster the psychology of regret from inventory errors. A decision
maker’s preference to minimize regret from inventory errors, and resulting de-
mand chasing behavior, might simply reflect intra-firm incentives often found in
practice, as exemplified in Section 3.4.3. Clearly, management has to set incen-
tives, but simply penalizing operational decisions for being wrong is wrong. If
management is not willing to accept that inventory decisions under uncertainty
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entail inventory errors almost surely, then decision makers on the operational
level have good reasons to follow suboptimal but regret minimizing strategies like
the preference for minimizing ex-post inventory errors and the demand chasing
heuristic. The general implication of this viewpoint is, that not the newsvendors
need to be debiased, but rather those who set inappropriate incentives.
3.6 Conclusions
Previous experimental work on the newsvendor model reveals that decision mak-
ers tend to order closer to mean demand, relative to the profit optimal prescrip-
tion. We contribute to the existing literature by identifying and testing the
psychological drivers behind three competing explanations for this mean order-
ing behavior, in an attempt to untangle them.
In both studies we give normative theory its very best shot, employing rather
radical experimental control of the different aspects of the newsvendor problem.
First, we substantially reduce complexity associated with the number of pos-
sible demand outcomes and order options. Secondly, we moved the problem
representation closer the standard gamble paradigm commonly used in decision
experiments. Specifically, but irrelevant from a normative perspective, we made
subjects work on final wealth distributions instead of the price and cost parame-
ters underlying these prospects. Thirdly, in the NEUTRAL treatments, we even
removed the connotation of demand which is a natural part of the newsvendor
problem and a building block for both the mean anchor heuristic and the ex-post
inventory error preference, but should have no implications from a normative
perspective.
Our first study furthermore removes the prerequisites for the chasing de-
mand heuristic. While aggregate behavior is largely consistent with the norma-
tive prescriptions of expected utility theory, the results demonstrate the amaz-
ing strength of the mean demand anchor in guiding behavior away from the
optimum. The implied managerial advice is to actively control anchorable in-
formation cues which is admittedly a non-trivial task (Arkes 1991). In our
second study we make ex-post inventory errors costly. The results show that
decision makers respond to such incentives by an increased tendency to chase
demand, driving average orders away from the profit optimal solution. The im-
plied managerial advice is to reduce incentives fueling the psychology of regret.
Without such remedies, we believe that inventory managers have all reason to
chase demand.
We make various attempts to assess the external validity of the managerial
conclusions drawn from behavior observed in our and other laboratory studies.
The observed strength of the mean demand anchor is particularly disturbing for
practice, since real-world newsvendor situations tend to be even more complex
than laboratory implementations and potentially provide even more information
cues decision makers can anchor on. Likewise, we provide anecdotal evidence
that the psychological sources for minimizing inventory errors and their adverse
impact on newsvendor decision making in practice might be stronger than what
is typically implemented in laboratory experiments. Ultimately, we need to
develop a better, empirically founded, understanding of those nuances of the
newsvendor setting that matter for inventory decision making in practice.
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Avoiding Inventory Risk -
The Perceived Value of
Upstream Supply
Flexibility
The exposition in this chapter is an extended version of Kremer et al. (2007).
4.1 Introduction
As documented in Chapter 3, making order and production decisions in an
uncertain world is difficult and almost inevitably leaves the supply chain with
costs from mismatches between supply and demand. For some industries such
costs can amount to around 25 percent of sales (Frazier 1986). Not surprisingly,
many supply chains have started to engage in accurate response techniques that
provide value by avoiding mismatch costs. These include provision of advanced-
demand information, volume and mix flexible production systems, and more
responsive supply systems (Milner and Kouvelis 2005). Streamlining internal
operations, such as reduction of lead times or investments in process-flexible
plants, can provide major benefits of increased flexibility and responsiveness.
In this chapter, we focus our analysis on externally-oriented measures where
increased decision flexibility (Benjaafar et al. 1995) stems from contractual
agreements with suppliers (upstream) or retailers (downstream), enabling the
postponement of ordering decisions until more information is available. For
example, a vendor of a seasonal product with long replenishment lead times
might accept a higher unit wholesale price if its supplier is willing to offer an
in-season replenishment opportunity, allowing the manufacturer to postpone its
order decision to the time demand materializes. Savings of mismatch costs from
such an option can be large enough to pay an additional 30-50% to a supplier
(Barnes-Schuster et al. 2002).
In this Chapter, we investigate the following questions: Do decision makers
intuitively value decision postponement beyond its value justified on the nor-
mative grounds of expected utility theory, and if so, how? Since these questions
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can best be answered empirically, we conduct a series of laboratory experi-
ments. We derive empirically testable research hypotheses from a newsvendor
model framework, the simplicity of which has two major advantages. First, it
lends itself to a clean empirical investigation in the laboratory, while being rich
enough to capture the value of postponing ordering decisions. Secondly, we can
build on existing literature since behavioral issues in the newsvendor problem
without postponement option are fairly well understood. As discussed in Chap-
ter 2, various non-standard formulations have been investigated: model-based
(Lau 1980, Eeckhoudt et al. 2004), empirical (Bolton and Katok 2007, Lurie
and Swaminathan 2007, or both (Schweitzer and Cachon 2000, Bostian et al.
2006).
Our results show that intuitive judgments of flexibility are not consistent
with predictions from expected utility theory. In particular, risk-neutral ex-
pected profit-maximizing behavior commonly assumed in formal analyses, sig-
nificantly underestimates the perceived value of decision postponement.
The Chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, we present a model
capturing the value derived from being able to avoid supply-demand mismatch
costs by postponing ordering decisions. Section 4.3 describes the design of a con-
trolled laboratory experiment, Sections 4.4 and 4.5 provide empirical evidence
on the perceived value of upstream supply flexibility. Section 4.6 discusses man-
agerial implications of our results, and Section 4.7 summarizes our main findings
and discusses open research questions.
4.2 Theory and Hypothesis Building
In this section we develop empirically testable research hypotheses based on a
stylized framework with a newsvendor being offered the option to completely
avoid supply-demand mismatches by sourcing from a fully responsive supplier.
Consider the standard setting with of a newsvendor choosing an order quan-
tity q∗ that maximizes expected utility
E [u (piNOW (q))]=
∫
Φ
u (pmin (q,D)−wq) dΦ(D) (4.1)
where u () denotes the utility of wealth and is increasing in its argument. For a
risk-neutral decision maker with utility u (pi)=pi, (4.1) provides the well-known
optimal order quantity q∗RN = Φ
−1
(
p−w
p
)
.
Ordering q∗RN before observing demand is optimal but likewise painful be-
cause the decision maker has to take a “bet” on demand and will almost surely
incur costs from supply not matching demand. Now consider an alternative in
which the newsvendor is offered to wait-and-see until demand realizes, and then
to order the quantity exactly matching demand. The profit under this scenario
is piLATER = (p − w)D, leading to expected utility E [u (piLATER)]. From the
newsvendor’s perspective, the wait-and-see option can be associated with per-
fect supply flexibility from its supplier. Clearly, ceteris paribus, more flexibility
is better than less - the value of perfect supply flexibility is always positive. In
other words, leaving the procurement cost per unit unchanged, ordering NOW
is stochastically dominated by ordering LATER after demand has materialized.
This implies that the newsvendor would be willing to pay its supplier a mark-up
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δ > 0 on the regular wholesale price in order to become flexible enough to com-
pletely avoid taking bets on demand. For the general case, value of flexibility is
precisely captured by the wholesale price mark-up δ∗ for which
E [u (piNOW (q∗))]=E [u (piLATER (D| δ∗))] (4.2)
where piLATER (D| δ∗)= (p− (w+δ∗))D.
Theorem 6. There exists a unique mark-up δ∗ that solves (4.2) and thus makes
the decision maker indifferent between NOW and LATER.
The value of perfect supply flexibility generally depends on the interplay between
different features of the decision situation, such as potential outcomes, demand
probabilities, the decision maker’s attitude towards risk, and his initial wealth.
Unfortunately, there is generally no monotonic relationship between value of
flexibility and risk attitude (Hilton 1981). This runs counter to the intuition
that a more risk-averse decision maker should pay more for postponing his
order decision until he observes demand. For example, for a decision maker
exhibiting constant absolute risk aversion, u(pi) = −e−rpi, Figure 4.1 plots the
value of perfect supply flexibility, δ∗, against the risk aversion captured by
the risk coefficient r. It is illustrated that δ∗, which is the solution of (4.2)
for any given attitude towards risk, r, might indeed be lower than the risk
neutral solution of (4.2), δ∗RN , for both a risk-averse and a risk-seeking individual
(Eeckhoudt 2000, Delquie 2006).
Figure 4.1: Risk attitude and willingness-to-pay for full flexibility (D ∼
U [100; 200], p = 12, w = 6, u(pi) = −e−rpi)
We close the model analysis by stating an additional theoretical result, which
will prove useful for separating potential drivers of the behavior observed in our
experimental study in Sections 4.4 and 4.5.
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Theorem 7. The indifference mark-up δ∗ will be higher than the solution of
(4.2) if the order quantity under NOW is constrained to qFixed 6= q∗.
Theorem 7 basically states that, if constrained to place an order qFixed being dif-
ferent from the ideally preferred order q∗ (recall that unless the decision-maker
is risk-neutral, q∗ 6= q∗RN ), the decision-maker would pay more for avoiding a
risky newsvendor order.
The above analysis directly leads to the formulation of our research hypothe-
ses. The first tests whether subjects value supply flexibility according to the
risk-neutral benchmark.
HYPOTHESIS 4.1. (RISK NEUTRALITY). The willingness-to-pay for full flex-
ibility (captured by δˆ) equals the mark up δ∗RN that makes “ordering NOW” and
“ordering LATER” the same in terms of expected profit.
While expected profit maximizing behavior is assumed in most supply chain
models, risk neutrality has been repeatedly shown to be descriptively inaccu-
rate for human behavior in choice under risk or uncertainty (e.g., Kahneman
and Tversky 1979). Hypothesis 4.2 generalizes on the theoretical value of full
supply flexibility as the solution of (4.2).
HYPOTHESIS 4.2. (GENERAL RISK ATTITUDE). The willingness-to-pay
for full flexibility (captured by δˆ) equals the mark up δ∗ that makes “ordering
NOW” and “ordering LATER” the same in terms of expected utility.
Our last hypothesis is tied to Theorem 7 which states that full flexibility is
more valuable if the order decision space for “NOW ” is exogenously restricted.
We note that this is mainly an auxiliary hypothesis serving experimental control
purposes, despite conceivable circumstances that restrict a firm’s order decision
in practice.
HYPOTHESIS 4.3. (ORDER RESTRICTION). A decision maker is willing to
pay more for full flexibility (i.e. order LATER) if the choice under NOW is
restricted to a quantity qFixed that deviates from his utility maximizing order q∗
from (4.1).
4.3 Experimental Design
4.3.1 Implementation and Parameterization: All Studies
In all studies demand is uniformly distributed with support on [100;200]. The
price and cost parameters are p = 12 and w = 6. Under these circumstances
the expected profit maximizing newsvendor order q∗RN equals mean demand
µ = 150. This effectively controls for the anchoring bias which describes the
empirically observed tendency to order closer to mean demand relative to the
optimal order quantity.
Our experiment follows a 2x2x2 mixed design. There are two between-
subject variables, Free Order vs. Fixed Order (discussed in Section 4.3.2), and
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Continuous Demand vs. Discrete Demand.11 Additionally, there is one within-
subject variable, Operations Frame vs. Neutral Frame, discussed in Section
4.3.3. Figure 4.2 gives an overview of the different treatment variables (detailed
instructions are provided in Appendix B.2).
Figure 4.2: Roadmap to experiments
4.3.2 Elicitation Procedure with Free or Fixed Order
The main decision throughout the experiment concerned choices between or-
dering NOW and ordering LATER. The pivotal quantity to test our research
hypotheses is an estimate of each subject’s willingness-to-pay for full supply
flexibility. We elicit this indifference mark-up, δˆ, on the regular wholesale price
w, by use of an adaptive choice-based method (see Appendix A.2). Figure 4.3
shows snapshots of a typical decision screen presented to the participants in the
course of the experiment.
Now:
You order from your 
supplier now before you 
learn actual demand. 
You pay 6.00 per unit 
ordered.
Demand: 100- 200 units
Selling price: 12
Later:
You wait until you 
observe realized 
demand. Then you 
order from your 
supplier and pay  7.00
per unit.
I order „NOW“ I am indifferent I order „LATER“
Choice-Based Adaption
(a) Free Order
Now:
You order 150  units 
from your supplier now 
before you learn actual 
demand. You pay 6.00
per unit ordered.
Demand: 100- 200 units
Selling price: 12
Later:
You wait until you 
observe realized 
demand. Then you 
order from your 
supplier and pay  7.00
per unit.
I order „NOW“ I am indifferent I order „LATER“
Profit-maximizing quantity
Choice-Based Adaption
(b) Fixed Order
Figure 4.3: Screenshots (Operations Frame)
11Note that, technically, we do not consider a continuous demand distribution since we
allow only integer values. In our terminology, Continuous Demand encompasses all integer
quantities on the support of the demand distribution, whereas Discrete Demand considers
only a subset of these.
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In both between-subject treatments participants chose either to order NOW
or to order LATER in each round12, with the unit wholesale price of the former
option being unchanged at 6 throughout the experiment.
In the Free Order treatment (Figure 4.3(a)), the order decision under the
NOW option is complex, but under the LATER option it is trivial because
ordering q = D is transparently the best course of action. If decision-makers
are averse to the cognitive effort required in the NOW option, their value for
the LATER option should increase. To control for this asymmetry between the
two options in the required cognitive effort, we conducted Fixed Order treat-
ments in which the newsvendor order was fixed at the profit-maximal quantity
q∗RN = 150 (Figure 4.3(b)). Of course, if q
∗ 6= 150, the value of postponement
should be higher under the Fixed Order than under the Free Order (Theorem 7
and Hypothesis 4.3). For the Free Order treatment, when choosing NOW, the
participant had to enter an order quantity, and then press a button to randomly
generate the quantity demanded. When choosing LATER, the participant had
to press a button to randomly generate the quantity demanded, and then enters
an order quantity. For the Fixed Order treatment, when choosing NOW the
participant’s order was automatically set to 150 units, which coincides with the
expected profit maximizing order.
After order quantity and demand had materialized, the computer screen
displayed revenue, costs and the resulting profit for the round. Based on choices
in previous rounds, the wholesale price for the option LATER, w + δ, was
adjusted by the computer by use of a bi-section algorithm. If, at a given mark-
up δ, a subject indicated a preference for ordering NOW (LATER), the mark-up
was increased (decreased) until the subject indicated indifference. We present
the details of the algorithm in Appendix A.
4.3.3 Control for Preferences towards Risky Prospects
Apart from an empirical estimate of the indifference mark-up δˆ, testing our re-
search hypotheses requires a normative benchmark δ∗ according to (4.2), which
is easy to compute for a risk neutral profit maximizer, but generally depends
on the unobservable utility function u (). This makes it cumbersome to test
Hypothesis 4.2 directly. In order to control for risk attitude as a potential
driver of willingness-to-pay for flexibility, we introduced a Neutral Frame to our
experiment, along the line of reasoning in Chapter 3.
Note that the newsvendor problem is naturally described by a context-
specific set of prices, costs, and quantities. The implicit assumption the preva-
lent supply chain models is that a decision maker, in order to make an optimal
decision, is both willing and able to construct profit distributions associated with
these parameters. Likewise, the time notion of ordering NOW or LATER in the
Operations Frame is essentially immaterial from a decision-theoretic perspective
because both options simply represent distributions of final wealth. The Neutral
Frame displays these profit distributions directly (see Figure 4.4(b) where lot-
tery ”A” is technically equivalent to ordering NOW in the Operations Frame)
and thus provides us with an estimate for a subject’s valuation of flexibility,
δˆNF , without this valuation being biased by any of the contextual factors as
12In later periods they could also indicate indifference between NOW and LATER. In this
case the computer randomly picked one of the two options to be played.
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in the Operations Frame. Since the two different frames offer identical, but
differently framed, profit distributions, they entail a simple decision theoretic
prediction which holds for every theory of choice under uncertainty working on
the distributions of final wealth, captured in the following auxiliary hypothesis
to test Hypothesis 4.2.
HYPOTHESIS 4.2’. Choices and the implied indifference markups δˆOF (Oper-
ations Frame) and δˆNF (Neutral Frame) should be identical.
Using a within-subject design allows us to construct for each subject an individ-
ual over-/undervaluation score δˆ
OF
δˆNF
. Each subject performed, on two occasions
(separated by a week), both the Operations Frame and the Neutral Frame, in
that order. The Neutral Frame was offered only in its Fixed Order version,
depicted in Figure 4.4(b), since this version entails choice between only two
risky prospects (one newsvendor order quantity and one postponement option),
whereas the corresponding Free Order treatment would entail the cumbersome
simultaneous display of 102 profit distributions (101 possible newsvendor order
quantities plus one postponement option).
Now:
You order 150 units 
from your supplier now 
before you learn actual 
demand. You pay 6.00
per unit ordered.
Demand: 100- 200 units
Selling price: 12
Later:
You wait until you 
observe realized 
demand. Then you 
order from your 
supplier and pay 7.00
per unit.
I order „NOW“ I am indifferent I order „LATER“
Equivalent to ordering 
(a) Operations frame
I choose „A“ I am indifferent I choose „B“
0
300
600
900
1200
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
P
a
y
o
ff
A B
Equivalent to ordering LATER Equivalent to ordering NOW
(b) Neutral frame
Figure 4.4: Screenshots (Fixed Order quantity)
4.3.4 Subject Payment
We recruited 79 subjects through a computerized system at the University of
Mannheim.13 All sessions were conducted at the laboratory of the Collaborative
Research Center 504. Participants read written instructions and were briefed
orally. To ensure that participants understood the logic of the experiment, each
participant had to answer a number of problem-related quiz questions on the
computer screen before being allowed to start the actual experiment. Data from
4 participants consistently violating dominance by choosing to order NOW even
when the option LATER came at no additional costs, were dropped.
Each subject participated in two sessions, a week apart, Operations Frame
in week 1 and Neutral Frame in week 2. We employed the random lottery
13Participants were students at the University of Mannheim, over 75% German, and most
others from other European countries, 40% were female and 60% male, 44% undergraduates
and 56% graduate students. The average age of the participants was 24, and the vast majority
were majoring in business, economics, or social sciences.
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procedure to determine subjects’ payoffs on each of the two occasions. After
participants completed the indifference price elicitation part of the study, a com-
puter randomly picked two rounds for payment. Additionally, subjects earned
a fixed amount of 2e for completing a post-experiment questionnaire in week 1.
Subjects were paid after completion of both sessions (using a conversion factor
of 0.0025 from laboratory tokens to e). The average payoff was 14.65e with a
standard deviation of 2.85e.
4.4 Study 1: Base Case with Continuous De-
mand
Recall that customer demand in this study is uniformly distributed between 100
and 200 units. For a risk-neutral profit maximizer this would imply a theoretical
indifference mark-up δ∗RN = 1.01 (from Equation 4.2).
4.4.1 Results
Figure 4.5 plots the average valuation of each subject in the Neutral frame (x-
axis) and the Operations Frame (y-axis), in the Free Order and the Fixed Order
treatments. Table 4.1 provides the corresponding sample averages (standard
deviations in parentheses) and the results from hypothesis tests. In Figure 4.5,
Hypothesis 4.1 implies δˆ = δ∗RN = 1.01 and thus data along the solid horizontal
line (for Operations Frame) and along the solid vertical line (for Neutral frame).
Hypothesis 4.2’postulates no differences under the two frames and thus implies
data along the 45 line. Hypothesis 4.3 implies the average willingness-to-pay in
the Fixed Order treatment above that in the Free Order treatment.
What we observe in Figure 4.5 is data along the solid vertical line, but gen-
erally above the solid horizontal line. Hypotheses tests (Table 4.1) confirm that
the average willingness-to-pay is above 1.01 in the Operations Frame treatments
(both Free and Fixed Order conditions). The average willingness-to-pay is not
significantly different from 1.01 in the Neutral Frame treatments. Thus, we can
reject Hypothesis 4.1 (Risk neutrality) for the Operations Frame, but not for
the Neutral Frame.
Frame H0 :a
Risk-neutral Operations Neutral
δ∗RN δˆ
OF δˆNF δˆOF = δ∗RN δˆ
NF = δ∗RN δˆ
OF = δˆNF
Free 1.01
1.52 1.03
0.001 0.756 0.005
(0.68) (0.12)
Fixed 1.01
1.84 1.03
0.000 0.859 0.000
(0.63) (0.25)
H0 : bδˆFree = δˆFixed 0.216 0.725
aMatched-pair Wilcoxon test
bTwo-sample Wilcoxon test
Table 4.1: Summary of average willingness-to-pay estimates (standard devia-
tions in parantheses) and hypothesis tests
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Figure 4.5: Distribution of valuations {δNFi , δOFi } (Note: Neutral Frame is Fixed
Order in both treatments)
Overvaluing flexibility in the Operations Frame does not necessarily indicate
a biased perception of the value of flexibility per se. We recognize that a subject
might be consciously willing to pay more than warranted by plain expected profit
considerations. E.g., intrinsic (and unobservable) attitudes towards risk could
potentially explain what appears to be overvaluation of flexibility. However,
results of the Neutral Frame control treatment indicate that this is not the
case. When presented with only the distributions of profits, subjects’ implicit
valuation of flexibility is amazingly close to the risk-neutral prediction of δ∗RN =
1.01, but significantly lower than in the Operations Frame.
The data in Figure 4.5 are located mostly above the 45 line. The relative
overvaluation of flexibility in the Operations Frame with respect to the Neutral
Frame benchmark, δˆ
OF
δˆNF
, amounts to 47% in the Free Order treatment and
79% in the Fixed Order treatment. By comparing average willingness-to-pay
for flexibility within subjects, in the Operations Frame (explicit revelation of
δˆ∗) and the Neutral Frame (which explicitly offers profit distributions based
on δˆ∗), we are in a position to rule out intrinsic preferences towards stochastic
distribution of profits as a reason for overvaluation of flexibility. We therefore
reject Hypothesis 4.2.
We now test the validity of Hypothesis 4.3, which states that the willingness-
to-pay for flexibility in Fixed Order should not be lower than in Free Order. Re-
call that the intuitive reasoning behind this hypothesis is that being constrained
to a quantity that is not the most preferred one makes the flexible option of
ordering LATER more valuable, resulting in an increased willingness-to-pay.
Figure 4.5 and Table 4.1 show that subjects indeed pay more, on average, in
57
Chapter 4
the Fixed Order than in the Free Order treatment, consistent with Hypothesis
4.3, although the differences are not statistically significant.
Lastly, we look at the order quantities participants choose with the NOW
option. Theoretically, the parameters of our setting controlled for the anchoring-
on-mean-demand bias reported in previous studies, since the expected-profit
maximizing quantity under NOW equals mean demand. In the Free Order
treatment the average order quantity is 144 when participants choose NOW,
which is slightly below the risk-neutral optimum q∗RN = 150 (Wilcoxon, p =
0.051).
4.4.2 Discussion
In the Operations Frame and Free Order condition participants are willing to
pay wholesale prices for the LATER option that are on average 52% above
the risk-neutral benchmark, and this overpayment is even higher, at 84%, in
the Fixed Order condition. These overpayments translate to leaving 10% of
expected profit on the table in the Free Order condition, and 16% in the Fixed
Order condition. In contrast, we observe no overpayment for the equivalent
option in the Neutral Frame. Why are participants willing to pay different
amounts for flexibility in the Operations and Neutral Frames? We consider two
potential explanations.
The first explanation relates to the fact that in the Neutral Frame partici-
pants face a simpler problem than they do in the Operations Frame, because in
the Neutral Frame they make decisions about the profit distributions from the
two options presented to them directly. In the Operations Frame, however, they
have to construct these profit distributions from problem parameters first. We
term this the cognitive effort hypothesis.
While the latter can explain differences between the Operations and the
Neutral Frame, there is no a priori reason to assume that limited capabilities
or willingness to construct the correct prospects would bias the valuation of
flexibility in any specific direction. Overvaluation is putting too much weight
on the positive aspect of increased flexibility (namely a better match between
supply and demand) while undervaluation is putting too much weight on the
negative aspect (namely paying a higher per-unit price). Shedding more light on
this issue, our second explanation for the results implies psychological aspects
of the LATER option increasing its value, beyond the expected profit. One such
aspect may have to do with the fact that the LATER option allows participants
to avoid any ex post decision regret from failing to match supply and demand.
The following, admittedly highly simplistic model, captures this logic. Suppose
participants experience some disutility from ex-post inventory error, f(|q−D|)
(Schweitzer and Cachon 2000). Assuming f ′(·) > 0 and f(0) = 0, this disutility
is meaningless when ordering LATER (where q = D) but decreases the expected
utility from ordering NOW,
UNOW=E [u (piNOW (q))−f (|q−D|)] (4.3)
The willingness-to-pay for full flexibility then increases relative to a newsvendor
that does not anticipate future regret from an order decision.
Theorem 8. The willingness-to-pay for flexibility, δ∗, is higher if the decision
maker experiences and anticipates disutility from the ex-post inventory error,
|q −D|.
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Even though anticipated regret is minimized at the profit maximal order
quantity (because regret is minimized at mean demand which is q∗RN , given our
parameters, see Schweitzer and Cachon 2000), it may well be that the impact of
decision regret is even stronger in our setting than in previous newsvendor ex-
periments without a decision postponement option. This is because the ex-ante
presence of such an option may render regret from ex-post inventory error from
a newsvendor order decision very salient. When foregoing the option to order
LATER a decision maker is more likely to engage in self-recrimination, which is
a strong antecedent variable for decision regret (Sugden 1985). Anticipated de-
cision regret becomes a valid behavioral explanation for apparent overvaluation
of flexibility since the Operations Frame provides the decision maker with an
appropriate frame-of-mind for regret behavior. Clearly, such a frame-of-mind is
non-existent in the Neutral Frame. This implies a lower valuation of flexibility
since regret behavior captured in (4.3) is meaningless under this frame. We
term this the framing and regret hypothesis.
The framing, regret, and cognitive effort explanations offered above are not
mutually exclusive. We designed Study 2 to measure whether overvaluing flexi-
bility in the Operations Frame persists in a cognitively less challenging setting.
To do this, we simplify the problem in the Operations Frame by allowing cus-
tomer demand to take only three values: 100, 150 and 200. If we continue to
observe overvaluing flexibility in this simpler setting, it will provide additional
evidence that behavioral factors, such as the desire to avoid anticipated decision
regret, are causing flexibility to be overvalued.
4.5 Study 2: The Impact of Decreased Task Com-
plexity
The setting in Study 2 is identical to Study 1, except that demand is D ∈
{100, 150, 200}14, with each demand state being equally likely. For a risk neutral
profit maximizing player this would imply an indifference mark-up δ∗RN = 1.33.
The Neutral Frame again controlled for contextual factors by displaying choices
between simple lotteries equivalent to the Operations Frame with Fixed Order.
Figure 4.6 shows screenshots for the NOW and the LATER options in the
Operations Frame (Figure 4.6(a)) and the Neutral Frame (Figure 4.6(b)).
4.5.1 Results
Figure 4.7 plots average willingness-to-pay in the two frames for each subject,
averages across subjects in the Free and Fixed Order treatments, and the risk-
neutral benchmarks. Table 4.2 summarizes averages and standard deviations
across subjects, and results of hypothesis tests.
In Figure 4.7, Hypothesis 4.1 implies data around {1.33,1.33}, Hypothe-
sis 4.2’implies data along the 45 line, and Hypothesis 4.3 implies the average
willingness-to-pay in the Fixed Order treatment above that in the Free Order
treatment.
The data in the Fixed Order treatment are consistent with Hypotheses 4.1
and 4.2’: the willingness-to-pay is not significantly different from its risk-neutral
14The order quantity is likewise restricted to q ∈ {100, 150, 200}.
59
Chapter 4
Now:
You order 150 units 
from your supplier now 
before you learn actual 
demand. You pay 6.00
per unit ordered.
Demand: 100, 150 or 200 units
Selling price: 12
Later:
You wait until you 
observe realized 
demand. Then you 
order from your 
supplier and pay 7.00
per unit.
I order „NOW“ I am indifferent I order „LATER“
(a) Operations frame
I choose „N“ I am indifferent I choose „L“
State: A, B, C
N L
A
B
C
A
B
C
300
900
500
750
1000900
(b) Neutral frame
Figure 4.6: Screenshots: Fixed Order quantity with coarse demand
Figure 4.7: Distribution of valuations {δNFi , δOFi } (Note: Neutral Frame is Fixed
Order in both treatments)
benchmark in either the Operations Frame or the Neutral Frame. So, when we
simplify the problem sufficiently by making the demand distribution consist
of only three values, and fix the order amount in the NOW option to 150, the
overvaluation of flexibility disappears. However, overvaluation in the Operations
Frame persists in the Free Order treatment, where participants’ implicit valua-
tion of flexibility in the Operations Frame is significantly above the risk-neutral
benchmark as well as the Neutral Frame valuation.
Lastly, Hypothesis 4.3 states that the willingness-to-pay for flexibility in
Fixed Order should not be lower than in Free Order. Although the difference is
not significant, the sample average for Free Order is higher, and we have reason
to believe that the normative prediction of Theorem 2 might be violated due to
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Frame H0 :a
Risk-neutral Operations Neutral
δ∗RN δˆ
OF δˆNF δˆOF = δ∗RN δˆ
NF = δ∗RN δˆ
OF = δˆNF
Free 1.33
1.72 1.21
0.001 0.348 0.001
(0.47) (0.12)
Fixed 1.33
1.46 1.23
0.165 0.368 0.190
(0.64) (0.25)
H0b : δˆFree = δˆFixed 0.127 0.861
aMatched-pair Wilcoxon test
bTwo-sample Wilcoxon test
Table 4.2: Summary of average willingnes-to-pay estimates (standard deviations
in parentheses) and hypothesis tests
causes outside the standard theory. We discuss these in the following section.
As in the continuous demand case of the previous section, we calculate for
the Free Order treatment the average order quantity (subject to having chosen
to order NOW ) which is 141, not statistically significantly below the risk-neutral
optimum q∗RN = 150 (Wilcoxon, p = 0.216).
4.5.2 Discussion
In the Operations Frame, the Free Order condition participants are willing to
pay wholesale prices for the LATER option that are on average 29% above
the risk-neutral benchmark, and this overpayment decreases to only 10% in the
Fixed Order condition. These overpayments translate to leaving 8% of expected
profit on the table in the Free Order condition, and only 3% in the Fixed Order
condition.
The results point to a similar qualitative direction as Study 1, but over-
valuation of flexibility, δˆ
OF
δˆNF
, is weakened. This decrease may be due to the
lower cognitive effort required to solve the problem with only three potential
demand levels. However, the lower cognitive effort required cannot alone ex-
plain the striking result that willingness-to-pay in the Fixed Order treatment
is statistically indistinguishable from both the risk-neutral benchmark δ∗RN and
the Neutral Frame benchmark δˆNF , while substantial overvaluation remains in
the Free Order treatment. Paying more under Free Order than under Fixed
Order is also inconsistent with Theorem 7 and, moreover, directionally reverses
the results of Study 1. To build an intuitive understanding for this effect we
enlarge on the psychophysics of the Fixed Order treatment.
Being exogenously constrained to a newsvendor order quantity under Fixed
Order, the decision maker has to mentally solve the following trade-off. On
the one hand, by choosing to order a pre-specified quantity the decision maker
can avoid calculating a preferred order quantity. This might be psychologically
beneficial 1) due to the more general notion of pain of deciding (Amir and Ariely
2007) and 2) since regret from an ex-post wrong order decision can potentially
be mitigated by less potential for self-recrimination (after all, the order decision
was made by “somebody else”, cf. Sugden 1985). On the other hand, the
pre-specified newsvendor quantity in the Fixed Order treatment comes at a
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disadvantage if the quantity does not seem to be the most preferred one (see
Theorem 7). Since optimality of the pre-specified order quantity is obvious for
the coarse nature of the demand distribution in this section, but less obvious in
Section 4.4, the psychological disadvantage of being constrained might be offset
by its benefits. In effect, subjects then tend to pay more for supply flexibility
when having to choose freely than for a situation where they do not have to
make this obvious decision in the Fixed Order treatment.
4.6 Managerial Implications
We found that intuitive judgments of the value of decision postponement sys-
tematically deviated from normative predictions. Subjects were willing to pay
significantly more for full supply flexibility than what is warranted by solely
maximizing expected profit. This section discusses the managerial implications
of our investigation, both for the individual firm and the entire supply chain.
4.6.1 Individually Rational Reasons for Waiting and (For-
gone) Profit Opportunities
Intuitively, the observed mark-up on the theoretical wholesale price might reflect
a risk premium paid by a risk-averse individual (or firm) to reduce the variance of
profits by avoiding supply-demand mismatch risk. However, neither theory (cf.
Figure 4.1), nor our empirical results support the conjecture that the observed
mark-ups are driven by attitude towards risky prospects. It appears that the
increased willingness-to-pay for full flexibility is brought about by a desire to
minimize decision regret, or avoid uninformed decisions altogether. We admit
that it is generally difficult to argue against such psychological regularities. If a
person derives substantial disutility from being wrong, or disutility from making
uninformed decisions per se, it might be reasonable to postpone the decision,
thereby avoiding inventory risk as much as possible, and to pay extra for this.
Interestingly, subjects behaved consistently with risk-neutral benchmarks in
the Neutral Frame treatments that did not offer the notion of regret or decision
postponement. However, when playing the Operations Frame where the various
parameters and timing aspects of the real problem had to be combined intu-
itively to construct payoff functions, subjects overvalued flexibility. This was
especially salient in the more complex setting in Study 1 (continuous demand)
while the overvaluation of flexibility (relative to the risk-neutral benchmark) de-
creases in the cognitively less challenging setting in Study 2 (discrete demand).
This indicates a cognitive bias mitigated by the transparency of a problem sit-
uation. In this sense, quantitative decision support models have potential value
for correcting the bias, δˆ > δ∗RN , if they make profit consequences more trans-
parent. Of course, this argument assumes that the decision maker is willing to
admit that he is ultimately interested in optimizing monetary outcomes of a
decision under risk.
Finally, while a retailer’s overvaluation of full supply flexibility decreases
its expected profit by definition, a profit-maximizing supplier might actually
benefit from it. This is intuitive since the retailer is willing to pay a mark-up
on the regular wholesale price in order to avoid risk.
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4.6.2 Improved Supply Chain Performance under Whole-
sale Price-only Contracts
We now explore how the overvaluation of supply and demand mismatch avoid-
ance might actually result in the negotiation of contracts that benefit the entire
supply chain. From a behavioral perspective, it seems reasonable that the ten-
dency to avoid risk beyond what is profit optimal applies to decision makers at
every stage of the supply chain. Generalizing our empirical results implies that
the party that takes the inventory risk in a supply chain gets a better deal (a
lower wholesale price for the retailer or a larger wholesale price for the supplier.)
Consider a simple serial supply chain, consisting of a supplier and a retailer
and producing/distributing a perishable/seasonal good to serve a market with
stochastic demand. The supplier incurs a unit production cost c, the product
sells at a price of p on the market, and production leadtime is longer than the
selling season such that there is no second production opportunity throughout
the season. If the inter-firm relationship is governed by a wholesale price-only
contract, the supply chain then either operates in pure pull or pure push mode
(Cachon 2004).
If the supply chain operates in pull mode, the supplier takes the entire in-
ventory risk and earns a unit wholesale price w + δ where the mark-up δ is a
compensation for expected mismatch costs. Clearly, since the critical fractile
w+δ−c
w+δ is increasing in the mark-up, δˆ > δ
∗
RN implies an increased production
quantity of the supplier. In the same spirit, if the supply chain operates in
push mode, the retailer takes the entire inventory risk and pays a unit whole-
sale price w− δ where the discount δ is a compensation for expected mismatch
costs. Since the retailer’s critical fractile p−(w−δ)p is increasing in the discount,
δˆ > δ∗RN implies an increased order quantity of the retailer. Either way, if the
risk-taking party is compensated for disutility from taking the inventory risk
beyond what appears reasonable from a pure profit point of view, the critical
ratio becomes larger, and this mitigates the double marginalization problem -
the supply chain may benefit from more inventory in the system.
The extent to which this potential benefit can be realized in practice depends
on whether the contractual agreement shifts the risk upstream to the supplier or
downstream to the retailer. The latter being an open empirical question itself,
model-based insights make it desirable that the supply chain operates in pure
pull with the supplier taking the inventory risk rather than in pure push with
the retailer taking the risk (see Chapter 2). Indeed, the retailer perspective of
our experiment would suggest that risk is assumed by its supplier (due to the
retailer’s increased willingness-to-pay for perfect upstream supply flexibility),
but we argued above that the supplier might itself be willing to pay a premium
to avoid inventory risk.
Finally, the supply chain implications of the present study might be even
stronger in a one supplier multiple retailer context. In such a divergent distri-
bution network, the logic of risk pooling tends to push inventory towards the
supplier when taking a system profit point of view (Anupindi and Bassok 1999).
Whether the centrally optimal stocking decision constitutes a stable equilibrium
in a decentralized supply chain with local decision-making depends on the con-
tractual agreements between the supplier and its retailers. Since the potential
for decision regret is lower for the supplier (because risk is associated with the
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aggregate production quantity) than for the retailers (none of which can pool
inventory risk themselves), our results would then imply that 1) risk tends to
be shifted upstream, 2) the supplier receives a premium on the wholesale price,
and 3) the supplier’s optimal stocking decision increases. Hence, supply chain
efficiency may increase, even under a wholesale price-only contract.
4.7 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter we empirically observed an increased willingness-to-pay for in-
ventory risk avoidance, when compared to the normative prescription of profit
maximizing behavior. Moreover, the employed experimental control suggests
that our results are not simply driven by expected utility theory preferences
that deviate from commonly assumed risk neutrality. What seems like a deci-
sion bias can in part be explained by contextual factors of the Operations Frame
providing salient antecedents for decision regret, which can be efficiently avoided
by postponing the order decision. We note, however, that the overvaluation of
risk avoidance cannot be explained by regret theory axiomatized simultaneously
by Loomes and Sugden (1982) and Bell (1982), which would not predict any
shifts in decisions between the technically equivalent Operations and Neutral
Frame versions of the problem. In fact, the behavior observed in our experi-
ments is inconsistent with any theory of choice under uncertainty that works on
the distribution of final wealth like, for example, Prospect Theory (Kahneman
and Tversky 1979), or rank-dependent expected utility theory (Quiggin 1982).
In this spirit, we believe that directly testing the validity of the multiple gener-
alizations of expected utility theory in a given operations management context
is unlikely to yield interesting results. Operations decisions under uncertainty
in practice are almost never presented as profit distributions, but rather entail a
complex interplay between multiple problem parameters (which might be used
to construct profit distributions). It then seems fruitful to further explore how
these parameters and their particular framing affect managerial intuition and,
ultimately, behavior (see Schultz et al. 2007 for a study of framing effects on
the newsvendor problem). We employed an experimental strategy that was in-
troduced in Chapter 3 and seems to be useful to address such issues because a
Neutral Frame effectively controls for theories in which choices are made based
on monetary prospects.
The discussion of our results in the previous section implies a number of
interesting hypotheses that are worth investigating in further studies. As an
obvious example, note that the value of making an informed decision by paying
for more upstream supply flexibility can be complemented, or even substituted
for, by downstream early order commitment (Milner 2002). Interestingly, pay-
ing an upstream party a mark-up δ on the procurement price or granting a
downstream party an equal discount δ on the wholesale price, is theoretically
equivalent in the simple framework of this thesis (cf. our discussion in Section
4.6.2). It is not at all obvious, and thus interesting to explore, whether this
reasoning meets the intuition of a real decision maker. Secondly, for experi-
mental control reasons our study was concerned with only the endpoints of a
risk-sharing spectrum, where the focal firm either takes all or none of the inven-
tory risk. In contrast to this perspective, most of the supply chain contracting
literature indicates that system coordination is typically achieved only by risk-
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sharing agreements. Depending on the perspective, one might investigate the
impact of a supplier providing partial, but not full, supply flexibility or a re-
tailer offering partial, but not full, commitment to an early order. Finally, in our
study we separated a single decision making entity to experimentally control for
factors that come with real interaction. At a later stage it might be interesting
to explore how inventory risk is distributed in the supply chain in an interac-
tive setting. Would the intuitive perception of inventory risk lead to contractual
agreements that push risk further upstream or downstream in the supply chain?
Would the firm assuming most of the inventory risk be excessively compensated
by the risk avoiding partner? Would the resulting inventory decisions improve
supply chain efficiency relative to the prediction of model-based research on this
topic?
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Taking Partial Inventory
Risk - Mental Accounts of
Risk Sharing Contracts
The previous chapter documented substantial biases of a single firm forced to
make risky order decision under the regime of a simple wholesale price-only
contract with its supplier. When extending the perspective across an individual
firm’s boundaries, supply chain performance is jeopardized beyond managerial
misbehavior: Although widespread in practice, simple wholesale-price contracts
are theoretically unable to induce local inventory decisions that are in the best
interest of the entire supply chain (Section 2.1). Essentially, they fail to share
demand risk properly along the supply chain and cannot coordinate the system
as a result (Lariviere and Porteus 2001).
A large and influential research stream has been dedicated to incentive mech-
anisms that can coordinate the supply chain (Cachon 2003). Out of the multi-
tude of risk-sharing contracts our study considers two, the buyback contract and
the revenue sharing contract. These two have been successfully implemented in
practice, e.g. has the revenue sharing contract boosted profits in the video
rental industry (compare the introductory example of blockbuster in Chapter
1 and Cachon and Lariviere 2001). From a less practical standpoint, the two
contracts provide an intriguing testbed for empirical research, since they are
strategically equivalent in a simple supply chain setting with a supplier selling
to a newsvendor. Contradicting this normative benchmark, recent experimental
research indicates that actual order behavior and, consequently, profits can be
different under these two risk-sharing contracts (Katok and Wu 2007). In this
chapter, we extend on this matter by considering the choice between contracts,
rather than the subsequent order decisions.
5.1 Theory and Hypothesis Building
Consider a supplier producing a seasonal good at unit cost c and selling it to a
newsvendor at a wholesale price w. Under such a contract the retailer’s overage
costs w are higher than the corresponding unit costs of the supply chain, c, while
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her underage costs p − w are lower compared to the margin lost by the total
system, p− c. Supply chain coordination requires the decision maker’s (in this
case the retailer) incentives to be aligned with the system’s. Since the wholesale
price directly impacts the retailer’s optimal order quantity q∗ = Φ−1
(
p−w
p
)
, but
is irrelevant for the supply chain optimal inventory qo = Φ−1
(
p−c
p
)
(leading to
total profit Πo)), the wholesale-price-only contract cannot induce jointly optimal
retailer behavior unless w = c (Figure 5.1).
Figure 5.1: Coordination by risk-sharing contracts
To induce the retailer to place larger orders, the supply chain partners might
implement a risk-sharing contract. For example, consider a buyback contract
comprising a wholesale price wbb and a buyback price b which the supplier pays
the retailer per unit remaining at the end of the season. Alternatively, consider
the revenue sharing contract under which the retailer pays a wholesale price wrs
per unit purchases and, additionally, a fraction 1− r of the revenue of each unit
sold. Put differently, under a buyback [revenue sharing] contract, the retailer
pays wbb−b [wrs] for every unit purchased and an additional b [(1−r)p] per unit
sold (for notational convenience, we substitute R = (1 − r)p for the remainder
of this chapter). From this, it follows directly the technical equivalence of pairs
of buyback and revenue sharing contract satisfying the following equations,
wbb = wrs +R (5.1)
b = R. (5.2)
The two contracts not only imply identical expected profits, but they are equiv-
alent in its strongest decision-theoretic sense: they generate identical distri-
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butions of profits for any given order quantity q and thus merely represent
different frames of a common mechanism. It follows directly that all theories
of risky choice which work on distributions of final wealth, including expected
utility theory and most of its generalizations (like e.g. regret theory discussed
in Chapter 3), predict no behavioral differences between the two contracts.
Katok and Wu (2007) subject this normative benchmark to an empirical
test. Their results indicate that actual order behavior can be very different
under a revenue sharing and a buyback contract, although the differences vanish
when subjects gain experience over multiple rounds. Our study investigates
the contract design stage which naturally precedes inventory decisions given
a contractual agreement. In reality, an implemented contract is typically the
outcome of a negotiation process. While the actual position reached on the
coordination line depicted in Figure 5.1 depends on the firms’ relative bargaining
power and skills, any contract off the frontier cannot be a feasible negotiation
outcome. This is because there exist by definition other contract parameters
that make both players better off. Since wholesale price-only contracts are not
on the Pareto frontier (unless w = c, compare Figure 5.1) but wide-spread
in practice, it is natural to expect firms to start with these simple contracts
and then converge towards the Pareto efficient frontier by using risk-sharing
agreements, rather then the other way around. Actual bargaining processes in
reality can easily become rather involved, but they typically require each partner
to repeatedly evaluate various offers relative to each other. As a starting point
towards a real bargaining process, this study thus investigates binary choices
between two supply chain contracts being offered to an individual decision maker
at a time.
Our study considers contract choice behavior in the presence of the whole-
sale price-only contract. Specifically, we test the following two hypotheses that
follow directly from the assumptions commonly made in the supply chain liter-
ature.
HYPOTHESIS 5.1 (Profit maximization). The decision maker chooses the ex-
pected profit maximizing option from every set of contracts offered to him.
While this hypothesis rests on the common assumption of risk-neutrality, it is
important to keep in mind the implications of non-neutral preferences towards
risky profits (Gan et al. 2004). For example, a supplier might not be willing
to agree to the implementation of a risk-sharing contract if the higher expected
profit does not overcompensate the larger variance in profits the contract in-
volves. Nevertheless and irrespective of the decision makers’ attitudes towards
risk, the following behavioral hypothesis should always hold.
HYPOTHESIS 5.2 (Contract equivalence). The decision maker is indifferent
between contracts which are equivalent with respect to the profit distribution
they generate.
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5.2 Study 1: Binary Contract Choices
5.2.1 Experimental Design
In our study, demand in uniformly distributed between 100 and 200. We set
the selling price p to 12 and the supplier’s unit production cost c to 3. These
parameters imply the supplier’s most preferred push wholesale-price contract
w∗ = argmaxw pis(q∗(w)) = 7.50, where q∗(w) = Φ−1
(
p−w
p
)
is the retailer’s
best response to w. Our focus is on risk-sharing contracts that are Pareto
improving over the supplier’s most preferred wholesale-price push contract (i.e.
those contracts in the shaded triangle in Figure 5.1). Starting from the non-
coordinating benchmark w∗, we design four generic risk-sharing contracts that
move total supply chain profit towards the efficient frontier, as visualized in
Figure 5.2.15 The four generic contracts differ with respect to the implied total
supply chain profit as well as the profit allocation between the retailer and the
supplier. Contracts along the vertical line in Figure 5.2 increase total profits,
but keep the retailer’s expected profit constant at pir(q∗(w∗)). The supplier’s
expected profit increases. On the other hand, contracts along the diagonal line
increase the retailer’s expected profit, while keeping it at a constant fraction
λ = pir(q
∗(w∗))
Π(q∗(w∗)) = 0.33 of total supply chain profit. Each of the four generic
contracts can be framed as technically equivalent buyback or revenue sharing
contracts.
We thus consider eight separate treatments each of which involves the choice
between two adjacent contracts on either the vertical or diagonal line in Figure
5.3.16 Each of these eight different choice sets is offered to either a retailer or a
supplier (between-subject). In a retailer treatment, each subject chooses a con-
tract, then makes an order decision given the contractual terms, and realized
profits are calculated based on a randomly drawn demand. In a supplier treat-
ment, each subject chooses a contract, the order quantity is calculated based
on the retailer’s best response to the contractual terms, and realized profits are
calculated based on a randomly drawn demand (detailed instructions can be
found in Appendix B.3). To check for the dependence of our results on the par-
ticular parameterization, we additionally include eight buyer treatments where
all price and cost parameters are scaled up by a factor of 10. Overall, our study
follows an incomplete factorial 8x2x2 design with three between-subject factors:
1) eight different choice sets, 2) supplier versus buyer, and 3) an additional
buyer treatment with upscaled contract parameters, resulting in 24 different
questionnaires.
Let θi define the proportion of retailers (i = r) or suppliers (i = s) choosing,
from a given set, that contract which moves total supply chain profit towards the
Pareto efficient frontier. The research hypotheses stated in the preceding section
then translate into our experimental set-up as follows. Hypothesis 5.1 postulates
that subjects always choose the contract that entails the largest expected profit.
For a supplier, all contracts that are located closer to the Pareto frontier strictly
15Since the plain wording might lead to different perceived attractiveness of the contracts,
we avoided the terms buyback and revenue sharing but used a more neutral description of the
two contracts. Specifically, the revenue sharing contract was presented as the option to the
retailer to pay a fixed wholesale price wrs and an additional cost R for each unit sold.
16Note that the choice set never implies a direct comparison between a buyback and a
revenue sharing contract.
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Figure 5.2: Transition to the pareto frontier
increase his expected profit (refer to Figure 5.3 for convenience). Theory would
thus predict θs = 1 for this case. The same is true for the retailer for those
choice sets that follow the diagonal line in Figure 5.3, and we would expect
θr = 1 in these cases. On the other hand, all contracts along the vertical line
entail the same expected profit for the retailer. This implies indifference for a
risk neutral decision maker. Since theory lacks a clear cut prediction in these
cases, we make the ad-hoc assumption that θr = 0.5, which corresponds to an
indecisive decision maker tossing a coin. While deviations from risk-neutrality
might lead the retailer to favor one contract over the other along the vertical
line, theory generally postulates θsbb = θ
s
rs when the elements in a given choice
set only differ with respect to their framing as a buyback or a revenue sharing
contract.
The experimental study was administered through a questionnaire which
was distributed among students in a number of main business courses at the
University of Mannheim. A total of 802 subjects participated in Study 1. Cash
was the only incentive offered (see instructions in Appendix B.3 for further
details). Roughly 4% of the participants were chosen in a random draw and
paid according to their responses. The potential payoff for the chosen subjects
was quite substantial (between e0 and e26), relative to the task duration, with
an average payoff of e20. Losses were not possible for the parameterization of
the studies presented here. The order of presentation of the contracts in a choice
set was alternated across the questionnaires of each treatment. Since we did not
find any systematic order effects, the results presented in the next sections are
pooled across order conditions.
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(a) Sets 1 and 2 (b) Sets 3 and 4
Figure 5.3: Study 1: Design and parameterization
5.2.2 Results
We start with the analysis of retailers’ choice behavior. For the eight treat-
ments involved, Figure 5.4 displays θr, the proportion of retailers choosing the
more profitable contract. Table 5.1 provides the detailed description of each
treatment’s choice set and the corresponding statistical analyses.
Figure 5.4: Choice behavior: Buyer
For choice sets 1 and 2, risk-neutrality predicts indifference since the pairs of
contracts in each of these sets entail identical expected profits. The proportion
of subjects choosing the contract that maximizes total supply chain profits,
while keeping the retailer’s expected profit the same, is significantly larger than
50% (binomial test, significant except from the revenue sharing treatment in
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set 2). For choice sets 3 and 4, theory predicts θr = 100%, since the Pareto
improving contracts in each treatment’s choice set strictly increases the retailer’s
expected profit. The results show that this prediction does not hold for any
of the four treatments in choice sets 3 and 5. Most severely, for choice sets
including the revenue sharing contract, half of the participants rather stick with
a less profitable contract. This result is even more puzzling since contracts
that are closer to the Pareto efficient frontier (Figure 5.3) not only increase
the retailer’s expected profit, but also reduce risk in terms of profit variance.17
Overall, the observed behavior leads us to reject Hypothesis 5.1.
We now compare behavior across choice sets with equivalent buyback and
revenue sharing contracts. Consider first choice set 1 which includes two treat-
ments with a wholesale price-only contract and either a buyback or a revenue
sharing contract. We detect no difference in choice behavior (Fisher’s exact test,
p = 1.000). Although the coordinating contracts seem to be preferred to the
simple wholesale price contract (θri = 76%), there seems to be no irregularities
in behavior between the buyback and the revenue sharing treatments. However,
for choice sets 2 through 4, we do observe differences. In indirect comparison,
the buyback frame induces the choice of those contracts that increase total sup-
ply chain profits (not significant for choice set 4 where p = 0.116). At least on
the aggregate level of our study, this result implies that the buyback frame of
a risk-sharing contract facilitates Pareto improving transitions towards larger
total supply chain profits, when translated into the profit space in Figure 5.3.
Overall, we conclude that the parameters of Pareto improving buyback contracts
are viewed more favorably by a retailer than the parameters of a mathematically
equivalent revenue sharing contract. We thus reject Hypothesis 5.2.
Figure 5.5: Choice behavior: Buyer (upscaled parameters)
17The retailer’s expected profit piR(q) = ED[pˇiR(q,D)] is 84 for each contract along the
vertical line. The standard deviation σpˇiR(q,D) is 135 for the wholesale price-only contract,
107 for the non-coordinating risk-sharing contract, and 74 for the coordinating risk-sharing
contract. See Appendix A.2.2 for the derivation of σpˇiR(q,D).
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In order to check the robustness of these results, we conducted eight addi-
tional treatments which differed only in scale. Specifically, all price and cost
parameters were scaled up by a factor of 10. For the eight treatments involved,
Figure 5.5 displays θr, the proportion of retailers choosing the more profitable
contract from a given set of two options. Table 5.1 provides the detailed descrip-
tion of each treatment’s choice set and the corresponding statistical analyses.
We first contrast empirical behavior with the prediction of expected profit max-
imization. For choice sets 1 and 2, the proportion of subjects choosing the
contract that maximizes total supply chain profits, while keeping the retailer’s
expected profit the same, is larger than 50%, but this is only significant for the
buyback frame in set 1. For choice sets 3 and 4, subjects tend to choose Pareto
improving contracts from a set of alternatives, but average choice behavior falls
short of θr = 100% predicted by theory (although not significantly so for the
buyback frame in set 3). The behavior leads us to reject Hypothesis 5.1 (profit
maximization).
A comparison of choice behavior across the buyback and the revenue shar-
ing frame qualitatively replicates the results from the base case. The buyback
frame induces the choice of those contracts that increase total supply chain prof-
its, implying that the buyback frame of a risk-sharing contract facilitates Pareto
improving transitions towards larger total supply chain profits. Since this find-
ing is statistically significant only for set 3, we cannot fully reject Hypothesis
5.2 (equivalence) for buyer behavior under upscaled parameters.
This lack of statistical significance for the upscaled version of the retailer
base case is possibly due to smaller sample sizes. But it leaves room for the
conjecture that results of newsvendor-type experiments are sensitive to the par-
ticular parameterization. We compare choice behavior between the base case
and the upscaled parameters for each of the eight contract sets. The results in
Table 5.2 show no significant impact of how the problem was scaled.
Set Contract type θr θrupscaled H0 : θ
r = θrupscaled
1
buyback 75.7% 79.4% p=0.781
revenue sharing 75.7% 65.7% p=0.436
2
buyback 66.7% 65.7% p=1.000
revenue sharing 40.5% 50.0% p=0.559
3
buyback 78.4% 93.8% p=0.248
revenue sharing 48.6% 66.7% p=0.257
4
buyback 67.5% 85.0% p=0.218
revenue sharing 48.8% 57.9% p=0.176
Table 5.2: Impact of scale
We now turn to supplier choices from contract sets that are identical to the
eight treatments in the retailer base case. Figure 5.6 displays θs, the propor-
tion of suppliers choosing the more profitable contract from a given set of two
options. Table 5.4 provides the detailed description of each treatment’s choice
set and the corresponding statistical analyses. Theory predicts θs = 100% for
all four sets (Figure 5.3). The results show that this prediction does not hold
(binomial tests, p < 0.001, for all treatments). For both the buyback and the
revenue-sharing contract, 50-60% of the subjects choose a risk-sharing, but not
Pareto efficient, contract over the simple wholesale price contract (sets 1 and
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Figure 5.6: Choice behavior: Supplier
2). These choice proportions are slightly lower than in the retailer treatments,
but not significantly so. A substantial fraction of suppliers stay anchored on the
wholesale-price contract. Since this simple contract relieves the supplier from
any inventory risk, this result can be reconciled with risk-aversion on the part
of some subjects in the sample.18 When choosing from a set of two risk-sharing
contracts (sets 2 and 4), even less subjects move towards the Pareto efficient
frontier, but rather stay anchored with a less profitable contract. This again
can be explained in part by a risk-averse supplier’s unwillingness to adopt more
inventory risk, which is highest for the supplier when contracting on the Pareto
frontier.
Finally, we compare supplier choice behavior across the two different frames
of risk-sharing contracts. In contrast to the retailer results above, we do not
detect any systematic, nor significant, differences in how buyback and revenue
sharing contracts are perceived (Table 5.4).
5.2.3 Discussion
Our results show that contract choice behavior deviates from the literature
predictions. Clearly, observed choices are not in line with the maximization
of expected profit. Some instances of our experiments can be loosely tied to
risk aversion. For example, we observe that suppliers are generally less prone to
adopting risk-sharing contracts. This might be due to the fact that buyback and
revenue sharing contracts shift risk towards the supplier, while strictly working
in favor for both partners in terms of expected profits for the parameters of our
18Both the supplier’s expected profit pis(q) = ED[pˇis(q,D)] and its standard deviation
σpˇis(q,D) increases towards the Pareto efficient frontier. For the wholesale price contract, we
have pis(q) = 168.75 and σpˇis(q,D) = 0. For the two risk-sharing contracts along the diagonal
line with λ = 0.33, we have
σpˇis
pis(q)
= 65
200
= 0.33 and
σpˇis
pis(q)
= 198
225
= 0.88. For the two risk-
sharing contracts along the vertical line, we have
σpˇis
pis(q)
= 92
219
= 0.42 and
σpˇis
pis(q)
= 223
253
= 0.88.
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Set Contract parameters θs H0 : θs = 1 H0 : θsbb = θ
s
rs
1
w = 7.50 {wbb = 8.70, 63.4%
p = 0.496
b = 5.55} (N = 41) p < 0.001
w = 7.50 {wrs = 3.15, 53.9%
R = 5.55} (N = 39) p < 0.001
2
{wbb = 8.70, {wbb = 9.75, 27.5%
p = 1.000
b = 5.55} b = 9.00} (N = 40) p < 0.001
{wrs = 3.15, {wrs = 0.75, 27.0%
R = 5.55} R = 9.00} (N = 37) p < 0.001
3
w = 7.50 {wbb = 8.00, 55.8%
p = 0.372
b = 5.00} (N = 42) p < 0.001
w = 7.50 {wrs = 5.00, 65.9%
R = 5.00} (N = 41) p < 0.001
4
{wbb = 8.00, {wbb = 9.00, 30.2%
p = 0.201
b = 5.00} b = 8.00} (N = 43) p < 0.001
{wrs = 5.00, {wrs = 1.00, 16.3%
R = 5.00} R = 8.00} (N = 43) p < 0.001
Table 5.3: Choice behavior: Supplier
study. However, risk aversion cannot explain the observed differential perception
of buyback contracts and revenue sharing contracts. In particular, the retailers
seem to view buyback contracts systematically more favorably than revenue
sharing contracts, even when these contractual arrangements are technically
equivalent.
Recall that underage and overage cost under a buyback and a revenue sharing
contract, and thus the resulting distributions of final profits, are identical when
contract parameters are set according to conditions (5.1) and (5.2). Our results
show that human decision makers are unable to figure this out. Given the
complexity of the problem, it is in fact not unlikely that decision makers fail to
correctly convert the contract parameters into profit distributions, but rather
map them into different mental accounts (Thaler 1980). While this violates
the normative economic principle of asset integration, it greatly relieves the
cognitive burden inherent in the contract choice task. The key in understanding
the contracts’ differential perception must then lie in the particular composition
of overage and underage costs. To make this claim more specific, we make the
following Mental Accounting assumptions.
• MA1 . Utility is derived directly from the parameters instead of the impact
on final profits they imply.
• MA2 . Utility u(·) is experienced along the value function of prospect
theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, compare Figure 5.7).
– MA2.1 . Utility u(·) is defined over gains and losses relative to some
reference point. Let u−(x) define the (dis)utility for x ≤ 0 and u+(x)
the utility for x ≥ 0.
– MA2.2 . u−(·) is convex, u′′−(·) > 0, and u+(·) is concave, u′′+(·) < 0.
Diminishing sensitivity in both the gain and loss domain follows from
the basic psychological principle underlying the Weber-Fechner law.
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– MA2.3 . The decision maker exhibit loss aversion, i.e. −u−(−x) >
u+(x).
Figure 5.7: Contract parameters along the value function
To understand why risk-sharing contracts might be viewed very differently
when in fact equivalent, note that the buyback contract has one parameter in the
gain domain, b, and one parameter in the loss domain, wbb. On the other hand,
the revenue sharing contract has two cost parameters that can be perceived to
lie in the loss domain, namely wrs and R. The following theorem relates the
total utility from a buyback contract, U totbb = u+(b) + u−(−wbb), to the total
utility from a revenue sharing contract, U totrs = u−(−R) + u−(−wrs).
Theorem 9. If the two contracts are equivalent according to equations (5.1)
and (5.2), then U totbb > U
tot
rs .
Theorem 9 offers an explanation why decision makers rather adopt a Pareto
improving buyback19 over a given wholesale price contract, but to a lesser extent
stay put with the simple contract when offered a revenue sharing agreement (sets
1 and 3 in our study). What remains is to build intuition for the observation
that the buyback frame seems to facilitate the transition towards the Pareto
frontier, when the choice set contains two risk-sharing contracts (sets 2 and 4
in our study).
Starting from a wholesale price-only contract, note how the parameters of
the risk sharing contracts evolve in order to induce the retailer to place larger
orders and move the total expected supply chain profit towards Πo (Figure 5.8).
19Note that we use the term Pareto improving contract in expected profit terms and not in
terms of the utility derived from the mental editing of the contract’s parameters.
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Under the buyback contract, the retailer’s cost of a sale wbb slowly increases,
but a swift rise in the buyback price b relieves the retailer from the underage
risk wbb− b of each unit, making it profitable to raise the order quantity. Under
revenue sharing, the retailer’s cost of a sale wrs+R (= wbb under an equivalent
buyback) slowly increases towards the Pareto frontier. However, the quickly
decreasing overage cost, wrs (= wbb− b under an equivalent buyback) renders a
larger order quantity profitable for the retailer.
(a) Buyback (b) Revenue Sharing
Figure 5.8: Contract parameters for λ = 0.33
We investigate the change in utility resulting from the transition from some
buyback contract {w1bb, b1} towards a Pareto superior buyback agreement {w2bb, b2},
compared to the corresponding transition from a revenue sharing contract {w1rs, R1}
towards a Pareto superior revenue sharing agreement {w2rs, R2}. When assess-
ing the relative attractiveness of two risk-sharing contracts in a given choice
set, the decision maker might use a comprehensive mental account involving
the comparison across all relevant contract parameters, both within and be-
tween contracts (Figure 5.9(a)). Easing the decision maker’s cognitive burden
as well as analytical tractability, we assume that two contracts are compared in
utility by use of a more limited account (Figure 5.9(b)). The total change in
utility from choosing a Pareto superior buyback contract is then composed of
∆−wbb = u−(w
1
bb−w2bb), a utility decrease from w2bb > w1bb, and ∆+b = u+(b2−b1),
a utility increase from a larger buyback price b2 > b1 (compare Figure 5.8(a)).
On the other hand, the change in utility from choosing a Pareto superior revenue
sharing contract entails ∆−R = u−(R
1 − R2), a utility decrease from R2 > R1,
and ∆+wrs = u+(w
1
rs − w2rs), a utility increase from a lower wholesale price
w2rs < w
1
rs (compare Figure 5.8(b)). Under the Mental Accounting assump-
tions made above, the following Theorem relates the total utility change from
choosing a Pareto improving buyback contract, U totbb = ∆
−
wbb
+∆+b , to the corre-
sponding total utility change from choosing a Pareto improving revenue sharing
contract, U totrs = ∆
−
R +∆
+
wrs .
Theorem 10. If the two contracts are equivalent according to equations (5.1)
and (5.2), then U totbb > U
tot
rs .
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(a) Comprehensive account (b) Limited account
Figure 5.9: Mental accounts of risk-sharing contracts
Theorem 10 implies that the retailer’s mental contract perception facilitates the
transition towards the Pareto efficient frontier under the buyback frame. This
conjecture is strengthened by the fact that our empirical results indicate that
the supplier’s contract perception does work in favor of any of the two frames.
5.3 Study 2: Moving Reference Contracts
The results of Study 1 establish the existence of a frame-dependent percep-
tion and evaluation of supply chain contracts. We argue that each contract is
evaluated by mentally mapping its parameters either into the domain of losses
(w,wbb, wrs, r) or gains (b).
This study carries the notion of reference-dependent contract choice further.
Standard single shot contracting models work under the assumption that there
is no previous contract in place or, equivalent with respect to the theoretical
predictions, that previous deals have no impact on current contract choice. In
reality, at the time a decision maker evaluates a given contract offer, there typ-
ically exists (a) a contract in place from the previous selling season or (b) a
contract offered in a previous step of the negotiation process. Then it is likely
that current contract perception and subsequent choice is influenced by a refer-
ence deal. Since supplier-retailer relations are typically governed by wholesale
price-only contracts initially, and then move towards more complex arrange-
ments, it is straightforward to view a wholesale price-only contract as setting a
natural reference point for the evaluation of risk-sharing contracts. This con-
jecture seems particularly reasonable since both the buyback and the revenue
sharing contract entail a wholesale price parameter as a natural point for com-
parison. The following study investigates the impact of an existing wholesale
price contract on subsequent choice of risk-sharing contracts. Specifically, we
test the following hypothesis which is derived from strictly normative accounts.
HYPOTHESIS 5.3 (Irrelevance of reference points). The choice between two
risk-sharing contracts is independent from the reference point set by an existing
wholesale-price contract.
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(a) Reference: w∗ = 7.50
(b) Reference: w = 8.50
(c) Reference: w = 9.50
Figure 5.10: Study 2: Design and parameterization
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5.3.1 Experimental Design
The parameterization and implementation closely follows Study 1. Demand is
uniformly distributed between 100 and 200, the selling price p is 12, and the
unit production cost c is 3. We consider risk-sharing contracts that keep the
retailer’s profit share constant at λ = pir(q
∗(w∗))
Π(q∗(w∗)) = 0.33, which is the fraction of
total supply chain profit the retailer earns under the supplier’s most preferred
wholesale price push contract with w∗ = 7.50. In Study 2, subjects are offered
a choice set of three contracts: two contracts within the class of either the
buyback or the revenue sharing, along with a wholesale price-only contract. To
assess the extent to which the simple wholesale price contracts sets a mental
reference point for the risk-sharing contracts, we vary the wholesale price on
three levels (between-subject). Specifically, we let w∗ = 7.50, w = 8.50, and
w = 9.50 (Figures 5.10(a), 5.10(b), and 5.10(c)).
Offering wholesale prices larger than the supplier’s most preferred w∗ = 7.50
are somewhat artificial because they benefit neither the supplier nor the retailer
(who is strictly better off with a lower wholesale price). We choose these refer-
ence points in order to induce subjects to focus on the risk-sharing alternatives.
This allows us to study the impact of relatively unattractive reference points on
choice behavior. Overall, our study thus follows a 2x3 design with two between-
subject factors (1. buyback vs. revenue sharing, 2. reference wholesale price).
A total of 199 subjects participated in the resulting six treatments, admin-
istered through a questionnaire. As in Study 1, cash was the only incentive
offered (see Appendix B.3 for instructions).
5.3.2 Results
Figure 5.11 displays the proportion of choices for the six treatments. In the
revenue-sharing frame, few retailers choose the wholesale-price contract, but
most subjects stick with the less profitable revenue sharing contract (58%) in-
stead of moving towards its Pareto optimal counterpart (32%). This pattern is
consistent across the three different wholesale price contracts offered as part of
each choice set. For the buyback contract, we first look at choices when the set
of alternatives includes the supplier’s most preferred wholesale-price push con-
tract w∗ = 7.50. The observed behavior is qualitatively in line with the results
of study 1, although a rigorous comparison is prevented by the different size of
choice sets involved in Study 1 (two contracts) and Study 2 (three contracts).
Only few retailers (5%) stick with the wholesale-price-only contract w∗ = 7.50,
while the most profitable buyback contract {wbb = 9, b = 8} is chosen by more
subjects (60%) than its Pareto inferior counterpart {wbb = 4, b = 4} picked by
35% of the subjects. We observe a similar pattern when the choice set involves
a wholesale-price-only contract with w = 9.50. The pattern is reversed for
w = 8.50 in an interesting way: While only few actually choose the wholesale-
price contract itself, it seems to induce subjects to stick with the less profitable
buyback contract {wbb = 8.00, b = 5.00} instead of moving to the profit-optimal
contract with {wbb = 9.00, b = 8.00}.
The proportion of subjects choosing the wholesale price contract tends to be
negligible across all treatments. We now narrow our and investigate how this
choice between two risk-sharing contracts is moderated by the wholesale price
contract. Define θri|w as the proportion of Pareto efficient choices among those
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(a) Buyback (b) Revenue Sharing
Figure 5.11: Choice behavior under moving reference points
subjects that pick a risk-sharing contract (i = bb or i = rs) over a wholesale
price-only contract w offered in the same choice set. A comparison across con-
tract frames reveals that the buyback frame generally induces more choices on
the efficient frontier than does the revenue frame, θrbb|w > θ
r
rs|w, in accordance
with Study 1. This pattern holds for all reference contracts w, but is significant
only for w = 7.50 (Table 5.4, all tests are Fisher’s exact tests). For the rev-
enue sharing treatments alone, choices between two risk-sharing contracts are
unaffected by the particular wholesale price contract included in the choice set
(p = 1.000 for all pairwise comparisons of θrrs|w across revenue sharing treat-
ments with different reference wholesale prices). However, the buyback treat-
ments reveals an interesting behavioral anomaly, as noted above. The relative
attractiveness of the two risk-sharing contracts, captured by θrbb|w, is reversed
when the wholesale price w = 8.50 is ”wedged in” between the two buyback con-
tracts’ wholesale parameters wbb, working in favor of the less profitable contract
with wbb = 8.00 < 8.50.
wholesale price buyback revenue sharing H0 : θrbb|w = θ
r
rs|w
w = 7.50
63%a 35% p = 0.031
(N = 37) (N = 38)
w = 8.50
41% 33% p = 0.630
(N = 38) (N = 37)
w = 9.50
59% 36% p = 0.238
(N = 29) (N = 20)
H0 : θri|w=7.50 = θ
r
i|w=8.50 p = 0.065 p = 1.000
H0 : θri|w=8.50 = θ
r
i|w=9.50 p = 0.215 p = 1.000
H0 : θri|w=7.50 = θ
r
i|w=9.50 p = 0.800 p = 1.000
achoices of the profit maximizing contract relative to all choices of coordinating contracts.
Table 5.4: Reference-dependent choice behavior
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5.3.3 Discussion
Study 2 investigates how contract choice behavior is affected by an existing
wholesale price-only contract which constitutes a salient reference point when
transiting towards risk-sharing contracts that also include a wholesale price
parameter.
We find that increases in the wholesale price w decreases the likelihood of
subjects choosing this simple contract, but this ”moving reference contract”
does not qualitatively affect preferences between the two risk-sharing alterna-
tives in the choice set. In five out of six treatments, we observe behavior similar
to Study 1. Relatively more subjects choose the Pareto inferior contract under
the revenue sharing frame, while this ratio is reversed for the buyback frame.
This would lead us to accepting Hypothesis 5.3 which states that an existing
wholesale price-only contract does not affect the choice between risk-sharing
contracts. However, we found one incident which contradicts this hypothesis: If
the existing wholesale price w separates two buyback contracts on the dimen-
sion of the wholesale price parameter, more subjects choose the Pareto inferior
contract with wbb < w rather than the Pareto efficient contract which typically
implies wbb > w (compare Figure 5.8(a)). This observation alone suggests that
the wholesale price-only contract, while rarely chosen itself, does have an impact
on choice between risk-sharing contracts. Admittedly, this result should not be
overstated given the parameterization of our study. In reality, we would expect
the wholesale price w of any initial contract to be smaller than the wholesale
price wbb of any buyback contract which moves the supply chain towards the
Pareto efficient frontier (Figure 5.8(a)). In this light, the particular parameter
instances used in this study might restrict our results to mere laboratory cu-
riosities. But the issue of reference-dependent contract choice certainly merits
further attention in future studies. For example, note from Figure 5.8 that the
wholesale price-only contract typically separates pareto-improving buyback con-
tracts from revenue sharing contracts by wrs < w < wbb. It might be interesting
to investigate the choice between a buyback and an equivalent revenue sharing
contract in the presence of an existing wholesale price-only contract.
5.4 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter investigates the choice between simple, and frequently imple-
mented, wholesale price contracts and risk-sharing contracts with the potential
to coordinate the supply chain. The strongest result of our studies is the re-
tailer’s differential perception of buyback and revenue sharing contracts when
these two are in fact mathematically equivalent. In a nutshell, the buyback
contract seems to be viewed more favorably than an equivalent revenue sharing
contract.
This finding cannot be attributed to any choice theory that adheres to the
normative principle of invariance. The invariance axiom postulates that choice
should be unaffected by the task description. Based on the mental accounting
arithmetics, and along the value function of prospect theory, we argue that
the parameters of a buyback are in fact a hedonic frame of the strategically
equivalent parameters of revenue sharing contracts.
Our findings bear some interesting implications for supply chain contract-
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ing. We observe that Pareto improving contracts are viewed more favorably by
retailers under a buyback contract than under a revenue sharing contract. On
the other hand, supplier choice behavior seems to be largely insensitive to the
contract frame. It is thus straightforward to conjecture that the outcome of a
contract bargaining process is more likely to be on the Pareto efficient frontier
when a buyback contract is the subject of negotiation. Admittedly, due to the
particular design of our studies, our results cannot make a stringent claim here.
But they call for further empirical research. For example, future work needs to
allow subjects to learn over multiple repetitions of the choice task, since lack of
learning opportunities is the major limitation of the questionnaire design used
in the present study. Furthermore, future laboratory experiments should in-
vestigate contract negotiations between retailers and suppliers in an interactive
setting, with a particular focus on the role of anchor points (Kristensen and
Gaerling 2000).
A further interesting research opportunity concerns the actual sequence of
payments under the two risk-sharing contracts. The buyback contract typically
involves a comparatively high upfront procurement cost prior to the selling sea-
son, followed by revenues generated by sales during the season and, possibly,
revenues generated by returning leftovers to the supplier. On the other hand,
the revenue sharing contract entails relatively low upfront procurement costs,
followed by sales revenues during the season accompanied by further procure-
ment cost for every unit sold (this is at least one way to look at it). For this
extended view on the newsvendor situation, a standard economic analysis would
be in favor of the revenue sharing contract. This is because, assuming a positive
interest rate, the revenue sharing contract yields a higher discounted expected
value. However, there is sound theoretical evidence that the perception of a
decision maker might in fact work into the opposite direction. For example,
people generally like sequences of monetary events that improve over time, i.e.
they exhibit a preference for prepayment (Prelec and Loewenstein (1998)). In
this spirit, the buyback contract might be preferred because it entails a large
up-front cost after which the newsvendor can exclusively focus on gains, as cap-
tured by p and b. The notion of coupling would point into a similar direction:
via the additional cost R under the revenue sharing scheme, the earning period
during the selling season is coupled to the related costs of the units sold. Con-
trary to this, the buyback contract decouples costs from earnings because the
only costs arise at the time the order is placed. The buyback contract would
then be perceived as favorable because the earning period is not tied to the
unpleasant experience of costs.
Finally, it is important to note the existence of major non-behavioral reasons
for adopting one particular contract instead of the other. For example, leftover
inventories might have to be transported back to the supplier in order to protect
the supplier’s brand image by keeping the retailer to sell off leftovers at steep
discounts, but the associated transportation costs are not captured by our simple
model. In this case, the implementation of a buyback contract seems more viable
than a revenue sharing contract.20 Such economic reasons can easily predispose
different industries to use either a buyback or a revenue-sharing contract when
20Note that the buyback contract does not necessitate the physical return of leftovers, since
the buyback price b might in fact just represent an inventory subsidy for the retailer who
can salvage excess inventories through alternative distribution channels or clearance-pricing
activities.
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moving away from simple wholesale price contracts. But the interesting question
remains: Does the misperception of contract parameters systematically lead to
Pareto inefficient bargaining outcomes? And if so, under which contract types
is this more likely?
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Pooling Inventory Risk -
The Efficacy of Excess
Inventory Markets
Inventory decision making under uncertain demand entails an inevitable positive
probability of undesirable leftover inventories after demand realization. In the
course of this thesis we have touched upon various options a firm has to deal with
this issue. In its standard textbook version, the newsvendor can salvage every
unit not sold during the selling season at a value known at the time of the order
(in Chapter 3, we normalized this salvage value to zero). More realistically, the
firm uses end-of-season clearance pricing, where leftovers are sold at a discount
(Cachon and Kok 2007). With clearance pricing, the management of leftovers
would still be endogenous to the firm. An alternative option arises from possible
contractual agreements between firms. For example, a retailer might be able to
return all unsold units to its supplier for a partial refund (Chapter 5). Finally,
a firm might deal with excess inventories by avoiding them altogether, implying
a shift of the entire risk of supply-demand mismatches to the supplier (Chapter
4).
In this section, we consider an alternative for managing leftover inventory,
offered by the divergent topology of most real life supply networks. Supply
chains frequently encounter situations where some resellers have surplus stock
while others are stocked out. Clearly, if transportation costs are sufficiently low,
avoiding costly supply-demand mismatches through lateral inventory realloca-
tions benefits all firms. Recent supply chain research has built theoretical sup-
port for the efficacy of market-enabled lateral inventory reallocations between
independent firms in decentralized settings (Rudi et al. 2001, Lee and Whang
2002, Chod and Rudi 2007). Secondary markets, such as auctions, have been
shown to positively affect initial stocking decisions and then - after stochastic
demand materializes at each stocking location - help alleviate inventory imbal-
ances (Section 2.1.4).
The management of excess inventories is not a second-order concern in prac-
tice. In the year 2000 the excess consumer goods inventory market had a sub-
stantial volume of roughly $120 billion globally - this volume is expected to only
increase in the future (Bonasera 2000). Whereas less than 1% of the total excess
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inventory market was run on Internet-based exchanges in 2000, online trading
exchanges for excess inventory has become a $60 billion addressable market
worldwide (Alsin 2006). The major benefit of electronic market places stems
from improved information and communication structures, lowering the trans-
action costs for finding supply or demand in reasonable time. Lower transaction
costs in turn enable cost savings from inventory pooling across independent firms
or retail locations.
While their major benefits are easily understood, and advertised heavily,
little is really known about the impact of secondary markets on inventory deci-
sions, besides scattered anecdotal evidence that online exchanges do not make
traders want even more excess inventory (Haney 2007). This chapter attempts a
step towards a better understanding of supply chain inventory decision making
in the presence of secondary markets, testing a stylized model in a controlled
laboratory setting. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first empirical
study to address this issue. Section 6.1 introduces the notion of inventory risk
pooling and develops the detailed research questions for the two independent
empirical studies presented in Sections 6.2 and 6.3.
6.1 The Principles of Inventory Risk Pooling
Relative to individual decision making in the newsvendor experiments presented
before, inventory rebalancing in secondary markets entails a higher cognitive
burden for the decision makers due to the strategic interaction with other play-
ers. To partially compensate for this increased complexity, we simplify the
model of Lee and Whang (2002) presented in Section 2.1.4. Specifically, we
remove the second selling season taking place after inventory rebalancing in the
secondary market.21 The objective of inventory rebalancing in the secondary
market then is to salvage excess stock at a positive value (for resellers with
leftover inventories). The objective for resellers with unmet demand from the
regular selling season is to provide their waiting customers with units procured
on the secondary market. This implies that unmet demand can be backlogged, in
deviation from the previous chapters. In this Section we investigate a situation
where stocking decisions for each of multiple locations are centrally coordinated
to maximize total system profits. This case serves as an upper bound benchmark
for the decentralized settings considered in the subsequent sections.
Consider M stocking locations (i= 1..M) facing independent and identically
distributed demand. After making order decisions and observing individual
customer demand, inventories can be transfered from locations with leftover
inventories (i.e. qi>Di) to locations with unmet demand (i.e. qi<Di). For
analytical tractability as well as ease of laboratory implementation, we assume
transportation costs to be zero.22 Prior to the selling season, the objective is to
choose an order quantity Q=
∑M
i=1 qi that maximizes total expected profit
Π (Q) = −wQ+ p
∫
ΦM
(min(Q,DM )dΦM (DM ) (6.1)
21Strictly speaking, with no further selling season after the secondary market, the firms en-
gage in shortage clearing rather than inventory rebalancing. In the remainder of this Chapter
we use these two terms interchangeably.
22This is a common assumption in the literature, see e.g. Lee and Whang (2002).
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where ΦM denotes the convolution of M random variables, with expected value
µM=Mµ and standard deviation σM =
√
Mσ. Due to the absence of trans-
portation costs, this again is a standard newsvendor problem with an opti-
mal solution Qo = Φ−1M
(
p−w
p
)
. For a better comparison with the solution
from decentralized settings, we let qo = Q
o
M . For M identically uniformly [a;b]-
distributed market demands, used for the parameterization of the experiments,
the following Theorem describes the quantity effect of the secondary market.
Theorem 11. . The centrally optimal order quantity qo in the presence of a
secondary market is larger than q∗ for wp< 0.5. For
w
p > 0.5 it is smaller than
q∗.
Essentially, Theorem 11 implies a regression to the mean which is intuitive due
to simple risk pooling arguments (Lee and Whang 2002). Along with a quantity
effect, the option to pool inventories through the introduction of the secondary
market has a non-negative profit effect.
Theorem 12. . Total system profit increases in the presence of a secondary
market.
A central planner provides a useful, but hypothetical, performance bench-
mark for the distributed decision making nature found in most real settings.
This chapter’s unit of analysis is a set of independent firms. Our research goal
is two-fold. First, we investigate whether human decision makers efficiently
exploit the rebalancing opportunities offered by excess inventory markets. Sec-
ondly, moving backwards in time, we are interested whether the presence of the
secondary market can move independent order decisions towards the system’s
optimum. We divide our analysis into two parts. In Section 6.2 we study a
situation where the unit transfer price for inventory reallocations on the trans-
shipment market is exogenously given. While real-world examples for this case
are rare (Rudi et al. 2001), exogenously determined price have two distinctive
advantages from an experimental viewpoint. First, it allows for the derivation of
unambiguous theoretical prediction. Secondly, it greatly reduces the cognitive
burden for the decision maker. In Section 6.3 the transfer price is endogenized
and determined through a market-clearing auction mechanism. This setting
is more realistic but comes at a cost. First, we lack exact theoretical predic-
tions. Secondly, it increases computational complexity for the decision maker
considerably.
6.2 Study 1: Secondary Markets with Exoge-
nous Prices
6.2.1 Theory and Hypothesis Building
Suppose that each retailer i chooses its inventory level qi to maximize her own
profit, while anticipating the option to salvage leftover inventories in the sec-
ondary market: If inventory at one location exceeds realized demand, it may
transship (part of) its excess inventory to other locations that require further
units, i.e. qi < Di. The unit transfer price τ , charged by the sending location,
is assumed to be exogenously set and independent of the demand realizations
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and inventory levels at the M locations. Define oi = (qi −Di)+ as the excess
inventory of location i and ui = (Di − qi)+ as its excess demand, respectively.
On the aggregate level, let O =
∑M
i=1 (qi −Di)+ and U =
∑M
i=1 (Di − qi)+
denote total secondary market supply and demand, respectively.23
Since total supply is typically not equal to total demand, we need to specify
a rationing rule.24 We assume that the allocation of tradable units in the sec-
ondary market, min {U,O}, depends directly on the relative overage (underage)
position in the secondary market: If total demand U exceeds total supply O
in the secondary market, each retailer i with ui > 0 receives a quantity uiU O
and each retailer i with oi > 0 can transfer all leftover units. Likewise, if total
supply O exceeds total demand U in the secondary market, each retailer i with
oi > 0 can transship a quantity oiOU and each retailer i with ui > 0 can receive
sufficient units to fulfill unmet demand from the selling season.25
The expected profit of retailer i is then a function of its own order quantity
qi, as well as the other retailers’ order quantities Q−i = (q1, q2, ..qi−1, qi+1, ..qM ),
pii(qi, Q−i) = −w · qi + p
∫ b
a
min(qi, Di)dΦDi + ED[pi
sm
i (qi, Q−i)] (6.2)
with the demand vector D = (D1, ..., DM ) ∈ RM+ and
pismi (qi, Q−i) =

τoi if oi > 0 ∧ U > O
τ oiOU if oi > 0 ∧O > U
(p− τ)ui if ui > 0 ∧O > U
(p− τ)uiU O if ui > 0 ∧ U > O.
Then, Q∗ = (q∗1 , q
∗
2 , .., q
∗
M ) is a Nash equilibrium if, for each i = 1, 2, ..,M :
q∗i = argmaxpii
qi
(
q∗1 , ..q
∗
i−1, qi, q
∗
i+1, ..q
∗
M
)
. (6.3)
Since every retailer is symmetric, q∗i = q
∗ must satisfy for each i :
dpii (q∗, ..q∗, qi, q∗, ..q∗)
dqi
∣∣∣∣
qi=q∗
= 0. (6.4)
While determining the general existence and uniqueness of a symmetric Nash
equilibrium is outside the scope of this thesis, we are interested in the sensitivity
of Q∗ with respect to the transfer price τ . Based on extensive numerical studies,
and in line with the results of Rudi et al. (2001) for the two-location case, we
conclude that each retailer i’s equilibrium choice of inventory is increasing in
τ ∈ [w, p].26
CONJECTURE 1. Retailer i ’s optimal equilibrium order quantity q∗i = q
∗ is
increasing in τ .
23For the sake of expositional clarity, we use these definitions, keeping in mind they are
functions of order quantities and demand realizations.
24Clearly, this is unnecessary for M = 2 considered by Rudi et al. (2001).
25Other allocation rules have been investigated in the literature, in settings different from
ours. For example, available total supply could be allocated proportionally to the different
retailers’ initial order quantities (Lee et al. 1997), their sales in previous periods (Cachon and
Lariviere 1999), or based on a ”fair share” (Eppen and Schrage 1981).
26see Appendix A.2.3.
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The intuition behind this conjecture is roughly the following. Increasing τ in-
creases retailer i ’s marginal value of ordering an additional unit q∗i + 1, since
the retailer wishes to decrease the probability of buying units in the secondary
market (at increased cost τ), and increase the probability of selling units in
the secondary market (at higher unit revenue τ). Since this intuition holds
for every retailer, we would expect the equilibrium order quantities Q∗ to be
non-decreasing in τ .
It is implicit in our rationing mechanism in (6.2) that the actual reallocation
is automatically determined according to the distribution of O and U . In order
to study trading behavior, in our experiment we allow each potential seller
(buyer) on the excess inventory market to enter the number of units he wishes
to sell (buy) at τ . Sellers’ bids si are constrained by own inventory, i.e. si ≤ oi,
whereas each buyer can bid bi up to the total available supply (which might
exceed an individual buyer’s demand), i.e. bi ≤ O. In the likely case of a
mismatch between total demand and supply at τ ,
∑
si 6=
∑
bi, inventories are
reallocated proportionally to each player’s bid quantity. Specifically, a buyer
i will receive bi∑ bj ∑ si if ∑ bi > ∑ si, and each seller i can sell si∑ sj ∑ bi if∑
si >
∑
bi. Optimal buyer bids b∗i (b
∗
−i) and seller bids s
∗
i (s
∗
−i) equal ui or oi
in equilibrium, with one exception. To see this, distinguish the following cases.
• Case 1: oi > 0
– Case 1A, U > O: Note that sellers’ bid quantities si are constrained
by available inventory oi. Since bidding si < oi only decreases profit,
it follows directly that s∗i (s
∗
−i) = oi
– Case 1B, O > U : Since total supply exceeds total demand, ev-
ery seller has the incentive to inflate his bids in order to receive a
higher fraction of total demand. However, since sellers’ bid quanti-
ties si are constrained by available inventory oi, it follows directly
that s∗i (s
∗
−i) = oi.
• Case 2: ui > 0
– Case 2A, O > U : Since total supply exceeds total demand, unilat-
eral deviations from bi = ui cannot be profitable. Hence, b∗i (b
∗
−i) =
ui.
– Case 2B, U > O: Note that buyers’ bid quantities bi are not con-
strained by true demand ui. When total supply demand exceeds
total supply, it is easy to figure out the non-existence of an equilib-
rium in pure strategies since, for any given allocation of total supply,
bi∑
bj
O, each buyer has the incentive to unilaterally inflate his bids
from bi = ui (for all i) in order to receive a higher fraction of total
supply.
Having traders place bids, rather than automate the reallocation of excess in-
ventories, comes at a cost of an exact equilibrium prediction for Case 2B. On
the upside, it allows us to study trading behavior in the transshipment market.
We formulate three research hypotheses which follow directly from the the-
oretical considerations above. First, we expect initial order decisions to be
sensitive to the transfer price τ .
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HYPOTHESIS 6.1. Order quantities are increasing in the transfer price in the
secondary market.
Secondly, we expect average profits to increase relative to a situation without
secondary market. This is obvious since retailers can always choose to ignore
the secondary market and earn their default newsvendor profits.
HYPOTHESIS 6.2. Average profits are increasing in the presence of a secondary
market.
Thirdly, we expect subjects to exploit the secondary market trading oppor-
tunities in order to salvage their leftover inventories (or buy additional units to
mitigate supply shortages) and thus increase their profits.
HYPOTHESIS 6.3. The trading volume on the secondary market always is
min(O,U).
Hypothesis 6.3 implies that the secondary market is always cleared. It follows
directly from the fact that s∗i (s
∗
−i) = oi and buyers having no apparent incentive
to deflate their bids. Since every unit traded in the secondary market implies
a better match between total demand and supply, the excess inventory market
can be expected to increase supply chain efficacy.
HYPOTHESIS 6.4. The option to trade units in the secondary market increases
profits.
We test Hypothesis 6.1 and 6.2 in Section 6.2.3 (order behavior) and turn
to Hypothesis 6.3 and 6.4 in Section 6.2.4 (trading behavior).
6.2.2 Experimental Design
The timeline of events for this study is as follows (detailed instructions are
provided in the Appendix). First, each subject i places an order qi. After market
demand Di is materialized, players enter the secondary market stage. Subjects
with leftover inventory (qi > Di) act as potential sellers in the secondary market
and enter the amount of units sSi ≤ oi they are willing to transship at the given
price τ . Subjects with unfilled customer demand (Di > qi) act as potential
buyers and enter the amount of units bi they are willing to buy at τ . Information
on total demand U as well as total supply O in the secondary market is made
available to every subject, but the exact distribution of U and O among the
group members is not. After inventories are (partially) reallocated, total profits
are displayed and subjects proceed with inventory decisions for the next round.
In all treatments, demand is uniformly distributed, Di ∼ U [100, 200], and
the retail price is p = 12. Our experimental setup entails three between-subject
factors to test our hypotheses. First, we vary the transfer price τ on two levels
(3 or 9) in order to test Hypothesis 6.1. Secondly, we vary the group size M (4
or 10). Lastly, we vary the wholesale price w (6 and 9) and thus the ratio p−wp .
To control for potential anchoring behavior, all treatments included a simple
newsvendor experiment without the option to reallocate inventories after the
season as a within-subject factor. This provides a useful empirical benchmark
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to distinguish the impact of the transshipment market from mean anchoring
more clearly. Table 6.1 summarizes the experimental design and provides the
theoretical benchmarks for this study. To avoid notational confusion, let the
subscripts ”nv” and ”sm” distinguish the standard newsvendor solution q∗ from
the equilibrium quantities q∗i (Q
∗
−i) in the presence of the secondary market.
27
The newsvendor treatment was played over 20 rounds while the secondary mar-
ket treatments entailed 40 rounds to account for its higher complexity, with the
newsvendor treatment being played first.
wholesale transfer Group Size
price price M=4 M=10
w = 9
τ = 3
q∗nv = 125, q∗sm = 126, qo = 140 -
(N=20)
τ = 9
q∗nv = 125, q∗sm = 141, qo = 140 -
(N=20)
w = 6
τ = 3
q∗sm = 143, q∗nv = qo = 150 q∗sm = 141, q∗nv = qo = 150
(N=16) (N=40)
τ = 9
q∗sm = 157, q∗nv = qo = 150 q∗sm = 159, q∗nv = qo = 150
(N=20) (N=40)
Table 6.1: Design, theoretical predictions, and sample sizes
A total of 146 subjects participated in the experiments. All experimental
sessions were conducted with students participating in a supply chain course
at the University of Mannheim in June 2007. The students participated for
partial course credit for the semester’s supply chain management exam. All
sessions were conducted at the laboratory of the Collaborative Research Center
504 at the University of Mannheim. Participants read written instructions and
were briefed orally. To ensure that participants understood the logic of the
experiment, each participant had to answer a number of problem-related quiz
questions on the computer screen prior to the actual experiment. The software
for the experiment was programmed and conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher
2007) In Appendix B.4, we provide screenshots of typical computer screens.
6.2.3 Results: Order Behavior
Low profit and small groups
We first analyze the results from the small group (M = 4), low profit condition
(w = 9) which entails four treatments (τ = 3 vs. τ = 9 plus a within-subject
newsvendor control treatment each). The descriptive statistics are given in
Figure 6.2.3 with the results from significance tests being provided separatedly
in Table 6.2.28
We observe average order quantities in both newsvendor treatments to be
significantly above the theoretical prediction for the standard newsvendor, q∗nv.
27The symmetric equilibrium order quantities q∗i (Q
∗
−1) were calculated numerically (see
Appendix A.2.3).
28Throughout this section we use non-parametric tests (Siegel 1956): Wilcoxon for one-
sample and related-sample tests, Mann-Whitney-U for independent-sample tests. The tests
for the secondary market treatments are based on group averages. As in previous chapters,
we let “ˆ” denote empirically observed quantities.
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(a) Average order quantities (b) Average profits
(c) Order quantities over time
Figure 6.1: Order quantities and profits for w = 9 and M = 4
Moreover, we observe that average orders in the presence of the secondary mar-
ket are significantly above the theoretical predictions (but below µ) for both
τ = 3 and τ = 9. These findings are in line with the mean anchoring behav-
ior consistently observed in newsvendor experiments. We now check whether
subjects in the secondary market treatments converge towards the equilibrium
prediction. Fitting a simple trend line (Figure 6.1(c)) reveals this is indeed the
case for the low transfer price treatment (standardized β = −0.548, p < 0.001)
but subjects in the high transfer price treatments failed to adjust their ini-
tially high orders towards the equilibrium prediction q∗sm = 141 (standardized
β = −0.078, p = 0.632). A direct comparison of order behavior under the two
different transfer prices shows significantly higher average order quantities un-
der τ = 9, in line with what theory predicts. This suggests some sensitivity of
order quantities with respect to the transfer price τ . However, this finding is
somewhat convoluted by the fact that average order quantities are already sig-
nificantly higher under τ = 9 even without the option to trade in the secondary
market.
Even though subjects on average do not significantly change their behavior
after the introduction of the secondary market, they increases average profits p¯i
significantly (383 vs. 310 for τ = 3, 383 vs. 318 for τ = 9). It is worthwhile to
note that the increased performance has to be attributed solely to the option
to trade excess inventories, and not by the potential of the secondary market
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τ = 3 τ = 9
Hypothesis p-value Hypothesis p-value
qˆnv = q∗nv 0.001 qˆnv = q∗nv <0.001
qˆsm = q∗nv 0.043 qˆsm = q
∗
nv 0.043
qˆsm = q∗sm 0.043 qˆsm = q
∗
sm 0.043
qˆsm = qo 0.080 qˆsm = qo 0.043
qˆsm = qˆnv 0.686 qˆsm = qˆnv 0.138
p¯i(qˆsm) = p¯i(qˆnv) 0.043 p¯i(qˆsm) = p¯i(qˆnv) 0.043
qˆτ=3sm = qˆτ=9sm 0.009 qˆτ=3nv = qˆτ=9nv 0.055
Table 6.2: Statistical tests for w = 9, M = 4
to change initial stocking decisions. To appreciate this finding, we compute
the hypothetical average profits (for the demand realizations d implemented in
the experiment) had all subjects consistently ordered the optimal newsvendor
quantity q∗nv = 125, i.e. p¯i(q
∗
nv, d). Interestingly, this benchmark is 373 for both
τ = 3 and τ = 9, which corresponds to approximately 97% of average profits
captured by the participants in the secondary market treatments.
Medium profit and small groups
We now turn to the medium-profit case with w = 6 (Figure 6.2 and Table 6.3).
We find little evidence for anchoring behavior which was to be expected since the
medium-profit condition effectively controls for this bias. For the low transfer
price condition, the secondary market affects average orders as theory predicts.
We find average period-by-period orders to move slowly downward over time
(standardized β = −0.244), but this trend is not significant (p = 0.129), which
is reassuring since initial orders are already reasonably close to the equilibrium
prediction q∗sm = 141. For the high transfer price condition, average orders
fall short of the equilibrium prediction, but a simple linear trend line reveals
that subjects, initially anchoring around the mean, slowly converge towards
q∗sm = 157 (standardized β = 0.293, p = 0.067). Overall, subjects seem to
respond qualitatively correct to the incentives set by the transfer price. This is
supported by a direct comparison between the order quantities under τ = 3 and
τ = 9, showing that subjects order significantly more under the latter. Lastly,
we check how order behavior translates into profits. The option to trade excess
inventories in the secondary market increases average profits significantly (803
vs. 729 for τ = 3, 812 vs. 735 for τ = 9). Interestingly, average realized
profits seem to be higher under τ = 9, where average orders deviate from the
theoretical prediction, than under τ = 3 (812 vs. 803), but the difference is not
significant (p = 0.142).
Medium profit and large groups
In order to investigate the impact of group size on ordering and trading behavior,
our last subset of treatments was carried out in the medium-profit condition
with a larger group size of M = 10. As to the ordering behavior, discussed
in this section, we observe qualitatively similar effects as in the small group
condition (Figure 6.3). First, the order quantities from the newsvendor control
treatment are not significantly different from q∗nv = µ (Figure 6.3). For the
low transfer price τ = 3, our data shows ordering behavior that is consistent
with the theoretical prediction. As predicted, subjects order significantly less
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(a) Average order quantities (b) Average profits
(c) Order quantities over time
Figure 6.2: Order quantities and profits for w = 6 and M = 4
than in the absence of the excess inventory market (p = 0.068) and, on average,
not significantly different from the equilibrium prediction q∗sm = 141. While
anchoring in initial rounds, a simple linear regression shows that orders move
downward over time (standardized β = −0.823, p < 0.001), and appear to
remain relatively stable over the last 10 periods. With a high transfer price
τ = 9, average order quantities are slightly and insignificantly higher in the
presence of the secondary market, relative to newsvendor orders without the
option to trade. Nevertheless, they fall short of the equilibrium prediction q∗sm =
159 (p = 0.043), although exhibiting a significant upward trend (standardized
β = 0.299, p = 0.061). A direct comparison between the two treatments shows
that average orders increase in the transfer price τ (p = 0.021). Lastly, we check
how order behavior translates into profits. The option to trade excess inventories
in the secondary market increases average profits significantly (821 vs. 745 for
τ = 3, 837 vs. 745 for τ = 9). Average realized profits are significantly lower
(p = 0.083) under τ = 3 than under τ = 9 (812 vs 803). Although average
orders in the latter case deviate from the theoretical prediction, it is interesting
to note that these deviations entail higher system efficiency. Average profits
from the orders with τ = 9 are not statistically significantly different from
the hypothetical benchmark of a central planner which, given the implemented
demand realizations, would have reaped an average profit of 856 (p = 0.118).
Comparing the treatments with M = 4 and M = 10, we can analyze the
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τ = 3 τ = 9
M = 4 M = 10 M = 4 M = 10
Hypothesis p-value p-value p-value p-value
qˆnv = q∗nv 0.069 0.296 0.777 0.492
qˆsm = {q∗nv = qo} 0.068 0.068 0.500 0.068
qˆsm = q∗sm 0.273 0.068 0.043 0.068
qˆsm = qˆnv 0.068 0.068 0.345 0.068
p¯i(qˆsm) = p¯i(qˆnv) 0.068 0.068 0.043 0.068
qˆτ=3sm = qˆτ=9sm 0.014 0.021
Table 6.3: Statistical tests for w = 6, M = 4 and M = 10
impact of market size on the efficiency of the secondary market as well as on
initial order quantities (Table 6.4). Under the low transfer price, the average
order quantity qˆM=4sm , 141, is not statistically significantly different from the
average order quantity qˆM=10sm = 142 (p = 0.564). Under the high transfer price,
the average order quantity qˆM=4sm = 152, is not statistically significantly different
from the average order quantity qˆM=10sm = 153 (p = 0.462). This is consistent
with the theoretical equilibria which predict only a minor impact of the number
of players on initial order quantities. However, since finding demand (supply)
for a leftover (shortage) unit is more likely when the secondary market is large,
we hypothesize that average profits increase as we move fromM = 4 toM = 10.
Theoretically, players in large groups should on average earn 836 (836) when
τ = 3 (9) while players in small groups have to settle for 821 (821). This is
replicated in our data. For τ = 3 (9), participants in larger groups earn on
average 821 (837), which is significantly higher than the average profit in small
groups, which is 803 (812).
Hypothesis p-value
qˆτ=3,M=4sm = qˆ
τ=3,M=10
sm 0.564
p¯i(qˆτ=3,M=4sm ) = p¯i(qˆτ=3,M=10sm ) 0.083
qˆτ=9,M=4sm = qˆτ=9,M=10sm 0.462
p¯i(qˆτ=9,M=4sm ) = p¯i(qˆ
τ=9,M=10
sm ) 0.014
Table 6.4: Statistical tests for w = 6, M = 4 vs. M = 10
6.2.4 Results: Trading Behavior
We now analyze bidding behavior in the secondary market in more detail. We
capture buyers’ (sellers’) aggregate bidding behavior in excess supply markets
(where O > U) by bO =
∑
bi/U (sO =
∑
si/O). Equivalently, for excess de-
mand markets (where U > O), we define bU =
∑
bi/U (sU =
∑
si/O).
Low profit and small groups
Figure 6.4 summarizes the aggregate secondary market bidding behavior for the
treatments with w = 9 and M = 4. Comparing first buyers’ bidding quantities
with their actual shortage position shows a consistent bid inflation (significant
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(a) Average order quantities (b) Average profits
(c) Order quantities over time
Figure 6.3: Order quantities and profits for w = 6 and M = 10
except for τ = 3 and U > O where p = 0.424). While bid inflation appears
reasonable for U > O, it is interesting to note that buyers tend to inflate their
bids even when excess inventories exceed total demand for units. Comparing
sellers’ bidding quantities with their actual excess inventory position shows con-
sistent bid shading (significant except for τ = 9 and U > O where p = 0.374).
Also, suppliers tend to shade their bids more when being on the long side of the
market, i.e. O > U , but this difference is only significant for τ = 9 (p = 0.042).
When comparing seller behavior under a low and high transfer price τ , we find
that sellers tend to bid less under the low transfer price τ = 3, but only weakly
(for seller markets O > U) or not significant (for buyer markets U > O) so. The
observed bidding behavior potentially harms profits on the secondary market.
When buyers inflate their bids beyond true demand, there is a risk that part
of available supply ends up with buyers with no actual need for these units,
while other buyers are kept from making sales at p. Likewise, total profits are
harmed when profitable transshipments are not made because sellers withhold
some supply. We can quantify this efficiency loss by relating the realized total
secondary market profit to the maximum profits that could have theoretically
been made if the minimum of O and U had been traded. For the low-profit
treatments (w = 9) this ”deadweight loss” amounts to 4% for the low transfer
price and 1% for the high transfer price.
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Figure 6.4: Trading behavior for w = 9, M = 4
τ = 3 τ = 9
Hypothesis p-value p-value
bO = 100% 0.068 0.068
sO = 100% 0.109 0.042
bU = 100% 0.285 0.041
sU = 100% 0.068 0.317
sO = sU 0.273 0.042
sτ=3O = s
τ=9
O 0.833
sτ=3U = s
τ=9
U 0.095
Table 6.5: Bidding behavior: Statistical tests for w = 9, M = 4
Medium profits and small groups
We now carry out the same analysis for the medium-profit small-group treat-
ments (w = 6, M = 4). Average bidding behavior is depicted in Figure 6.5. On
the buyers’ side, we again observe traces of bid inflationing under τ = 3. As be-
fore, we observe buyers to inflate their bids more under O > U , i.e. when there
is no theoretically appealing reason to inflate. However, buyers’ bid inflationing
in seller markets might in fact be a best response to bid shading on the part
of the sellers. Indeed, the data reveals that sellers are not willing to transship
their entire excess stock but rather bid in significantly less than their leftover
units, even when these have zero salvage value otherwise. We now compare
seller behavior in seller and buyer markets. Results indicate more bid shading
in seller markets where O > U (significant for both τ = 3, p = 0.063, and
τ = 9, p = 0.042). We again find more bid shading under the lower transfer
price τ = 3 than under τ = 3 (significant only for buyer markets with U > O,
p = 0.016). Overall, the substantial bid inflationing and shading entails signifi-
cant opportunity costs to the system: The ”deadweight loss” in the secondary
market amounts to 5% for the low transfer price and 4% for the high transfer
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price.
Our results so far indicate that bidding behavior is affected by transfer price.
It is interesting to compare seller behavior under the low-profit condition w = 9
and the medium-profit condition w = 6. Statistical analyses reveal no system-
atic impact of the wholesale price on bidding behavior (6.6). This is in line with
normative principles which would predict no effect since the wholesale price is
sunk at the time sellers enter the secondary market.
Figure 6.5: Trading behavior for w = 6, M = 4
τ = 3 τ = 9
Hypothesis p-value p-value
bO = 100% 0.102 0.854
sO = 100% 0.068 0.042
bU = 100% 0.066 0.684
sU = 100% 0.066 0.317
sO = sU 0.063 0.042
sw=6O = s
w=9
O 0.286 0.222
sw=6U = s
w=9
U 0.556 1.000
sτ=3O = s
τ=9
O 0.556
sτ=3U = s
τ=9
U 0.016
Table 6.6: Bidding behavior: Statistical tests for w = 6, M = 4
Medium profit and large groups
Finally, Figure 6.6 and Table 6.7 summarize the bidding results for the medium-
profit large-group treatments (w = 6, M = 10). We observe that buyers inflate
their bids above their true demand (statistically significant except for seller mar-
kets (O > U) under τ = 9, where p = 0.461). Consistent with intuition, bid
inflationing is larger when buyers compete for scarce supply, U > O. Interest-
ingly, we again observe buyers to inflate their bids in situations with sufficient
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Figure 6.6: Trading behavior for w = 6, M = 10
supply, O > U , i.e. when there is no theoretically appealing reason to do so.
This might be a response to the bidding behavior on the part of the suppliers
who tend to bid in less than their actual excess inventory (statistically signif-
icant except for buyer markets under τ = 9, where p = 0.317). Comparing
seller behavior under the two transfer price conditions reveals more bid shad-
ing when the transfer price is low (significant only for situations with excess
demand, U > O). Overall, the substantial bid shading leads to a secondary
market ”deadweight loss” of 4% for the high transfer price and 16% for the low
transfer price.
The high deadweight loss under τ = 3 and M = 10 is significantly higher
than the comparable loss underM = 4 (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.083). We observe
that buyers get engaged in more severe bid inflationing when the market is
large (significant only for buyer markets, U > O), leading to a relatively higher
deadweight loss for larger groups.
Hypothesis p-value Hypothesis p-value
bτ=3O = 100% 0.068 b
τ=9
O = 100% 0.461
sτ=3O = 100% 0.066 s
τ=9
O = 100% 0.068
bτ=3U = 100% 0.068 b
τ=9
U = 100% 0.066
sτ=3U = 100% 0.068 s
τ=9
U = 100% 0.317
sτ=3O = s
τ=9
O 0.886 s
τ=3
O = s
τ=3
U 0.285
sτ=3U = s
τ=9
U 0.057 s
τ=9
O = s
τ=9
U 0.066
bτ=3,M=4O = b
τ=3,M=10
O 0.114 s
τ=3,M=4
O = s
τ=3,M=10
O 0.343
bτ=9,M=4O = b
τ=9,M=10
O 0.556 s
τ=9,M=4
O = s
τ=9,M=10
O 0.190
bτ=3,M=4U = b
τ=3,M=10
U 0.029 s
τ=3,M=4
U = s
τ=3,M=10
U 0.486
bτ=9,M=4U = b
τ=9,M=10
U 0.016 s
τ=9,M=4
U = s
τ=9,M=10
U 0.905
Table 6.7: Bidding behavior: Statistical tests for w = 6, M = 10
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6.2.5 Discussion
We present a laboratory study of newsvendor behavior in the presence of sec-
ondary markets with exogenously set unit transfer prices. This section summa-
rizes the results and implications.
Result 1: The option to trade units in the secondary market increases supply
chain profitability.
This result supports the common belief that market-enabled reallocations of
excess inventories benefits the system. In our setting, with no transaction costs
other than the system-internal transfer prices, every unit traded in the sec-
ondary market increases total supply chain profit. We note that this increased
profitability is likely to persist even if the secondary market lead subjects sub-
stantially off the jointly optimal order quantities qo.
However, not all profit potential of the secondary market is captured in our
studies, partially due to the fact that not all beneficial trades are made.
Result 2: Subjects fail to capture the full profit potential of the secondary
market.
In the six independent secondary market treatments, we observed secondary
market ”deadweight losses” ranging between 1% and 16%. On the one hand,
this result can be attributed to bid inflationing on the part of the buyers: over-
bidding buyers occasionally need to salvage allocated units exceeding their true
demand ui at zero, while non-overbidding buyers simultaneously loose the po-
tential revenue p from some of their secondary market demand ui. On the other
hand, the inefficient secondary market trading outcome can be attributed to the
observed withholding of excess inventories by the sellers: Since there is theoret-
ically no incentive for sellers to shade their bids, we conclude that behavioral
factors not captured by normative accounts are present. Specifically, since sell-
ers tend to withhold more of their available units when the transfer price is
high, we conjecture that sellers exhibit traces of inequality aversion (Fehr and
Schmidt 1999) because a high transfer price makes trades more profitable to
buyers than to sellers.
We also observed that average profits depends on market size. On the one
hand, the secondary market itself is less efficient (as measured by the ”dead-
weight loss”) for larger groups. We conjecture that this might be due to an
increased tendency of the buyers to inflate their bids bi when they face more
competitors for scarce supply underM = 10. In contrast, they have no incentive
to deviate from bi = ui when being the sole bidder on the demand side of the
market, a situation which is much more likely underM = 4. On the other hand,
it is interesting to note that average profits are nevertheless higher with larger
groups sizes of M = 10. Obviously, the players still exploit that a larger market
provides a higher probability of finding supply for any given demand (and vice
versa), overcompensating the negative impact of more severe bid inflationing
under M = 10.
Result 3: Subjects reap higher average profits when the group size is large
despite a higher secondary market efficiency with small groups.
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Regarding initial stocking decisions, we find that subjects responded sys-
tematically to the presence of the secondary market as well as the level of the
transfer price τ .
Result 4: Individual stocking decisions responses to exogenously set transfer
prices are inaccurate with respect to the theoretical prediction, but exhibit qual-
itatively correct directional tendencies.
Overall, order quantities increase in the transfer price, in accordance with the-
oretical predictions, but the impact of τ is convoluted by the strength of the
mean anchoring heuristic. Despite this persisting bias, the results of our study
carry some good news for those who seek to improve decision making in a
multi-location setting: Since decision makers respond to transfer prices, they
can be used as an intra-firm incentive mechanism to guide behavior. This is
particularly attractive since transshipment prices are more easily controlled by
the firm than selling prices or procurement costs which determine the critical
ratio but are typically set by competitive market forces or by inter-firm ne-
gotiations. However, our results show that transfer prices would need some
adjustment from the theoretically suggested value, in order to correct for the
mean-anchoring bias.
6.3 Study 2: Secondary Markets with Endoge-
nous Prices
The previous section investigated at inventory decision making in the presence
of secondary markets when the transfer price for excess units is exogenously
determined by some central planner. In many real settings, transfer prices for
inventory transshipments typically evolve in a market-like manner (Lee and
Whang 2002). This case is the subject of Study 2.
6.3.1 Theory and Hypothesis Building
As in Study 1, retailers enter the secondary market either as potential buyers
(ui > 0) or as potential sellers (oi > 0), but now we consider the case where the
secondary market transfer price τ is determined endogenously. If the number of
players M is large enough, τ might reflect a perfect market equilibrium Lee and
Whang 2002). However, for reasonable numbers of players (and certainly for the
number of subjects justifiable in a laboratory experiment), players in the sec-
ondary market face in fact a multi-unit double auction. Out of the multitude of
conceivable bidding mechanisms, we consider the following. Taking into account
the publicly known total supply O and total demand U, each seller i submits a
non-decreasing step supply curve (Si := s0i , s
1
i , ..., s
p
i ) to the auctioneer, where
sτi indicates the amount of units the seller wants to supply at transfer price τ ,
sτi ≤ oi ∀τ . Similarly, each buyer i submits a non-increasing step demand curve
(Bi := b0i , b
1
i , ..., b
p
i ) where b
τ
i indicates the amount of units the buyer is willing
to buy at τ . The auctioneer aggregates to create aggregate supply and demand
curves, and the market clearing transfer price τˆ is determined. Generally, in
this setting, each player‘s secondary market profit pismi (B
∗(Q,D), S∗(Q,D))
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is a complex function of the equilibrium bids S∗ := (S∗1 (S
∗
−1), ..., S
∗
M (S
∗
−M ))
and B∗ := (B∗1(B
∗
−1), ..., B
∗
M (B
∗
−M )), which in turn are complex functions of all
players’ secondary market endowments, oi and ui, respectively. Each player’s
expected profit as a function of equilibrium stocking levels and equilibrium bid-
ding strategies is then
pii(qi, Q−i) = −w·qi+p
∫ b
a
min(qi, Di)dΦDi+ED [pi
sm
i (B
∗(Q,D)), S∗(Q,D)] .
Unfortunately, the equilibrium stocking strategies q∗i (Q
∗
−i), if existent, are ana-
lytically not tractable because there is not even a unique equilibrium for second
period bidding strategies (Elmaghraby 2007). We simplify the situation some-
what by allowing only players on the long side of the market to place bids:
When total demand exceeds total supply, U > O, only resellers with unmet
demand ui > 0 bid, while potential sellers with oi > 0 are automated.29 If total
supply exceeds total demand, U > O, only resellers with excess stock oi > 0 bid,
while potential buyers with ui > 0 are automated. This simplification towards a
one-sided multi-unit auction still does not offer much more analytical tractabil-
ity, but it facilitates the hypothesis building: Sticking with the assumption of a
perfectly competitive market for the moment, we would expect bidding buyers
to compete prices up to their marginal valuation p, leading to τˆU>O = p. On
the other hand, we would expect bidding sellers to compete prices down to their
marginal valuation, which is zero since unit procurement cost w are sunk at the
time the auction takes place. We can then formulate the following hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 6.4. When U > O, buyers bid themselves up to their marginal
valuation p. When O > U , sellers bid themselves down to their marginal valu-
ation 0.
The competitive prediction in Hypothesis 6.4 can serve as a useful bench-
mark for observed behavior but it is in fact not an exact equilibrium prediction.
Rather than bidding all the way down (up) to their marginal valuations, bid-
ders have the incentives to strategically shade their bids in order to influence
equilibrium prices in a favorable manner. This has been shown both formally
(Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn 1998, Ausubel and Cramton 2002) as well as
empirically (List and Lucking-Reiley 2000, Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. 2006).
In our context, this strategic bidding behavior would entail equilibrium transfer
prices of τˆU>O = p − δU>O if buyers bid, and τˆO>U = δO>U − 0 if sellers bid,
where δ > 0 approximates the extent to which bidders succeed in strategically
driving the equilibrium price off their marginal valuations. Due to the symme-
try expressed in δ, at the very least we would expect that bidder behavior in
buyer markets with U > O is an approximate mirror image of bidder behavior
in seller markets with O > U . This is captured in the following Hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 6.5. The difference δU>O = p − τˆU>O in buyer markets equals
the difference δO>U = τˆO>U − 0 in seller markets.
29Basically, the auctioneer ”bids in” an aggregate supply curve which is insensitive with
respect to the transfer price: At every τ , the supply side automatically bids in O. The reverse
holds if the buyers are automated under O > U .
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The first two hypotheses concern bidding behavior in the secondary mar-
ket, but they make no claim with regard to initial order quantities. We expect
newsvendor order quantities to ”regress towards the mean” in the presence of a
secondary market (Lee and Whang 2002).
HYPOTHESIS 6.6. Order quantities in the presence of a secondary market
regress to the mean, relative to the newsvendor quantities.
We test Hypothesis 6.6 in Section 6.3.3 (order behavior) and turn to Hy-
pothesis 6.4 and 6.5 in Section 6.3.4 (trading behavior).
6.3.2 Experimental Design
The parameterization and the experimental protocol is identical to Study 1,
except for the trading period (detailed instructions can be found in the Ap-
pendix B.4). The secondary market is organized such that the transfer price τ
is determined endogenously in the following way. Only the players on the long
side of the market are allowed to enter bids in the secondary market, i.e. only
subjects with unfilled customer demand (Di > qi) bid if U > O, whereas only
subjects with leftover inventory (qi > Di) bid if O > U . The short side of the
market is automated, as explained above. Each bidder enters the number of
units he wishes to sell (buy) at each potential transfer price τ . Clearly, for a
bidder with leftover inventory, the bid schedule must satisfy si(τ) ≤ si(τ + 1)
for each τ . Likewise, the bid schedule for a bidder with unfilled demand must
satisfy bi(τ) ≥ bi(τ + 1) for each τ . The experimental software prevents sub-
jects from entering invalid bid schedules. Moreover, as in Study 1, bids are
constrained by si(τ) ≤ oi and bi(τ) ≤ O, respectively. The actual transfer price
τˆ depends solely on the players’ bidding behavior. If buyers bid, τˆ is deter-
mined by the highest transfer price at which some bid quantity (of the total
amount of units bid) is rejected. If sellers bid, τˆ is determined by the lowest
transfer price at which some bid quantity (of the total amount of units bid) is
rejected. The number of units a player can actually buy (sell) depends on his
own bid quantity bi(τˆ) (si(τˆ)) as well as the other bidders’ quantities
∑
j 6=i bj(τˆ)(∑
j 6=i sj(τˆ)
)
. Specifically, a buyer i will receive bi(τˆ)∑
j 6=i bj(τˆ)
O if
∑
bi(τˆ) > O,
and bi(τˆ) otherwise. Each seller i will sell
si(τˆ)∑
j 6=i sj(τˆ)
U if
∑
si(τˆ) > U , and si(τˆ)
otherwise.
Study 2 employs a 2 x 2 mixed design with one between-subject factor (low
profit w = 9 vs. medium profit w = 6) and one within-subject factor (secondary
market vs. no secondary market) with the newsvendor control treatment being
played first. A total of 78 subjects participated in the study. The secondary
market treatments are played in groups of 10 (the medium-profit condition
entails two groups of 9), making for four independent observations for each
profit condition. We choose a rather large group size in order to 1) increase
the likelihood of simultaneous supply and demand in the secondary market and
2) approximate the large market assumption made by Lee and Whang (2002).
As in the previous study, the simple newsvendor control treatments last 25
rounds. Due to the time consuming process of submitting bids, the secondary
market treatments are restricted to 20 rounds.The experimental design as well
as theoretical benchmarks are summarized in Table 6.8 below.
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wholesale price benchmarks and sample sizes
w = 9
q∗nv = 125, q
o = 144
(N=40)
w = 6
q∗nv = q
o = 150
(N=38)
Table 6.8: Design, theoretical predictions, and sample sizes
6.3.3 Results: Order Behavior
The descriptive statistics are given in Figure 6.3.3 with the results from signif-
icance tests being provided separately in Table 6.9.30 For the low-profit condi-
tion, w = 9, we observe the usual anchoring pattern for the newsvendor order
quantities without the secondary market, but average orders qˆnv = 138 fall short
of the central benchmark qo = 144 (p = 0.068). With the secondary market
present, average order quantities qˆsm are statistically indistinguishable from qo
(p = 0.715). A simple linear regression shows that order quantities qˆsm start
out above qo, then decrease significantly over time (standardized β = −0.484,
p = 0.014), and remain significantly below qo over the last five rounds (Wilcoxon,
p = 0.068). Overall, we have some indications that the secondary market in-
duces order quantities to induce centrally optimal order quantities, relative to
q∗nv. However, a direct comparison between qˆsm and qˆnv does not support the
positive impact of the secondary market in a statistical sense (p = 0.144), pos-
sibly due to the small sample of only four independent observations.
A comparison of average profits shows that subjects earn substantially more
in the presence of the secondary market than in the standard newsvendor prob-
lem (p = 0.068). It is worthwhile to note that most of this performance increase
has to be attributed to the option to trade excess inventories, and not by the
potential of the secondary market to change initial stocking decisions. We com-
pute, for the treatment with w = 9, the hypothetical average profits (for the
demand realizations d implemented in the experiment) had all subjects consis-
tently ordered the optimal newsvendor quantity q∗nv = 125, i.e. p¯i(q∗nv, d). This
benchmark is 376 for both τ = 3 and τ = 9, which corresponds to approxi-
mately 93% of average profits captured by the participants in the secondary
market treatments. While trading is beneficial, subjects earn on average signif-
icantly less than the centrally optimal profit (p = 0.066). Since average orders
in the secondary market treatment qˆsm = 144 are essentially indistinguishable
from the central optimum qo = 144, the reason for p¯i(qˆsm) < pi(qo) must be
inefficient trading on the secondary market (investigated in the next section).
For the medium profit condition, w = 6, the newsvendor order quantities,
qˆnv, as well as the order quantities with the secondary market, qˆsm, are sta-
tistically indistinguishable from the central benchmark qo = q∗nv = µ. A sim-
ple linear regression shows that order quantities qˆsm start out below qo and
then increase towards the central optimum over time (standardized β = 0.366,
p = 0.072).
30Throughout this section we use non-parametric tests: Wilcoxon for one-sample and
related-sample tests, Mann-Whitney-U for independent-sample tests. The tests for the sec-
ondary market treatments are based on group averages.
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(a) Average order quantities (b) Profits
(c) Order quantities over time
Figure 6.7: Order quantities and profits for w = 9 and w = 6
Although average order quantities with and without the secondary market do
not differ, the associated profits do. Due to profitable inventory reallocations,
subjects earn significantly more in the presence of a secondary market (p =
0.068). Interestingly, unlike in the low-profit condition, average profits p¯i(qˆw=6sm )
are not different from the central benchmark (p = 0.068).
6.3.4 Results: Trading Behavior
We first analyze average market prices relative to buyer’s and seller’s marginal
valuations for each unit (Figure 6.8). In the low-profit condition, the average
transfer price τˆU>O is 9 when buyers bid (in 17 out of 25 rounds on average
across the four groups involved), which below the selling price of 12 (Wilcoxon,
p = 0.068). When sellers bid, the average transfer price τˆO>U is 7, which is above
zero (Wilcoxon, p = 0.068). In the medium-profit condition, the average transfer
price τˆU>O is 8.2 when buyers bid (in 17 out of 25 rounds on average across
the four groups involved) while τˆO>U = 4.9. Again, these values are different
from 12 and 0, respectively (Wilcoxon, p = 0.068). Together, these results
negate Hypothesis 6.4 which states that both buyers and sellers competitively
bid towards their marginal evaluations.
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τ = 3 τ = 9
Hypothesis p-value p-value
qˆw=9nv = q∗nv <0.001 0.295
qˆw=9nv = q
o 0.068 0.144
qˆw=9sm = q
∗
nv 0.068 0.465
qˆw=9sm = qo 0.715 0.465
qˆw=9sm = qˆ
w=9
nv 0.144 1.000
p¯i(qˆw=9sm ) = p¯i(qˆ
w=9
nv ) 0.068 0.068
qˆw=9sm = qˆw=6sm 0.560
qˆw=9nv = qˆ
w=6
nv 0.010
Table 6.9: Order quantities and profits (w = 9 and w = 6): Statistical tests
Figure 6.8: Average trading prices
We now analyze differences between buyer-determined transfer prices τˆU>O
and seller-determined transfer prices τˆO>U . Under both profit conditions, buyer-
determined transfer prices are larger than their seller-determined counterparts
(Wilcoxon, p = 0.068 for both profit conditions). Now let δU>O = p− τˆU>O de-
note the extent to which buyers manage to decrease the transfer price, relative
to the competitive outcome p, by shading their bids in the auction. Equiv-
alently, let δO>U = τˆO>U − 0 denote the extent to which sellers successfully
manage to increase the transfer price, relative to the competitive outcome of
zero, by shading their bids in the auction. For both profits conditions, δO>U is
larger than δU>O (significant only for w = 9, Wilcoxon, p = 0.068). This in-
dicates that sellers tend to shade their bids more aggressively in order to drive
up transfer prices than buyers do in order to drive down transfer prices. We
also compare buyer and seller behavior across profit conditions. We observe
that the lower wholesale price w = 6 tends to decrease both buyer-determined
and seller-determined transfer prices, but the differences are not statistically
significant (Mann-Whitney-U, p = 0.343 for δU>O and p = 0.114 for δO>U ). We
acknowledge that this analyses cannot perfectly control for factors potentially
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affecting bidding behavior, like e.g. the relative position of an individual bidder
with respect to total demand and supply in the market, which can differ across
profit conditions as well as between buyer and seller markets. Still, the aggre-
gate date suggests that bidding behavior depends to some extend on being a
buyer or a seller as well as on the wholesale price w.
Figure 6.9: Average bidding
To shed more light on this issue, we now analyze bidding behavior of buyers
and sellers in more detail. Figure 6.9 displays, for secondary market buyers
and sellers separately, the fraction of units needed (buyers) or available for sale
(sellers) that is bid in at every transfer price τ . For buyers we observe more bid
shading in the medium profit condition than in the low profit condition. For
example, at a transfer price of τ = 9, on average buyers shade 50% of their real
demand ui when w = 6, but only about 25% when the procurement price is
high. This pattern is reversed when sellers bid. For example, at a transfer price
of τ = 4, on average sellers withhold 40% of their available inventory oi when
w = 6, but 60% when the procurement cost is high. A series of non-parametric
tests shows that buyers’ aggregate bidding behavior is significantly different for
the transfer price range from 2 to 10, while differences in sellers’ behavior at
this level of aggregation is significant only for τ = 6, possibly due to the small
group size of only four independent observations.
6.3.5 Discussion
We present a laboratory study of newsvendor behavior in the presence of sec-
ondary markets with unit transfer prices that evolve endogenously in an auction-
based market-clearing mechanism. Lacking clear-cut theoretical predictions, the
research goal of this Chapter was modest and exploratory in nature but yields
some interesting results and implications summarized in this Section.
Result 1: The option to trade units in the secondary market increases supply
chain profitability.
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As in Study 1, this is not surprising per se since, given any set of pre-season
stocking decisions, every unit traded in the secondary market increases total
supply chain profit. Beyond this easy-to-reap profit increase, the secondary
market shows to have a beneficial impact on inventory decision ahead of the
selling season, further boosting profits relative to the standard newsvendor sit-
uation without inventory risk pooling opportunities.
Result 2: The option to trade units in the secondary market induces average
order quantities to regress towards system-optimal levels.
Turning to the actual bidding behavior on the secondary market, we note
that average profits are lower than the first-best, even though qˆsm = qo. This
suggests that not all profit opportunities are exploited in the secondary market.
For example, the units traded might be less than min(U,O), as observed in
Study 1. In Study 2, this is unlikely because the implemented auction mecha-
nism should always clear the market (i.e. the trading volume equals min(U,O))
even in the presence of bid shading. In particular, no unit of supply are withheld
from trading unless sellers shade their supply even at the highest possible trans-
fer price p = 12. Likewise, no unit of demand is withheld from the secondary
market unless buyers shade their demand even at the lowest possible transfer
price 0. Rather, secondary market inefficiency arises from leftover inventory
ending up with bid-inflationing buyers, even if all units min(U,O) are traded
at the market clearing transfer price.
Furthermore, it is interesting to observe how strategic bidding behavior
translates into market-clearing transfer prices.
Result 3a: Transfer prices are lower (higher) than bidding buyers’ (suppliers’)
marginal valuation of the auctioned units, negating Hypothesis 6.4 (Competi-
tive prices equal marginal valuations).
This results states that, contrary to the competitive equilibrium hypothesis,
strategic bidding behavior enables players on the long side of the market to
influence equilibrium transfer prices in favor of the bidding side of the mar-
ket. This is broadly in line with theory on demand reduction and bid-shading
in multi-unit auctions (Ausubel and Cramton (2002)), but the comparison be-
tween buyer and seller behavior is somewhat puzzling:
Result 3b: Bidding behavior in buyer markets is systematically different from
bidding behavior in seller markets, negating Hypothesis 6.5 (Symmetry in bid-
ding behavior).
We observe that bidding secondary market sellers are able to drive transfer prices
up into their favorable direction to a greater extent than buyers succeed in bid-
ding the transfer price down in their favor. Even in the presence of multiple
equilibria in bidding strategies, symmetry arguments would predict otherwise.
Admittedly, bidding behavior is influenced by a complex interplay between each
bidders’ overage or underage position relative to the total excess demand or ex-
cess supply (and their distribution among all market participants), as well as
each bidder’s knowledge about these quantities. These determinants of bidding
behavior were not entirely controlled for in our study which was mostly con-
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cerned with order behavior, and set up accordingly. This of course precludes
unambiguous conclusions. One parsimonious explanation for the observed be-
havior is the sunk cost bias well documented in other decision making contexts
(Arkes and Blumer 1985). In this sense, subjects acting as bidding sellers might
withhold substantial parts of their available excess stock at transfer prices below
their initial unit procurement costs prior to the regular season. While these cost
are sunk, and thus irrelevant to decision making, when the subjects enter the
secondary market, the logic of our auction mechanism would then indeed drive
up market-clearing transfer prices as observed.
6.4 Summary and Conclusions
The impact of secondary markets on supply chain performance is an important,
but empirically understudied, problem. In this chapter we investigated ordering
and trading behavior when inventory risk can be pooled across independent
stocking locations through a secondary market mechanism.
We find that individual stocking decisions can be fairly efficiently guided
towards the system optimum when transfer prices are either set exogenously
or emerge endogenously due to the trading activity on the secondary market.
However, this result is to some extent confounded by the well-documented mean
anchoring bias in the newsvendor setting, which coincides with the mean order
regression as being normatively predicted by inventory risk pooling.
As far as trading behavior in the secondary market is concerned, we observe
several behavioral irregularities in our studies. Most notably, resellers entering
the secondary market stage as potential sellers tend to withhold some of their
excess stock. When transfer prices are exogenously given, sellers tend to with-
hold more inventory when the transfer prices is high. We suggest inequality
aversion as a behavioral factor since, under a high transfer, the buyers benefit
relatively more from each unit traded than the sellers. When transfer prices are
determined endogenously in the secondary market, bidding sellers seem to drive
the market-clearing transfer price further up than bidding buyers drive it down.
We suggest a sunk cost bias as a behavioral explanation: Sellers are unwilling
to sell excess inventory below initial unit procurement costs even though the
latter are sunk at the time of the auction (and every unit of excess inventory
has in fact a marginal value of zero outside the secondary market).
Our results imply numerous opportunities for interesting further research.
Do buyers and sellers systematically behave differently in auction markets, even
when their positions are strategically equivalent? If so, what is the possible
role of fairness concerns and sunk cost effects? Noting the multitude of possible
market mechanisms, what are the most efficient auction formats to laterally
reallocate excess inventories, and thus provide the right incentives for pre-season
inventory decisions?
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Conclusions
Model-based research has generated a tremendous body of literature contribut-
ing to our understanding of how demand related inventory risk should be man-
aged along the supply chain. In this thesis, we empirically test some of the core
predictions from normative models on supply chain decision making under un-
certainty. Results from four independent laboratory studies of human decision
making establish a number of behavioral anomalies that can potentially harm
supply chain efficiency in practice and, at the very least, question the descriptive
accuracy of the mathematical models.
All results presented in this thesis, summarized in detail at the end of each
chapter, have a common denominator: Framing matters. In accordance with
expected utility theory underlying them, formal supply chain models implicitly
assume that decisions under risk are based on well-defined distributions of fi-
nal wealth and invariant to description or context. However, in sharp contrast
to the simple context-free gambles commonly used to test (and, more often
than not, reject) the normative principles of expected utility theory and its
generalizations, operations settings are naturally described in terms of highly
context-loaded parameters. This provides sufficient ground for the conjecture
that human decisions can easily be (mis)guided by context provided by a partic-
ular operations frame. Our results document several such incidents. To explain
our observations, we were able to draw on abundant evidence on human be-
havior documented in adjunct fields like for example Behavioral Economics and
Behavioral Finance. Nonetheless, our results show that existing behavioral the-
ory is unlikely to translate to the operations domain in a simple way, if at all.
We view this as an opportunity to uncover human regularities that are unique
to, or that manifest themselves in novel ways in, operations settings.
While the setup and results of this thesis might appear like an outright
criticism of mathematical supply chain modeling per se, and the term ”exper-
imental” almost has an ”anti-modeling” stance, this is not at all the view we
take. We not only acknowledge the merits of formal models in sharpening our
intuition in ways no other technique can, but the empirical results generated
throughout this thesis would in fact be meaningless without a solid mathemat-
ical backbone. Because verbal theory (the prosaic description of phenomena)
cannot describe complex systems with sufficient precision, it is the body of
mathematical models, existing or appropriately adapted, which best allow the
behavioral researcher to formulate clean empirically testable hypotheses.
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Human experiments and mathematical models can jointly advance opera-
tions theory, but they encounter a common criticism, namely their potentially
limited relevance for managerial decision making in the field. Complaints have
long accumulated that formal operations research models and techniques of-
ten have an unsatisfactory impact in practice (Corbett and Van Wassenhove
1993). Disregard of human element is one potential reason for this explanatory
gap. Experimental research is one self-evident vehicle to bridge the gap, but
its value for providing insights beyond mere laboratory artifacts remains yet to
be proven. Throughout this thesis we made a number of modest attempts to
extrapolate our results to the real world but, ultimately, we need more rigorous
answers to three questions which can be raised, but not finally be answered, by
empirical evidence from the laboratory. First, can we expect behavioral factors
detected under controlled laboratory conditions to play a role in operations de-
cision making in practice? Since the complexity of real world situations suggests
an even higher managerial susceptibility to decision biases, the likely answer is
yes. Secondly, can we expect these behavioral factors to translate to managerial
decision making in the field directly? Since human (mis)behavior is sensitive
to institutional context, the likely answer is no. Thirdly, even if behavioral
anomalies observed in laboratory settings do translate accurately to the field,
are they of first or only of secondary order, relative to the many non-behavioral
factors determining the performance of supply chains and operations systems?
For the development of behaviorally well-founded operations theory, these are
important, but not easily answered, questions.
The good news is: research opportunities abound.
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Appendix A
Proofs and Algorithms
A.1 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. Eeckhoudt et al. (2004).
Proof of Theorem 2. Lee and Whang (2002).
Proof of Theorem 3. Schweitzer and Cachon (2000).
Proof of Theorem 4. For uniformly distributed demand, q∗ = a+(b−a)p−wp .
Letting z(q,D) = E [δ(pˇi(q)− pˇi(D))], we get
∂z
∂q
∣∣∣∣∣
q=q∗
=
∫ q
a
wδ′(w(q −D))φ(D)dD + ∫ b
q
(w − p)δ′((p− w)(D − q))φ(D)dD
= 1b−a
[
[−δ (w (q∗ −D))]q∗a + [−δ ((p− w) (D − q∗))]bq∗
]
= 1b−a
[
δ
(
(p− w)(b− a)wp )
)
− δ
(
(p− w)(b− a)wp )
)]
= 0.
Since
∂2z
∂q2
=
∫ q
a
w2δ′′(w(q −D))φ(D)dD + ∫ b
q
(w − p)2δ′′((p− w)(D − q))φ(D)dD
= 1b−a [δ (w(q − a)) + δ ((p− w) (b− q))] > 0,
the regret-minimizing quantity is unique and coincides with the profit-maximizing
quantity q∗ for δ′(·) > 0.
Proof of Theorem 5. The order quantity for the demand chasing heuristic
is given by
qt = qt−1 + α(Dt−1 − qt−1)
= (1− α)qt−1 + αDt−1 = (1− α)tq0 + α
t−1∑
i=0
(1− α)iDt−i−1
with an initial order quantity q0 and a smoothing parameter 0 < α ≤ 1. The
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expected average order quantity after N orders were placed is
E(q¯N ) = E
(
1
N + 1
N∑
t=0
qt
)
=
q0
N + 1
N∑
t=0
(1− α)t + αµ
N + 1
N∑
t=0
t∑
i=0
(1− α)i
=
q0
N + 1
1− (1− α)N+1
α
+
αµ
N + 1
N∑
t=0
1− (1− α)t
α
=
q0
N + 1
1− (1− α)N+1
α
+
µ
N + 1
(
N + 1− 1− (1− α)
N+1
α
)
= µ+
(q0 − µ)
N + 1
1− (1− α)N+1
α
The limiting value then becomes limN→∞E(q¯N ) = µ.
Proof of theorem 6. Noting that E [u (piNOW (q∗))]<E [u (piLATER (D| δ))]
for δ= 0, the proof follows directly from the fact that piLATER (D| δ) is strictly
decreasing in δ, u () is increasing in its argument, and consequently
dE[u(piLATER(D|δ))]
dδ
< 0.
Proof of theorem 7. The proof follows directly from the fact that, for any
qFixed 6= q∗, E [u (piNOW (qFixed))]<E [u (piNOW (q∗))].
Proof of theorem 8. The proof follows directly from the fact that E[f(|q −D|)]
is positive for any q by definition, and E [u (piLATER (D| δ))] is decreasing in δ.
Proof of theorem 9. The proof follows directly from u+(b) > 0 and the fact
that u−(−wbb) > u−(−R) + u−(−wrs) due to the equivalence condition (5.1),
wbb = wrs +R, and u′′−(·) > 0.
Proof of theorem 10. We let ∆−wbb = u−(w
1
bb − w2bb), ∆+b = u+(b2 − b1),
∆−R = u−(R
1 − R2), and ∆+wrs = u+(w1rs − w2rs). First, recall that equivalence
between buyback and revenue sharing contract requires wibb = w
i
rs + R
i (cf.
equation 5.1). Then,
w2bb − w1bb = (w2rs +R2)− (w1rs +R1)
= (w2rs − w1rs) + (R2 −R1) > 0
(A.1)
and (w2rs−w1rs) < 0 imply (R1−R2) < w1bb−w2bb < 0. Thus, ∆−wbb = u−(w1bb−
w2bb) > ∆
−
R = u−(R
1 − R2), due to u′′−(·) > 0 (Result A). Now recall that
equivalence between buyback and revenue sharing contract further requires bi =
Ri (cf. equation 5.2) which, in conjunction with (A.1), implies (b2 − b1) =
(R2 − R1) > (w1rs − w2rs). Thus, ∆+b = u−(b2 − b1) > ∆+wrs = u+(w1rs − w2rs),
due to u′′+(·) < 0 (Result B). Combining results A and B then yields U totbb =
∆−wbb +∆
+
b > U
tot
rs = ∆
−
R +∆
+
wrs .
Following similar steps, it is straightforward to show that U totbb < U
tot
rs for
the reversed case where the pareto-superior contract 2 is used as a reference
point, i.e. ∆+wbb = u+(w
2
bb − w1bb), ∆−b = u−(b1 − b2), ∆+R = u+(R2 − R1), and
∆−wrs = u−(w
2
rs − w1rs).
122
Proof of Theorem 11. For M identically uniformly [a;b]-distributed market
demands, the joint market demand distribution is given by
ΦM (Q) =
Q∫
Ma
(
1
(M − 1)!(b− a)M
·
M˜(M,x)∑
l=0
(−1)l
(
M
l
)
(x−Ma− l(b− a))M−1
)
dx.
with M˜(M,x) := dx−Mab−a e being the largest integer less than x−Mab−a (Renyi
1970). Due to the central limit theorem, ΦM converges to the normal distri-
bution extremely fast and, for identical uniform distributions, is statistically
indistinguishable already for M= 4 (Killmann and von Collani 2001). Under
these convolution properties of the uniform distribution, and without the op-
tion to reallocate inventories in the secondary market, the optimal total system
inventory is given by Q∗NV = Nq
∗
NV = µN + σN
√
3(2r − 1) where r denotes
the critical ratio p−wp . With the secondary market, and assuming approxi-
mate normality of FN , the optimal total system inventory can be written as
Qo = µN+σ
√
N ·F−10,1 (r). To prove the theorem, we need to determine the sign of
z=
√
N ·F−10,1 (r)−N
√
3 (2r−1) or, equivalently, z=r−F0,1
(√
3N (2r−1)
)
. Note
that F0,1
(√
3N (2r−1)
)
equals r for r= 0, 0.5, and 1, and furthermore is convex
(concave) increasing in r in the interval between 0 and 0.5 (0.5 and 1). Since,
for high profit products with r> 0.5, the sign of z is positive, it follows that
Q∗NV<Q
o. The opposite result follows for r< 0.5 due to the symmetry of the
uniform and normal distribution.
Proof of Theorem 12. Note that every optimal solution q∗nv to the opti-
mization problem without the option to transship leftovers is included in the
set of feasible solutions qsm to the optimization problem in the presence of an
excess inventory market. By ordering qsm = q∗nv and no participation in the
secondary market, every player can earn his default newsvendor profit. If only
one unit is being traded, both the total system profits and average profits per
player increase strictly. This is a well-known result in inventory theory (e.g.,
Eppen 1979).
A.2 Algorithms
A.2.1 Chapter 4
The following pseudo code describes the adaptive choice-based algorithm used
to elicit the indifference mark-up δ (similar to the procedure used by Abdellaoui
2000).
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Algorithm 1 Main Algorithm
Initialize
while not endCondition do
makeChoice(w)
if nextStep then
step = δ/2
if Choice = LATER then
w = w + δ
else
w = w − δ
end if
end if
end while
Algorithm 2 Initialize
period = 0
w = 6
makeChoice(w)
if nextStep then
if Choice = NOW then
STOP
end if
end if
w = 10
makeChoice(w)
if nextStep then
if Choice = LATER then
STOP
end if
end if
w = 8
δ = 0.5
Algorithm 3 makeChoice(w)
period = period+ 1
displayDecisionScreen
Algorithm 4 nextStep
if the same Choice has been has been made for three periods in a row then
nextStep = TRUE
end if
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Algorithm 5 endCondition
if nextStep and Choice =INDIFFERENT or not nextStep for 10 periods in
a row or period = 60 then
endCondition = TRUE
end if
In a pilot study, the algorithm was carefully tested, along with three different
algorithms, with a total of 42 subjects under the same incentive-compatible con-
ditions as those reported in the experimental part of this paper. All algorithms
produced qualitatively similar as well as statistically indistinguishable results.
The algorithm not chosen for the final experiment approached the indifference
mark-up from below (δ was initialized at 0), from above (δ was initialized at
6), or by some mixture different from the above described algorithm which,
following a bisection logic, appeared to be the most balanced one.
A.2.2 Chapter 5: Calculating variance of profit
Let sq = min(q,D) denote sales from an order q and a demand realization
D. Then pˇiR(q,D) = x · sq − yq denotes the realized newsvendor profit. The
wholesale price-only contract implies x = p and y = w. The buyback contract
implies x = p − b and y = wbb − b. The revenue sharing contract implies
x = p − R and y = wrs. The variance of pˇiR(q,D) is given by x2V ar(sq) +
y2V ar(q) − 2xyCov(sq, q), which reduces to σ2pˇiR(q,D) = x2V ar(sq). Noting
that V ar(s) = E[s2q] − (E[sq])2, E[s2q] =
∫ q
a
DdΦ(D) +
∫ b
q
qdΦ(D) = S(q),
and (E[sq])2 =
∫ q
a
D2dΦ(D) +
∫ b
q
q2dΦ(D), it is easy to calculate the standard
deviation of profit for a given contract as σpˇiR(q,D) = x
√
V ar(sq).
A.2.3 Chapter 6: Calculating Nash equilibria
Define Q−i := {q1, .., qi−1, qi+1, .., qM} and Qx−i := {q1 = x, .., qi−1 = x, qi+1 =
x, .., qM = x}. Furthermore, let D := {D1, ..., DM} ∈ RM+ and d := {d1, ..., dM}
be one realization from D. The following algorithm describes how we searched
for the symmetric Nash equilibrium q∗i (Q
∗
−i). For each set of problem parameters
{a, b, p, w, τ} we found a single unique equilibrium. The code was written in the
C programming language. The pseudo code of the algorithm is given below.
Algorithm 6 Equilibrium
q∗i (Q
∗
−i) = {}
for all x ∈ [a, b] do
Π−1x ← ExpProfit(x− 1, Q−i)
Πox ← ExpProfit(x,Q−i)
Π+1x ← ExpProfit(x+ 1, Q−i)
if Πox = max[Π
−1
x ,Π
0
x,Π
+1
x ] then
q∗i (Q
∗
−i)← x
end if
end for
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Algorithm 7 ExpProfit(y, Y )
picum = 0
for all d ∈ D do
picum ← picum + pi(y, Y |d))
end for
ExpProfit(y, Y ) ← picum
(b−a+1)M
We ran several numerical studies using this algorithm. The general observa-
tion is that the symmetric Nash equilibrium q∗i (Q
∗
−i) increases in the transship-
ment price τ . This is illustrated in Figure A.1 for a selected numerical values
of the problem parameters.
(a) w = 3, D ∼ U(100, 200) (b) w = 6, D ∼ U(100, 200) (c) w = 9, D ∼ U(100, 200)
(d) w = 3, D ∼ U(0, 300) (e) w = 6, D ∼ U(0, 300) (f) w = 9, D ∼ U(0, 300)
Figure A.1: Numerical results for exogenous transfer prices
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Appendix B
Instructions from
Experiments
The instructions from Chapters B.1, B.2, and B.3 are translated from German.
B.1 Chapter 3
B.1.1 Study 1 (OPERATIONS)
You are about to participate in an experiment in economics of individual decision
making. Your task will involve making a number of decisions in a particular sit-
uation. Please note that the questions are designed not to test your knowledge,
but to know more about your personal preferences. If you have any question,
feel free to raise your hand. Moreover, all individual responses are completely
confidential and anonymous.
Task description
Your task is to make a number of decisions under uncertainty.
You are a retailer who sells a single (fictional) item at a market price p. Prod-
ucts must be ordered from the supplier at a unit cost c before you know for
certain what quantity your customers will demand. However, at the time of
your order decision, you have some knowledge regarding the demand distribu-
tion. Specifically, you know that each demand realization in this range being
equally likely. Your decision concerns the choice of an order quantity.
The profit (in e) from your chosen order quantity depends on the random
realization of demand. In case demand exceeds your order quantity you loose
revenue (price-cost) for those units of demand which you cannot satisfy. In case
demand is lower than your order quantity, you have incurred costs for some
units bought, without being able to earn revenue with these units. You do not
have to calculate the prospective profits for each possible combination of order
quantity and demand. They are provided to you by means of decision matrices:
For this example with three possible demand realizations, demand can be 100,
200, or 300 units, each with equal probability. For example, if you order 300
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units, your realized profits will be -4.00e(with probability 1/3), 4.00e(with
probability 1/3) or 12.00e(with probability 1/3).
Experimental protocol
The computer-based part of the experiment starts with some test questions to
make sure you have understood the task. Then you have to make six order de-
cisions in six independent rounds. In each round, you have the choice among a
set of possible order quantities. After you have made all six decisions, the com-
puter randomly determines a demand realization for each of them. The profit
resulting from your order quantity and the realized demand in each round will
be displayed, and you will be asked to indicate how satisfied you are with your
order decision.
Please take sufficient time in order to make sound decisions. Throughout the
experiment, do not communicate with other participants, and raise your hand
if you have questions to the instructor.
Payment determination
To determine your actual payoff, the computer will randomly pick one of the six
decision rounds which you have played, with equal probability for each round
and independent for each participant. Your payoff is the average from these to
randomly determined decision rounds. In addition you receive a fixed payment
of e2 for your participation in this experiment. Your expected payoff is e10.80.
If the computer randomly picks a decision round you realized a loss in, this loss
will be deducted from your fixed payment. Note that each decision situation
you will face contains at least one choice alternative that prevents you from
losses!
The experiment will now start with a number of training rounds.
B.1.2 Study 1 (NEUTRAL)
You are about to participate in an experiment in economics of individual decision
making. Your task will involve making a number of decisions in a particular sit-
uation. Please note that the questions are designed not to test your knowledge,
but to know more about your personal preferences. If you have any question,
feel free to raise your hand. Moreover, all individual responses are completely
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confidential and anonymous.
Task description
Your task is to make a number of decisions under uncertainty.
In each decision round you have the choice between different alternatives A,
B,C. . .G. Each alternative represents a lottery the payoff of which is uncertain
at the time of your choice, and depends on the realization of a random number.
Each of these random numbers is equally likely and describes one state of the
world. For 100 possible states of the world, the following decision matrix gives
an example of your decision problem:
For example, if you choose alternative C, your payoff will be either e-4.00 (with
probability 1/3), e4.00 (with probability 1/3) oder e12.00 (with probability
1/3). Some further examples:
• If the random number realizes between 1 and 33 (i.e. with probability
1/3), your payoff is e7.00, if you had chosen alternative A. If you had
chosen alternative B, your payoff is e1.00. If you had chosen alternative
C, you lose e4.00.
• If the random number realizes between 34 and 66 (i.e. with probability
1/3), your payoff is e7.00, if you had chosen alternative A. If you had
chosen alternative B, your payoff is e9.00. If you had chosen alternative
C, you receive e4.00.
• If the random number realizes between 67 and 100 (i.e. with probability
1/3), your payoff is e7.00, if you had chosen alternative A. If you had
chosen alternative B, your payoff is e9.00. If you had chosen alternative
C, you receive e12.00.
Experimental protocol
The computer-based part of the experiment starts with some test questions to
make sure you have understood the task. Then you have to make six indepen-
dent decisions in six different rounds. In each round, you have to chose among a
set of possible alternatives. After you have made all six decisions, the computer
randomly determines a number for each of them. The profit resulting from your
decision and the random number realization in each round will be displayed,
and you will be asked to indicate how satisfied you are with your choice.
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Please take sufficient time in order to make sound decisions. Throughout the
experiment, do not communicate with other participants, and raise your hand
if you have questions to the instructor.
Payment determination
To determine your actual payoff, the computer will randomly pick one of the six
decision rounds which you have played, with equal probability for each round
and independent for each participant. Your payoff is the average from these to
randomly determined decision rounds. In addition you receive a fixed payment
of e2 for your participation in this experiment. Your expected payoff is e10.80.
If the computer randomly picks a decision round you realized a loss in, this loss
will be deducted from your fixed payment. Note that each decision situation
you will face contains at least one choice alternative that prevents you from
losses!
The experiment will now start with a number of training rounds.
B.1.3 Study 2 (OPERATIONS & REGRET)
You are about to participate in an experiment in economics of individual decision
making. Your task will involve making a number of decisions in a particular sit-
uation. Please note that the questions are designed not to test your knowledge,
but to know more about your personal preferences. If you have any question,
feel free to raise your hand. Moreover, all individual responses are completely
confidential and anonymous.
Task description
Your task is to make a number of decisions under uncertainty.
You are a retailer who sells a single (fictional) item at a market price p. Prod-
ucts must be ordered from the supplier at a unit cost c before you know for
certain what quantity your customers will demand. However, at the time of
your order decision, you have some knowledge regarding the demand distribu-
tion. Specifically, you know that each demand realization in this range being
equally likely. Your decision concerns the choice of an order quantity.
The profit (in e) from your chosen order quantity depends on the random
realization of demand. In case demand exceeds your order quantity you loose
revenue (price-cost) for those units of demand which you cannot satisfy. In case
demand is lower than your order quantity, you have incurred costs for some
units bought, without being able to earn revenue with these units. You do not
have to calculate the prospective profits for each possible combination of order
quantity and demand. They are provided to you by means of decision matrices:
For this example, possible demand realizations are 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600
or 700 units, each with equal probability. For example, if you order 300 units,
your realized profits will be e2.10 (with probability 1/7), e5.70 (with probabil-
ity 1/7) or e9.40 (with probability 5/7). If realized demand is 200, your profit
is e8.60 if you had ordered 200 units, or e2.90 if you had ordered 400 units.
Experimental protocol
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The computer-based part of the experiment starts with some test questions to
make sure you have understood the task. Then you have to make order de-
cisions in a number of rounds. In each round, you have the choice among a
set of possible order quantities. After your decision, the computer randomly
determines a demand realization. The profit resulting from your order quantity
and the realized demand will be displayed and you will be asked to indicate
how satisfied you are with your order decision. Then the computer guides you
to the next decision round. Note that, after a certain number of rounds, the
parameters of the problem (demand distribution, prices, costs) will change. The
computer will make you aware of this.
Please take sufficient time in order to make sound decisions. Throughout the
experiment, do not communicate with other participants, and raise your hand
if you have questions to the instructor.
Payment determination
To determine your actual payoff, the computer will randomly pick two of the
decision rounds which you have played, with equal probability for each round
and independent for each participant. Your payoff is the average from these to
randomly determined decision rounds. In addition you receive a fixed payment
of e1 for your participation in this experiment. Your expected payoff is e8.50.
If the computer randomly picks a decision round you realized a loss in, this loss
will be deducted from your fixed payment. Note that each decision situation
you will face contains at least one choice alternative that prevents you from
losses!
The experiment will now start with a number of training rounds.
B.1.4 Study 2 (PENALTY)
You are about to participate in an experiment in economics of individual decision
making. Your task will involve making a number of decisions in a particular sit-
uation. Please note that the questions are designed not to test your knowledge,
but to know more about your personal preferences. If you have any question,
feel free to raise your hand. Moreover, all individual responses are completely
confidential and anonymous.
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Task description
Your task is to make a number of decisions under uncertainty.
You are a retailer who sells a single (fictional) item at a market price p. Prod-
ucts must be ordered from the supplier at a unit cost c before you know for
certain what quantity your customers will demand. However, at the time of
your order decision, you have some knowledge regarding the demand distribu-
tion. Specifically, you know that each demand realization in this range being
equally likely. Your decision concerns the choice of an order quantity.
The profit (in e) from your chosen order quantity depends on the random
realization of demand. In case demand exceeds your order quantity you loose
revenue (price-cost) for those units of demand which you cannot satisfy. In case
demand is lower than your order quantity, you have incurred costs for some
units bought, without being able to earn revenue with these units. You do not
have to calculate the prospective profits for each possible combination of order
quantity and demand. They are provided to you by means of decision matrices:
For this example, possible demand realizations are 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600
or 700 units, each with equal probability. For example, if you order 300 units,
your realized profits will be e2.10 (with probability 1/7), e5.70 (with probabil-
ity 1/7) or e9.40 (with probability 5/7). If realized demand is 200, your profit
is e8.60 if you had ordered 200 units, or e2.90 if you had ordered 400 units.
Additionally, you will be penalized for too low or too high order quantities, and
this penalty will be deducted from the profit realized according to the above
table. For each leftover unit and for each unit of unsatisfied demand, you have
to pay 1.5 cents. Example: You ordered 100 units, but realized demand turns
out to be 500 units. Your base profit in this case is e7.80. You need to pay
e6 (1.5 cents * 400 units of unsatisfied demand). Your overall profit in this
example is then e1.80.
Experimental protocol
The computer-based part of the experiment starts with some test questions to
make sure you have understood the task. Then you have to make order de-
cisions in a number of rounds. In each round, you have the choice among a
set of possible order quantities. After your decision, the computer randomly
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determines a demand realization. The profit resulting from your order quantity
and the realized demand will be displayed and you will be asked to indicate
how satisfied you are with your order decision. Then the computer guides you
to the next decision round. Note that, after a certain number of rounds, the
parameters of the problem (demand distribution, prices, costs) will change. The
computer will make you aware of this.
Please take sufficient time in order to make sound decisions. Throughout the
experiment, do not communicate with other participants, and raise your hand
if you have questions to the instructor.
Payment determination
To determine your actual payoff, the computer will randomly pick two of the
decision rounds which you have played, with equal probability for each round
and independent for each participant. Your payoff is the average from these to
randomly determined decision rounds. In addition you receive a fixed payment
of e3 for your participation in this experiment. Your expected payoff is e8.50.
If the computer randomly picks a decision round you realized a loss in, this loss
will be deducted from your fixed payment. Note that each decision situation
you will face contains at least one choice alternative that prevents you from
losses!
The experiment will now start with a number of training rounds.
B.1.5 Study 2 (NEUTRAL)
You are about to participate in an experiment in economics of individual decision
making. Your task will involve making a number of decisions in a particular sit-
uation. Please note that the questions are designed not to test your knowledge,
but to know more about your personal preferences. If you have any question,
feel free to raise your hand. Moreover, all individual responses are completely
confidential and anonymous.
Task description
Your task is to make a number of decisions under uncertainty.
In each decision round you have the choice between different alternatives A, B,
C. . .G. Each alternative represents a lottery the payoff of which is uncertain at
the time of your choice, and depends on the realization of a random number.
Each of these random numbers is equally likely and describes one state of the
world. For 100 possible states of the world, the following decision matrix gives
an example of your decision problem:
For example, if you choose alternative C, your payoff will be either e2.10 (with
probability 1/7), e5.70 (with probability 1/7) oder e9.40 (with probability 5/7).
Some further examples:
• If the random number realizes between 1 and 14 (i.e. with probability
1/7), your payoff is e7.80, if you had chosen alternative A. If you had
chosen alternative B, your payoff is e4.90. If you had chosen alternative
E, you lose e3.60.
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• If the random number realizes between 43 and 56 (i.e. with probability
1/7), your payoff is e8.60, if you had chosen alternative B. If you had
chosen alternative F, your payoff is e4.40. If you had chosen alternative
G, you receive e1.60.
• If the random number realizes between 85 and 100 (i.e. with probability
1/7), your payoff is e9.40, if you had chosen alternative C. If you had
chosen alternative D, your payoff is e10.10. If you had chosen alternative
E, you receive e10.90.
Experimental protocol
The computer-based part of the experiment starts with some test questions to
make sure you have understood the task. Then you have to make order deci-
sions in a number of rounds. In each round, you have the choice among a set of
alternativesA, B, C.... After your decision, the computer randomly determines
a number between 1 and 100. The profit resulting from your decision and the
realized random number will be displayed and you will be asked to indicate how
satisfied you are with the decision you made. Then the computer guides you to
the next decision round. Note that, after a certain number of rounds, the en-
tries in the choice matrix will change. The computer will make you aware of this.
Please take sufficient time in order to make sound decisions. Throughout the
experiment, do not communicate with other participants, and raise your hand
if you have questions to the instructor.
Payment determination
To determine your actual payoff, the computer will randomly pick two of the
decision rounds which you have played, with equal probability for each round
and independent for each participant. Your payoff is the average from these to
randomly determined decision rounds. In addition you receive a fixed payment
of e1 for your participation in this experiment. Your expected payoff is e8.50.
If the computer randomly picks a decision round you realized a loss in, this loss
will be deducted from your fixed payment. Note that each decision situation
you will face contains at least one choice alternative that prevents you from
losses!
The experiment will now start with a number of training rounds.
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B.2 Chapter 4
B.2.1 OPERATIONS
You are about to participate in an experiment in economics of individual decision
making. Your task will involve making a number of decisions in a particular sit-
uation. Please note that the questions are designed not to test your knowledge,
but to know more about your personal preferences. If you have any question,
feel free to raise your hand. Moreover, all individual responses are completely
confidential and anonymous.
The decision situation
You are in the role of the manufacturer who buys a single (fictitious) seasonal
product from a supplier and then sells it to a retailer at the price of 12 Taler.
Your decision in this experiment refers to the choice between two different con-
tracts (“NOW ” and “LATER”) which your supplier offers to you.
At the time of the contract choice you do not know the exact demand quantity
of the retailer. However, you know that the demand will be between 100 and
200 units. You also know that each demand quantity is equally probable (this
means, e.g., that a demand of 101 units is as probable as a demand of 152 units).
[With discrete demand the instructions read: “However, you know that the de-
mand will be either 100, 150 or 200 units. You also know that each demand
quantity is equally probable (this means, e.g., that a demand of 100 units is as
probable as a demand of 150 units)”]
The demand quantities in the different periods are independent from each other:
a high (low) realized demand in a period is no signal for the demand in the next
period also being high (low)!
Your decision
You have the choice between the following two contracts:
Contract “Now”: You now make an order from your supplier before you know
what demand of the retailer will be.
[In the Fixed Order treatments the instructions read: “You order 150 units from
your supplier before you know what demand of the retailer will be”]
For each unit ordered you pay a buying price of 6 Taler to your supplier. With
each sold unit you earn a selling price of 12 Taler. Note that you cannot sell more
than you have ordered. You also cannot sell more than the realized demand.
Thus your profit (in Taler) depends on the order quantity as well as on the
random realization of demand:
1. If your order quantity is less than or equal to the demand:
Profit= 12* order quantity – 6* order quantity
2. If your order quantity is more than the demand:
Profit= 12* demand – 6* order quantity
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Contract “Later”: The supplier offers you that you can make your order de-
cision only when you can observe the demand of the retailer. This means that
you wait until the demand is realized and you then order exactly the quantity
(at the buying price of w) that you can sell (at a selling price of 12 Taler).
Profit= (12-w)* demand.
An example
Throughout the experiment, the decision situation described above will be
shown to you as follows:
[In the Fixed Order treatments the instructions displayed the following screen:]
If you choose the contract “Now” in this example, you order units at a buying
price of 6 Taler. You can only sell as much as you have ordered (if your order
quantity is smaller than demand), or as much as is demanded (if demand is
smaller than your order quantity). If you choose the contract “Later”, then you
wait until the demand is realized, you order the corresponding quantity at a
buying price (w) of 7 Taler, and sell at a selling price of 12 Taler. The profits
(in Taler) made by you in each period are saved.
Please note that the buying price for the contract “Later” will occasionally change
in the course of the experiment!!! The computer program will inform you of price
changes.
136
If you cannot make a decision for any of the two offered contracts in a period,
you will in addition get the opportunity in later runs to choose the option “I
am indifferent”. In this case the computer chooses, by chance, one of the two
contracts for you (each with equal probability of 50 % respectively) which will
then be played. If you prefer one of the two contracts, you should not choose
the option “I am indifferent“ because, with a probability of 50 %, the computer
chooses the contract which you prefer less.
B.2.2 NEUTRAL
The decision situation
Your task is to indicate by mouse click which of the two options given by the
computer you prefer. The payoff of each lottery depends on the random real-
ization of a number (between 0 and 100). Each of these random numbers is
equally probable.
[With discrete demand the instructions read: ”The payoff of each lottery de-
pends on the random realization of a state of the world (A, B, or C). Each of
these random states is equally probable.”]
Please work out conscientiously all decision question presented.
An example.
The screen shows you the following:
Now you must decide which of the two lotteries (A or B) you prefer.
1. With lottery A (“BLUE”) you will win 900 Taler if a random number
larger than 50 is realized. If a random number 30 is realized, you will win
600 Taler. If number 0 is realized, you will win 300 Taler.
2. With lottery B (“RED”) you will win 500 Taler if random number 0 is
realized. If random number 40 is realized, you will win 700 Taler, with
random number 90, you will win 950 Taler.
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By mouse click on the corresponding field (“I choose A”, respectively, “I choose
B”) you make your decision. The computer then determines, by chance, a num-
ber between 0 and 100, each with equal probability. Subsequently the computer
displays the next task.
Please note that the possible wins of lottery B will change in the course of
the experiment after a few runs!!! The computer program will indicate these
changes.
[With discrete demand the instructions read:
”The screen shows you the following: Now you must decide which of the two
lotteries (“N” or “L”) you prefer.
1. With lottery “N” you will win 300 Taler with probability 13 (if random
state A realizes). If random state B realizes (with probability 13 ), you win
900 Taler. If random state C realizes (with probability 13 ), you win 900
Taler.
2. With lottery “L” you will win 500 Taler with probability 13 (if random
state A realizes). If random state B realizes (with probability 13 ), you win
750 Taler. If random state C realizes (with probability 13 ), you win 1000
Taler.
By mouseclick on the corresponding field (“I choose N”, respectively, “I choose
L”) you make your decision. The computer then determines randomly a state
A, B, or C, each with equal probability. Subsequently the computer displays
the next task.
Please note that the possible wins of lottery L will change in the course of the ex-
periment after a few runs!!! The computer program will indicate these changes.”]
If you cannot decide for one of the two lotteries offered, later you will addi-
tionally have the possibility to choose the option “I am indifferent”. In this
case the computer chooses, by chance, one of the two lotteries (each with equal
probability of 50 %) and this one will then be played. If you prefer one of the
two lotteries, you should not choose the option “I am indifferent” because, with
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a probability of 50 %, your less preferred lottery will be chosen.
Important: This experiment does not deal with your mathematical skills, there
are no right or wrong answers. It deals with your personal preferences: If
somebody gives you the choice between 2 lotteries - which one do you prefer?
B.3 Chapter 5
The following instructions use a specific parameterization for illustration pur-
poses, but are valid for all parameters tested in different treatments of the
experiment.
B.3.1 Study 1 (BUYER, BUYBACK)
You are about to participate in an experiment in economics of individual decision
making. Your task will involve making a number of decisions in a particular sit-
uation. Please note that the questions are designed not to test your knowledge,
but to know more about your personal preferences. If you have any question,
feel free to raise your hand. Moreover, all individual responses are completely
confidential and anonymous.
Based on your choices you can actually earn money in this experiment (up to
e26)! The detailed payment procedure is explained at the end of this question-
naire.
Description of the game
You are a retailer who sells a single (fictitious) item at a market price of 12
Taler. Products must be ordered from the supplier before you know for cer-
tain what quantity your customers will demand. However, at the time of your
order decision, you have some knowledge regarding the demand distribution.
Specifically, you know that demand will be between 0 units and 100 units
with each demand realization in this range being equally likely. Resulting from
an order quantity chosen is a profit (in experimental Taler) which depends on
the demand quantity realized. Basically, the above describes the problem of a
newsvendor.
The main task in this experiment is not the choice of an order quantity, however:
Prior to your order decision, you are given the opportunity to choose between
two different deals (supply contracts) being offered by your supplier. Your main
task in this experiment will be to pick the deal which you prefer the most.
Current Contract A: For every unit ordered you pay a wholesale price of
7.50 Taler to your supplier. There is no salvage value for remaining left-over
inventory at the end of the season.
a) If Demand < Order Quantity: Profit = 12 · Demand – 7.50 · Order Quantity
b) If Demand = Order Quantity: Profit = 12 · Order Quantity – 7.50 · Order
Quantity
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New Contract B: For every unit ordered you pay a wholesale price of 8 Taler
to your supplier. On the other hand, the supplier will buy back your leftovers at
the end of the season: For goods not sold during the season, the supplier pays
you buyback price of 4 Taler per unit.
a) If Demand < Order Quantity: Profit = 12 · Demand - 8 · Order Quantity +
4 · (Order Quantity - Demand)
b) If Demand ≥ Order Quantity: Profit = 12 · Order Quantity - 8 · Order
Quantity
Your choice
© I choose the current contract A.
© I choose the new contract B.
Payment Determination
Since the size of this class as well as our budget does not permit us to pay every-
body, 4 students will be chosen in a random draw and will be paid according to
their responses. The payoff can be quite substantial (between e0 and e26, for
less than 10 minutes work!), provided a sound decision and a little luck with re-
spect to the demand realization. The mean payoff is e20; losses are not possible.
The actual payoff for the randomly selected students will be determined in the
following way: Given your contract choice, you pick an order quantity. Then,
the computer randomly selects a demand quantity from the range of 0 to 100
units. Based on the contract choice as well as your (newsvendor) order quantity,
the realized (fictitious) profit will be computed according to the task descrip-
tion above. In addition you receive a fixed sum of 850 Taler. To determine
your actual payoff, the realized profit will be divided by 50. For example, a
profit of 100 + 850 (Fixum)=950 Taler would be converted to an actual payoff
of 19ewhich is paid out to you.
Thank you for your participation!
B.3.2 Study 1 (BUYER, REVENUE SHARING)
You are about to participate in an experiment in economics of individual decision
making. Your task will involve making a number of decisions in a particular sit-
uation. Please note that the questions are designed not to test your knowledge,
but to know more about your personal preferences. If you have any question,
feel free to raise your hand. Moreover, all individual responses are completely
confidential and anonymous.
Based on your choices you can actually earn money in this experiment (up to
e26)! The detailed payment procedure is explained at the end of this question-
naire.
Description of the game
You are a retailer who sells a single (fictitious) item at a market price of 12
Taler. Products must be ordered from the supplier before you know for cer-
tain what quantity your customers will demand. However, at the time of your
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order decision, you have some knowledge regarding the demand distribution.
Specifically, you know that demand will be between 0 units and 100 units
with each demand realization in this range being equally likely. Resulting from
an order quantity chosen is a profit (in experimental Taler) which depends on
the demand quantity realized. Basically, the above describes the problem of a
newsvendor.
The main task in this experiment is not the choice of an order quantity, however:
Prior to your order decision, you are given the opportunity to choose between
two different deals (supply contracts) being offered by your supplier. Your main
task in this experiment will be to pick the deal which you prefer the most.
Current Contract A: For every unit ordered you pay a wholesale price of
7.50 Taler to your supplier. There is no salvage value for remaining left-over
inventory at the end of the season.
a) If Demand < Order Quantity: Profit = 12 · Demand – 7.50 · Order Quantity
b) If Demand ≥ Order Quantity: Profit = 12 · Order Quantity – 7.50 · Order
Quantity
New Contract B: For every unit ordered you pay a wholesale price of 4 Taler
to your supplier. For each unit sold, you pay an additional 4 Taler to your
supplier. There is no salvage value for remaining left-over inventory at the end
of the season.
a) If Demand < Order Quantity: Profit = 12 · Demand – 4 · Order Quantity
–4 · Demand
b) If Demand ≥ Order Quantity: Profit = 12 · Order Quantity – 4 · Order
Quantity – 4 · Order Quantity
Your choice
© I choose the current contract A.
© I choose the new contract B.
Payment Determination
Since the size of this class as well as our budget does not permit us to pay every-
body, 4 students will be chosen in a random draw and will be paid according to
their responses. The payoff can be quite substantial (between e0 and e26, for
less than 10 minutes work!), provided a sound decision and a little luck with re-
spect to the demand realization. The mean payoff is e20; losses are not possible.
The actual payoff for the randomly selected students will be determined in the
following way: Given your contract choice, you pick an order quantity. Then,
the computer randomly selects a demand quantity from the range of 0 to 100
units. Based on the contract choice as well as your (newsvendor) order quantity,
the realized (fictitious) profit will be computed according to the task descrip-
tion above. In addition you receive a fixed sum of 850 Taler. To determine
your actual payoff, the realized profit will be divided by 50. For example, a
profit of 100 + 850 (Fixum)=950 Taler would be converted to an actual payoff
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of 19ewhich is paid out to you.
Thank you for your participation!
B.3.3 Study 1 (SUPPLIER, BUYBACK)
You are about to participate in an experiment in economics of individual decision
making. Your task will involve making a number of decisions in a particular sit-
uation. Please note that the questions are designed not to test your knowledge,
but to know more about your personal preferences. If you have any question,
feel free to raise your hand. Moreover, all individual responses are completely
confidential and anonymous.
Based on your choices you can actually earn money in this experiment (up to
e21)! The detailed payment procedure is explained at the end of this question-
naire.
Description of the game
You are a manufacturer who produces a single (fictitious) item at a unit pro-
duction cost 3 Taler before supplying it to a retailer. The retailer must order
from the supplier before he knows for certain what quantity his customers will
demand. However, at the time of his order decision, you (the manufacturer)
as well as the retailer have some knowledge regarding the demand distribution.
Specifically, you know that demand will be between 0 units and 100 units
with each demand realization in this range being equally likely.
The main task in this experiment is the choice of a supply contract: Prior to
the retailer’s order decision, you (the manufacturer) are given the opportunity
to choose between two different deals (supply contracts) being offered by the
retailer. Your main task in this experiment will be to pick the deal which you
prefer the most.
Current Contract A: The retailer offers to order 38 units and pay you a unit
wholesale price of 7.50 Taler. Your profit under this contract is.
Profit = (12 – 7.50) · Retailer order quantity.
New Contract B: The retailer offers to order 50 units and pay you a unit
wholesale price of 8 Taler. You have to refund the retailer for leftover units at
the end of the retailer’s selling season at a buyback price of 4 Taler per unit.
Your profit under this contract thus depends on the realization of random de-
mand at the retailer’s end customer market.
a) If Demand < Retailer order quantity: Profit = (8 – 3) · Demand - 8 · Retailer
order quantity - 4 · (Retailer order quantity - Demand)
b) If Demand≥ Retailer order quantity: Profit = (8 – 3) · Retailer order quantity
Your choice
© I choose the current contract A.
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© I choose the new contract B.
Payment Determination Since the size of this class as well as our budget does
not permit us to pay everybody, 4 students will be chosen in a random draw and
will be paid according to their responses. The payoff can be quite substantial
(between e11 and e21, for less than 10 minutes work!), provided a sound deci-
sion and a little luck with respect to the demand realization. The mean payoff
is e18; losses are not possible.
The actual payoff for the randomly selected students will be determined in the
following way: Given your contract choice, you pick an order quantity. Then,
the computer randomly selects a demand quantity from the range of 0 to 100
units. Based on the contract choice as well as your (newsvendor) order quantity,
the realized (fictitious) profit will be computed according to the task descrip-
tion above. In addition you receive a fixed sum of 175 Taler. To determine
your actual payoff, the realized profit will be divided by 20. For example, a
profit of 150 + 175 (Fixum)=325 Taler would be converted to an actual payoff
of 16.25ewhich is paid out to you.
Thank you for your participation!
B.3.4 Study 1 (SUPPLIER, REVENUE SHARING)
You are about to participate in an experiment in economics of individual decision
making. Your task will involve making a number of decisions in a particular sit-
uation. Please note that the questions are designed not to test your knowledge,
but to know more about your personal preferences. If you have any question,
feel free to raise your hand. Moreover, all individual responses are completely
confidential and anonymous.
Based on your choices you can actually earn money in this experiment (up to
e21)! The detailed payment procedure is explained at the end of this question-
naire.
Description of the game
You are a manufacturer who produces a single (fictitious) item at a unit pro-
duction cost 3 Taler before supplying it to a retailer. The retailer must order
from the supplier before he knows for certain what quantity his customers will
demand. However, at the time of his order decision, you (the manufacturer)
as well as the retailer have some knowledge regarding the demand distribution.
Specifically, you know that demand will be between 0 units and 100 units
with each demand realization in this range being equally likely.
The main task in this experiment is the choice of a supply contract: Prior to
the retailer’s order decision, you (the manufacturer) are given the opportunity
to choose between two different deals (supply contracts) being offered by the
retailer. Your main task in this experiment will be to pick the deal which you
prefer the most.
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Current Contract A: The retailer offers to order 38 units and pay you a unit
wholesale price of 7.50 Taler. Your profit under this contract is.
Profit = (12 – 7.50) · Retailer order quantity.
New Contract B: The retailer offers to order 50 units and pay you a unit
wholesale price of 4 Taler. Additionally, the retailer pays 4 Taler for every or-
dered unit which he can actually sell to its customers. Your profit under this
contract thus depends on the realization of random demand at the retailer’s end
customer market.
a) If Demand< Retailer order quantity: Profit = (4 – 3) · Retailer order quantity
+ 4 · Demand
b) If Demand ≥ Retailer order quantity: Profit = (4 – 3) · Retailer order quan-
tity + 4 · Retailer order quantity
Your choice
© I choose the current contract A.
© I choose the new contract B.
Payment Determination
Since the size of this class as well as our budget does not permit us to pay every-
body, 4 students will be chosen in a random draw and will be paid according to
their responses. The payoff can be quite substantial (between e11 and e21, for
less than 10 minutes work!), provided a sound decision and a little luck with re-
spect to the demand realization. The mean payoff is e18; losses are not possible.
The actual payoff for the randomly selected students will be determined in the
following way: Given your contract choice, you pick an order quantity. Then,
the computer randomly selects a demand quantity from the range of 0 to 100
units. Based on the contract choice as well as your (newsvendor) order quantity,
the realized (fictitious) profit will be computed according to the task descrip-
tion above. In addition you receive a fixed sum of 175 Taler. To determine
your actual payoff, the realized profit will be divided by 20. For example, a
profit of 150 + 175 (Fixum)=325 Taler would be converted to an actual payoff
of 16.25ewhich is paid out to you.
Thank you for your participation!
B.3.5 Study 2 (Moving reference contracts)
The instructions for Study 2 add a further risk-sharing contract (buyback or
revenue sharing) to the set of alternatives, but are otherwise equivalent to the
instruction for Study 1.
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B.4 Chapter 6
B.4.1 Study 1 (Exogenous prices)
This is a computerized experiment in the economics of market decision-making.
It is part of the computer exercise sessions of the ”Supply Chain Management”
course run by the Department of Logistics (Professor Minner). The purpose of
this session is to study how people make decisions in particular situations. A
pen and blank sheets of paper have been provided for any calculations or notes
you might wish to make. From now until the end of the session, unauthorized
communication of any nature with other participants is prohibited.
If you have any questions, feel free to raise your hand and a supervisor will
assist you.
Description of the game:
The game is repeated for 40 rounds in total. You are a retailer who sells a single
(fictional) item, the widget. Each round consists of two periods, the ”ordering
period” (first period) and the ”secondary market period” (second period).
In the first period, you can order units of the widget and sell them to customers
at a fixed per unit price. In the second period, you can sell (buy) units of
the widget to (from) other traders in the experiment depending on your inven-
tory level after the first period. Both periods are explained in more detail below.
All inventory held after the second period of a single round is lost (i.e., the sal-
vage value is zero). You will begin each new round with zero inventories. The
outcome in each round of the game is independent of the outcome of previous
rounds, i.e., high demand in an early round does not have any influence on the
demand in later rounds. Your goal is to maximize the profit you make in every
round of the game. The monetary unit in the experiment are experimental to-
kens.
The following picture summarizes the entire sequence of events:
First period: Ordering period
In the ordering period of each round, you order widgets from a supplier at a cost
of 9 tokens per unit, and sell widgets to your customers at a price of 12 tokens
per unit. The widgets must be ordered from the supplier before you know for
certain what quantity your customers will demand. You know, however, that
demand is uniformly distributed in a range between 100 and 200 (e.g., a demand
realization of 110 is as likely as a demand realization of 150). You may order
any positive amount of widgets per round. The ordering screen looks as follows.
Once you place your order, the computer randomly selects a demand realization.
Subsequently, you are given the end of period inventory (positive or negative)
and the selling season profit result for the first period, depending on your order
quantity q and realized demand D.
Case 1: q = D
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If the number of widgets ordered, q, is the same or less than the quantity
demanded, D, then your selling season profit for the first period is:
Selling Season Profit = 12q − 9q
For example, if you order 150 widgets and the demand is 175, then your selling
season profit is 12×150 – 9×150 = 450 tokens and you have 25 units of unfilled
demand that could not be satisfied from your inventory.
In this case (i.e., q<D), you will become a buyer in the second period and have
the chance of buying additional units of the widget from other traders in order
to satisfy unfilled demand from the first period.
Case 2: q > D
146
If the number of widgets ordered, q, is greater than the quantity demanded, D,
then your selling season profit for the first period is:
Selling Season Profit = 12D − 9q
For example, if you order 150 widgets and demand is 125, then your first period
profit for the round is 12×125 – 9×150 = 150 tokens and you have 25 units of
leftover inventory.
In this case (i.e., q > D), you will become a seller in the second period and have
the chance of selling your units of the widget to other traders in order to dispose
of leftover inventory from the first period.
Second period: Secondary market period
The second period is organized as a secondary market between four traders (i.e.,
you and three other traders). Traders with some unfilled demand after the first
period can buy units from other traders in order to fulfil their customer back-
logs. Traders with some leftover units after the first period can sell units to
other traders in order to reduce their leftover inventory. The transfer price T
at which all trades will take place is determined by a central institution prior
to the start of the game and is constant over all rounds of the game. T equals
3 tokens per unit.
If you have unfilled demand from the first period (q < D), you are a buyer in
the secondary market. If you have leftover inventory from the first period (q >
D), you are a seller in the secondary market.
At the beginning of the second period, you are given information about the total
amount of demand (Total Unfilled Demand) and supply (Total Leftover Units)
in the secondary market. All traders are then asked to enter the amount of units
they are willing to trade in the secondary market at the transfer price of 3 tokens.
Case A: Buyer
As a buyer, you can enter an amount up to the Total Leftover Units in the
market (i.e., you can bid more units than your own amount of unfilled demand).
The bidding screen looks as follows.
What amount of units you can trade in the secondary market is determined as
follows:
Case A.1:
If the total bid quantity from you and the other buyers at τ is lower
than (or equal to) the total amount of units supplied at τ , you can
buy your bid quantity.
Amount of units you can buy = Your bid quantity at τ
Case A.2:
If the total bid quantity from you and the other buyers at τ exceeds
the total amount of units supplied at τ , you can buy a share of the
total amount of units supplied in the market (not more than your bid
147
quantity) according to the proportion of your bid quantity relative
to the total bid quantity at τ .
Amount of units you can buy =
(
Your bid quantity at τ
Total bid quantity at τ
)
x Total supply at τ
The cost at which you buy these units from the sellers equals the
transfer price of 3 tokens in the secondary market. The price you
earn for reselling these units to your customers (not more than the
amount of your unfilled demand from the first period) is the selling
price of 12 tokens.
Case B: Seller
As a seller, you can enter an amount up to the amount of your leftover units.
The bidding screen looks as follows.
What amount of units you can trade in the secondary market is determined as
follows:
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Case B.1:
If the total bid quantity from you and the other sellers at τ is lower
than (or equal to) the total amount of units demanded at τ , you can
sell your bid quantity.
Amount of units you can sell = Your bid quantity at τ
Case B.2:
If the total bid quantity from you and the other sellers at τ exceeds
the total amount of units demanded at τ , you can sell a share of
the total amount of units demanded in the market (not more than
your bid quantity) according to the proportion of your bid quantity
relative to the total bid quantity at τ .
Amount of units you can sell =(
Your bid quantity at τ
Total bid quantity at τ
)
x Total demand at τ
The price at which you sell these units to the buyers equals the transfer price
τ=3 tokens in the secondary market.
End of round results:
After automated trading in the secondary market is finished, a result screen will
show you all necessary information for the current round (the amount of units
you were able to buy or sell and your profit results).
Case A: Buyer in the secondary market
Your secondary market profit is calculated from your secondary mar-
ket cost and your post-season revenue.
Secondary market cost =
Transfer price τ×(Units you bought in the secondary market)
Post-Season Revenue =
(Selling Price)×(Units you bought in the secondary market)
Note that the quantity component of your post-season revenue is
limited to the amount of your unfilled demand from the first period.
Case B: Seller in the secondary market
Your secondary market profit equals your secondary market revenue.
Secondary Market Revenue =
(Transfer Price τ)×(Units you sold in the secondary market)
Your total profit for the whole round equals the sum of your selling season profit
and your secondary market profit.
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B.4.2 Study 2 (Endogenous prices)
This is a computerized experiment in the economics of market decision-making.
It is part of the computer exercise sessions of the ”Supply Chain Management”
course run by the Department of Logistics (Professor Minner). The purpose of
this session is to study how people make decisions in particular situations. A
pen and blank sheets of paper have been provided for any calculations or notes
you might wish to make. From now until the end of the session, unauthorized
communication of any nature with other participants is prohibited.
If you have any questions, feel free to raise your hand and a supervisor will
assist you.
Description of the game:
The game is repeated for 25 rounds in total. You are a retailer who sells a single
(fictional) item, the widget. Each round consists of two periods, the ”ordering
period” (first period) and the ”secondary market period” (second period).
In the first period, you can order units of the widget and sell them to customers
at a fixed per unit price. In the second period, you can sell (buy) units of
the widget to (from) other traders in the experiment depending on your inven-
tory level after the first period. Both periods are explained in more detail below.
All inventory held after the second period of a single round is lost (i.e., the sal-
vage value is zero). You will begin each new round with zero inventories. The
outcome in each round of the game is independent of the outcome of previous
rounds, i.e., high demand in an early round does not have any influence on the
demand in later rounds. Your goal is to maximize the profit you make in every
round of the game. The monetary unit in the experiment are experimental to-
kens.
The following picture summarizes the entire sequence of events.
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First period: Ordering period
In the ordering period of each round, you order widgets from a supplier at a cost
of 9 tokens per unit, and sell widgets to your customers at a price of 12 tokens
per unit. The widgets must be ordered from the supplier before you know for
certain what quantity your customers will demand. You know, however, that
demand is uniformly distributed in a range between 100 and 200 (e.g., a demand
realization of 110 is as likely as a demand realization of 150). You may order
any positive amount of widgets per round. The ordering screen looks as follows.
Once you place your order, the computer randomly selects a demand realization.
Subsequently, you are given the end of period inventory (positive or negative)
and the selling season profit result for the first period, depending on your order
quantity q and realized demand D.
Case 1: q ≤ D
If the number of widgets ordered, q, is the same or less than the
quantity demanded, D, then your selling season profit for the first
period is:
Selling Season Profit = 12q − 9q
For example, if you order 150 widgets and the demand is 175, then
your selling season profit is 12×150 – 9×150 = 450 tokens and you
have 25 units of unfilled demand that could not be satisfied from
your inventory.
In this case (i.e., q<D), you will become a buyer in the second period
and have the chance of buying additional units of the widget from
other traders in order to satisfy unfilled demand from the first period.
Case 2: q > D
If the number of widgets ordered, q, is greater than the quantity
demanded, D, then your selling season profit for the first period is:
Selling Season Profit = 12D − 9q
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For example, if you order 150 widgets and demand is 125, then your
first period profit for the round is 12×125 – 9×150 = 150 tokens and
you have 25 units of leftover inventory.
In this case (i.e., q>D), you will become a seller in the second period
and have the chance of selling your units of the widget to other
traders in order to dispose of leftover inventory from the first pe-
riod.
Second period: Secondary market period
The second period is organized as a secondary market between ten traders (i.e.,
you and nine other traders). Traders with some unfilled demand after the first
period can buy units from other traders in order to fulfil their customer back-
logs. Traders with some leftover units after the first period can sell units to
other traders in order to reduce their leftover inventory.
If you have unfilled demand from the first period (q < D), you are a buyer in
the secondary market.
If you have leftover inventory from the first period (q > D), you are a seller in
the secondary market.
At the beginning of the second period, you are given information about the to-
tal amount of demand (Total Unfilled Demand) and the total amount of supply
(Total Leftover Units) in the secondary market across all ten traders.
Case A: If Total Unfilled Demand in the secondary market is greater
than Total Leftover Units, it is the buyers who can submit bids, the
sellers are non-bidders in this case.
Case B: If the Total Leftover Units in the secondary market is greater
than Total Unfilled Demand, it is the sellers who can submit bids,
the buyers are non-bidders in this case.
Case C: If Total Unfilled Demand equals the Total Leftover Units in
the secondary market, it is randomly selected whether the buyers or
the sellers can submit bids.
The transfer price τ* that emerges in the secondary market can be between 0
and 12 tokens, depending on your bids, the bids submitted by the other traders,
the total amount of units demanded and the total amount of units supplied in
the market. Details are described below.
Further instructions for bidders in the secondary market:
Case A: Bidding buyer
If you are a buyer (q < D) and Total Unfilled Demand exceeds the Total Left-
over Units, you are to bid in the secondary market.
For each potential transfer price τ between 0 and 12, every buyer submits a
quantity bid which he is willing to buy at this transfer price. The bids must
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be in non-descending order for transfer prices from 12 to 0, e.g., you cannot be
willing to buy more at τ=5 than at τ=4. At any transfer price you cannot buy
more units than the Total Leftover Units in the market. The bidding screen
looks as follows.
The actual transfer price τ* is determined by the highest transfer price at which
some bid quantity (of the total amount of units bid) is rejected.
Example:
Assume, there are two buyers and two sellers. Total Unfilled Demand in the
market is 85 and Total Leftover Units in the market are 60, i.e., the buyers are
the bidders in the secondary market. Assume further, the buyers have submit-
ted the following bids:
Then, the transfer price of 4 is the highest transfer price at which some bids
have to be rejected because the total amount of units bid at that transfer price
exceeds the Total Leftover Units in the market. Thus, the actual transfer price
τ* equals 4 in this case. What you can actually buy at τ* depends on the bids
of all buyers.
Case A.1:
If the total bid quantity from you and the other buyers at the actual
transfer price τ* is lower than (or equal to) the Total Leftover Units
in the market, you can buy your bid quantity at the current transfer
price τ*.
Amount of units you can buy = Your bid quantity at τ∗
Case A.2:
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Transfer Price Buyer 1 Bid
Quantity
Buyer 2 Bid
Quantity
Total Bid Quantity
12 0 0 0
11 10 0 10
10 10 0 10
9 10 20 30
8 10 20 30
7 30 20 50
6 30 20 50
5 30 20 50
4 50 25 75
3 50 25 75
2 50 25 75
1 55 30 85
0 55 30 85
If the total bid quantity from you and the other buyers at the result-
ing transfer price τ* exceeds the Total Leftover Units in the market,
you can buy a share of the Total Leftover Units in the market (not
more than your bid quantity) according to the proportion of your
bid quantity relative to the total bid quantity at the current transfer
price τ*.
Amount of units you can buy =(
Your bid quantity at τ∗
Total bid quantity at τ∗
)
Total Leftover Units in the market
The cost at which you buy these units equals the actual transfer price τ* in the
secondary market. The price you earn for reselling these units to your customers
(not more than the amount of your unfilled demand from the first period) is the
selling price of 12 tokens.
Case B: Bidding seller
If you are a seller (q > D) and the Total Leftover Units exceed Total Unfilled
Demand, you are to bid in the secondary market.
For each potential transfer price τ between 0 and 12, every seller submits a
quantity bid that he is willing to sell at the respective transfer price. The bids
must be in non-ascending order for transfer prices from 12 to 0, e.g., you cannot
be willing to sell more at τ=4 than at τ=5. At any transfer price you cannot
sell more than the amount of leftover units you have. The bidding screen looks
as follows.
The actual transfer price τ* is determined by the lowest transfer price at which
some bid quantity (of the total amount of units bid) is rejected.
Example:
Assume, there are two buyers and two sellers. Total Unfilled Demand in the
market is 42 and Total Leftover Units in the market are 145, i.e., the sellers are
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Transfer Price Seller 1 Bid
Quantity
Seller 2 Bid
Quantity
Total Bid Quantity
12 80 65 145
11 60 60 120
10 60 40 100
9 60 20 80
8 30 20 50
7 30 20 50
6 30 20 50
5 30 15 45
4 20 10 30
3 20 0 20
2 20 0 20
1 20 0 20
0 0 0 0
the bidders in the secondary market. Assume further, the sellers have submitted
the following bids.
Then, the transfer price of 5 is the lowest transfer price at which some bids
have to be rejected because the total amount of units bid at that transfer price
(45) exceeds the Total Unfilled Demand in the market (42). Thus, the actual
transfer price τ* equals 5 in this case.
What you can actually sell at τ* depends on the bids of all sellers.
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Case B.1:
If the total bid quantity from you and the other sellers at the actual
transfer price τ* is lower than (or equal to) Total Unfilled Demand
in the market, you can sell your bid quantity at the current transfer
price τ*.
Amount of units you can sell = Your bid quantity at τ∗
Case B.2:
If the total bid quantity from you and the other sellers at the result-
ing transfer price τ* exceeds Total Unfilled Demand in the market,
you can sell a share of Total Unfilled Demand in the market (not
more than the amount of your leftover inventory from the first pe-
riod) according to the proportion of your bid quantity relative to the
total bid quantity at the current transfer price τ*.
Amount of units you can sell =(
Your bid quantity at τ∗
Total bid quantity at τ∗
)
× Total Unfilled Demand in the market
The price at which you sell these units to the buyers equals the actual transfer
price τ* in the secondary market.
Further instructions for non-bidders in the secondary market:
If you are not to bid in a specific round of the game, you have to wait for the
bidders to make their decisions.
Case A: Non-bidding buyer
Case A.1:
If the total bid quantity at the resulting transfer price τ* exceeds
(or is equal to) Total Unfilled Demand in the market, you can buy
the amount of your unfilled demand.
Amount of units you can buy = Your unfilled demand
Case A.2:
If the total bid quantity at the resulting transfer price τ* is lower
than Total Unfilled Demand in the market, you can buy a share of
the total bid quantity at the resulting transfer price τ* (not more
than the amount of your unfilled demand) according to the propor-
tion of your amount of unfilled demand relative to Total Unfilled
Demand.
Amount of units you can buy =(
Your unfilled demand
Total unfilled demand in the market
)
× Total Bid Quantity at τ
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The cost at which you buy these units equals the actual transfer price τ* in the
secondary market. The price you earn for reselling these units to your customers
(not more than the amount of your unfilled demand from the first period) is the
selling price of 12 tokens.
Case B: Non-bidding seller
Case B.1:
If the total bid quantity at the resulting transfer price τ* exceeds
(or is equal to) the Total Leftover Units in the market, you can sell
the amount of your leftover units.
Amount of units you can sell = Your leftover units
Case B.2:
If the total bid quantity at the resulting transfer price τ* is lower
than the Total Leftover Units in the market, you can sell a share of
the total bid quantity at the resulting transfer price τ* (not more
than the amount of your leftover inventory) according to the pro-
portion of your amount of leftover inventory relative to the Total
Leftover Units in the market.
Amount of units you can sell =(
Your leftover units
Total leftover units in the market
)
× Total Bid Quantity at τ
The price at which you sell these units to the buyers equals the actual transfer
price τ* in the secondary market.
End of round results:
After trading in the secondary market is finished, a result screen will show you
all necessary information for the current round (e.g., the actual transfer price
τ* and the amount of units you were able to buy or sell).
Case A: Buyer in the secondary market
Your secondary market profit is calculated from your secondary mar-
ket cost and your post-season revenue.
Secondary market cost =
Actual Transfer Price τ*×(Units you bought in the secondary market)
Post-Season Revenue =
(Selling Price)×(Units you bought in the secondary market)
Note that the quantity component of your post-season revenue is
limited to the amount of your unfilled demand from the first period.
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Case B: Seller in the secondary market
Your secondary market profit equals your secondary market revenue.
Secondary Market Revenue =
(Actual Transfer Price τ*)×(Units you sold in the secondary market)
Your total profit for the whole round equals the sum of your selling season profit
and your secondary market profit.
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Appendix C
Choice Matrices (Chapter
3)
Table C.1: Parameter sets for the choice matrices
Number of states Low Profit High Profit
c p p−cp c p
p−c
p
3 0.3 0.4 25% 0.1 0.4 75%
5 0.186 0.266 30% 0.12 0.4 70%
7 0.286 0.364 21% 0.057 0.267 79%
Table C.2: 3 states choice matrices
(a) 3 states (LP)
Decision Demand
100 130 160
1
3
1
3
1
3
100∗ 10 10 10
130 1 13 13
160 -8 4 16
(b) 3 states (HP)
Decision Demand
300 600 900
1
3
1
3
1
3
300 6 6 6
600 4 12 12
900∗ 2 10 18
Table C.3: 5 states choice matrices
(a) Low profit
Decision Demand
100 115 130 145 160
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
100 8 8 8 8 8
115∗ 5.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2
130 2.4 6.4 10.4 10.4 10.4
145 -0.4 3.6 7.6 11.6 11.6
160 -3.2 0.8 4.8 8.8 12.8
(b) High profit
Decision Demand
300 450 600 750 900
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
300 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6
450 4.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4
600 3.2 7.2 11.2 11.2 11.2
750∗ 2.0 6.0 10.0 14.0 14.0
900 0.8 4.8 8.8 12.8 16.8
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Table C.4: 7 states choice matrices
(a) Low profit
Demand
100 110 120 130 140 150 160
1
7
1
7
1
7
1
7
1
7
1
7
1
7
100 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8
110∗ 4.9 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6
12031 2.1 5.7 9.4 9.4 9.4 9.4 9.4
130 -0.8 2.9 6.5 10.1 10.1 10.1 10.1
140 -3.6 0.0 3.6 7.3 10.9 10.9 10.9
150 -6.5 -2.9 0.8 4.4 8.1 11.7 11.7
160 -9.4 -5.7 -2.1 1.6 5.2 8.8 12.5
(b) High profit
Demand
300 400 500 600 700 800 900
1
7
1
7
1
7
1
7
1
7
1
7
1
7
300 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2
400 3.8 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6
500 3.4 5.2 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0
600 3.0 4.8 6.6 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4
70032 2.7 4.4 6.2 8.0 9.8 9.8 9.8
800∗ 2.3 4.1 5.8 7.6 9.4 11.2 11.2
900 1.9 3.7 5.5 7.2 9.0 10.8 12.6
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